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Abstract 
Many papers have attempted to identify why managers voluntarily disclose information 
about their companies.  This is commonly analysed with regression methods, but these 
often do not account for endogeneity among common explanatory variables. 
 
This study aims to resolve the endogeneity.  Data is gathered on various characteristics 
of 1,436 UK-listed companies.  The primary models of interest are made using 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).  This technique allows for correlations and 
causal relationships between explanatory variables, potentially solving the endogeneity 
problems common to regression techniques.  Regression models are made as a basis for 
comparison to both existing literature and the SEM. 
 
Analysis of SEMs indicates that Signalling Theory is the most consistently supported 
explanation of disclosure across all data types used.  In addition, several of the best 
fitting models are those for this theory.  As Signalling Theory is the best explanation of 
disclosure tested, managers are primarily providing voluntary disclosure of information 
in order to demonstrate the company’s recent financial performance (and by extension, 
the managers’ capabilities) in order to attract more investment at a lower required rate 
of return.  Results also indicate some power to Legitimacy Theory, suggesting that 
disclosure is to some extent provided in order to improve the company’s image. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Purpose 
At the simplest level, the overall research question here is one asked many times before: 
What drives corporate disclosure? 
 
Many disclosure studies name a single paper as the starting point for the line of 
research, that of Singhvi and Desai (1971).  Other researchers would later build on the 
paper with a combination of criticism and expansion to provide a broader and more 
thorough view of what drives companies to disclose information. 
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) initially investigated correlations between disclosure and 
several variables, and later in the paper create a multivariate regression model using all 
of the variables together to identify a formula for disclosure.  The major findings of the 
process were that a company’s size has a significant positive effect on its disclosure and 
that listed companies disclose far more than unlisted companies.  The other variables 
tested had much smaller or insignificant effects. 
 
In the decades since, the basic idea of Singhvi and Desai’s (1971) work has been used 
many times with varied samples.  Despite the range of changes to the research context, 
the basic findings are rarely much different.  Company size has a consistently positive 
effect on disclosure and, although it has generally changed from listed versus unlisted 
companies to singly-listed versus multiply-listed companies, listing status has a 
consistently powerful effect on disclosure.  It is possible that Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
found the major causes of disclosure immediately, that size and listing are the dominant 
causes of disclosure.  However, the question is still asked frequently, indicating a belief 
that there is more to be learned. 
 
The uniformity of results could stem from a number of sources, but many possibilities 
have been eliminated over time as researchers examined different samples.  Papers in 
the area were initially US focused, but soon turned to the UK and similar accounting 
systems without notable change.  Research in Continental European systems occurred 
and again identified size and listing as important.  Some researchers have tried multiple 
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countries either to increase their samples or as a comparison, but again with little 
change.  Country cannot be considered the cause of the results.  Similarly, those papers 
that have tested specific industrial sectors with the same results suggest that this is not 
the cause.  The long period of time over which disclosure studies have taken place 
suggests that timing is additionally not the cause of uniform results. 
 
With a range of national and industrial contexts reaching the same conclusions, there is 
one more possible commonality between papers: methods.  With few exceptions, almost 
all papers use a regression approach to the causes of disclosure.  Disclosure is measured 
in some way and used as the dependent variable, explained by a number of others that 
act as possible causes of disclosure.   
 
There are several problems with the very consistent use of regression.  First, there is 
little triangulation of results.  Very few papers use a different method, so the results are 
not independently verified in this way.  A consistent result from a different method 
would reinforce the existing findings as it is found by another means.  A different result 
may be due to some feature of the alternative method, or could indicate that regressions 
consistently make a Type I or Type II statistical error.  Any suitable alternative method 
of analysis would solve this problem. 
 
Second, the details of the regressions in many papers highlight another problem.  The 
values of the regression sum of squares, a useful measure of the model’s fit, are often 
low.  This may be due to the aforementioned non-independence; the model fits poorly 
because variable interactions are not taken into account.  However, it may also imply 
that models currently lack some possible causes of disclosure.  The low fit is barely 
discussed in the literature; researchers include the values, but few papers include any 
discussion on the fact that generally less than half of variance in disclosure is explained 
by the model.  Regression is not providing the full explanation of disclosure, although it 
is not clear whether this is a methodological problem or because some important 
variables have not yet been identified and included in models.  This problem can again 
be approached using any suitable alternative method.  A good fit from another method 
would demonstrate that low fit is from regression, while a poor fit would confirm that 
the cause lies in the variables used and that some explanation of disclosure is not 
currently included in models. 
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Third, are the common explanatory variables independent?  Explanatory variables are 
assumed to be independent in OLS regression, yet potential connections between 
common explanatory variables can be made.  For example, the ability to draw upon 
widespread funding from being publically listed means the company can potentially 
grow beyond the funding limits it would reach as a private entity.  Similarly, a company 
that has reached its limits will be more likely to list in order to grow further.  It is not 
clear whether listing should be considered a cause of size or if size leads to listing, but 
there is reason to believe these variables are not independent.  However, they are used 
together in a technique that assumes variables to be independent. 
 
Size and listing status, aside from the arguments above, were discussed in literature 
almost immediately.  Buzby (1975) suggested that there would be overlap and criticised 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) for using both without further discussion.  If they are 
connected, as expected, then regressions using both will be inaccurate due to the 
correlation.  However, the correlation may be weak enough that the results are not 
changed heavily by including both. 
 
The use of additional variables has the same problem of possible correlation and non-
independence.  This may explain why few other consistent results have emerged from 
regression.  A variable that influences both disclosure and another explanatory variable 
will not be treated properly in regression due to the independence assumption, with the 
effect of understating its importance as an explanation of disclosure.  This could either 
mean other variables have understated importance or that size and listing are even more 
powerful than is currently thought. 
 
Further, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) performed a meta-analysis of disclosure research to 
that date, using many papers together to identify the broad trends in results rather than 
studying the matter directly.  For the most part, the results are as expected from 
investigating other papers, with size and listing status found to be significant as causes 
of disclosure.  However, the paper includes a test for moderation among variables, 
finding some signs that the relationships between the causal variables are not as simple 
as the complete independence required of the regression technique favoured by most in 
the area. 
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Unlike the other two, this third problem of non-independence cannot be solved with any 
suitable alternative.  A technique that explicitly allows for explanatory variable non-
independence is necessary.  There are various options available with this limitation; the 
independence requirement in regression has led to various methods being developed 
without this restriction. 
 
The chosen method is structural equation modelling (SEM).  SEM is a very general case 
of the same techniques used in regression, including a relaxation of the requirements 
that all explanatory variables be independent.  Using this method would allow the use of 
the standard variables without the attendant problems of non-independence, and the 
underlying similarity of methods should mean that the main change made to the 
interpretation of results is in the effects of this non-independence.   
 
A few additional traits of SEM are used in the thesis and were considered in the 
decision to use this method.  These are summarised here and discussed in more detail in 
section 5.4.  The ability to use latent variables provides a more rounded view of a given 
concept.  For example, multiple measures of the concept of size are used (similar to 
Cooke, 1992) to provide a balanced measure of the scale of a company rather than being 
limited to a single measure that may artificially over- or under-rate a given company.  
The second is related to the relaxed variable independence assumption: SEM does not 
simply allow explanatory variables to be related, it can actively be used to model cases 
where this is happening and find the significance and effect size of such links.  This is 
used in modelling theories to provide supporting evidence for a given explanation of 
corporate behaviour.  More detail on the theory aspect of the thesis is provided in 
chapter 4. 
 
To summarise, there are three research questions: 
RQ1: What combination of company characteristics drives corporate disclosure? 
RQ2: Which theory or combination of theories best explains disclosure? 
RQ3: Does the use of SEM offer any benefit over regression analysis for the research 
questions above? 
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The thesis takes a purely empirical approach to the research questions, using statistical 
techniques to find generalised answers.  Regression, the common method of performing 
such research in this field, is used here as a basis for comparison to test the use of SEM.  
The intended contribution to literature from this thesis comes in comes in three parts. 
 
The first aspect is the use of SEM instead of regression.  Although related, this is a 
different methodology and should provide a different perspective on the research 
question of what drives disclosure.  Different results indicate a possible problem with 
using regressions and suggest that other methods need to be examined as possible 
means to answer this question.  Results consistent with the common regressions, on the 
other hand, help to triangulate the results by providing the same answer from another 
form of analysis.  The contribution is either a suggestion of how to better answer the 
question or a confirmation that existing results are reasonable.  The use of a different 
method is the primary contribution, examining an alternative approach that accounts for 
endogeneity of variables. 
 
The second contribution is in theories of disclosure.  By allowing causal links among 
explanatory variables, SEM enables models not possible under regression, which in turn 
allows new models of the theories of disclosure.  When using regression, theory is 
tested by examining each explanatory variable’s significance and power as an 
explanation of the dependent variable; the most appropriate theory is determined by 
which one best explains the observed significances.  However, few theories of 
disclosure are this simple and most will have implications beyond how explanatory 
variables affect disclosure.  As a simple example, a theory may state that every aspect of 
a given company, including its disclosures, is influenced by its listing status.  If a 
regression found listing status to influence disclosure then this would be considered 
support for the theory.  However, this model could not show whether listing status 
affects any other variable.  A structural model, by contrast, could allow listing status as 
a cause of all other explanatory variables and provide a more accurate means of 
determining whether the theory holds.  If listing status is found to influence disclosure 
and no other variable then the evidence does not support the theory.  While this is an 
unrealistically simple example, it highlights that SEM allows a more holistic approach 
to modelling that can provide additional supporting or rejecting evidence for a given 
theory. 
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The third aspect of contribution is related to the second as it relies on the relaxation of 
the explanatory variable independence assumption.  As discussed above and in more 
detail in section 5.3, there is reason to expect some of the explanatory variables to not 
be independent.  This is translated into including links between variables in the models 
of chapter 7.  Including these links should improve the quality of the models by better 
representing the underlying reality.  This may in turn suggest different relationships 
between disclosure and some explanatory variables; the effects of non-independence in 
regression are a distortion of the power of the variables involved, making some appear 
to be more or less important as determinants of the dependent variable than they should 
be. 
 
To summarise, the contribution this thesis makes to literature is the use of an alternative 
methodology.  The effects of this are expected to be varied and wide-ranging, although 
the primary contribution is that SEM can be used to expressly allow endogeneity among 
explanatory variables.  
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1.2: Summary 
The three questions above are answered with reference to a series of models using real-
world data.  Data is gathered on a sample of 1436 UK-listed companies, with no size or 
industry sector limitations.  The variables taken from this relate to six characteristics of 
the companies: Size, multiple listing, financial performance, debt finance levels, 
sensitivity to public opinion, and earnings volatility.  Four of these characteristics are 
not single variables, but are instead represented by several alternative measurements of 
the underlying concept.  Finally, disclosure is measured with reference to each 
company’s total analyst following, using Lang and Lundholm’s (1996b) argument and 
subsequent finding that analysts are more likely to follow companies that voluntarily 
release more information than comparable companies. 
 
In addition, five theories explaining disclosure have been selected for study.  These are 
all broader theories developed to explain some aspect of accounting or finance that have 
later been applied as explanations of disclosure: Lemons Theory (Akerlof, 1970), 
Signalling Theory (Spence, 1973), Legitimacy Theory (Shocker and Sethi, 1973), 
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and the Political Costs Hypothesis (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978 and 1990).  The five are compared against each other to 
determine relationships.  Lemons and Signalling Theories are considered identical in 
terms of disclosure due to very similar necessary and sufficient conditions, while 
Legitimacy Theory and the Political Costs Hypothesis are considered identical due to 
similar predictions.  Other than these relations, the theories are all found to be unrelated, 
allowing all to have some explanatory power over disclosure independently of others.  
Section 4.7 explains these comparisons in more detail. 
 
Two types of model are used here.  The first is the same type of regression analysis used 
frequently in quantitative research into disclosure, using one measure for each of the six 
characteristics as explanatory variables and examining the effects each has when 
disclosure is the dependent variable.  These largely support past research, finding 
company size to be particularly powerful, while multiple listing and sensitivity to public 
opinion consistently have significant effects in addition.  Financial performance and 
debt finance are each less reliable and volatility is almost never significant.  Overall, 
these regressions favour Legitimacy Theory as the consistently significant sensitivity 
variable is primarily included to test this theory. 
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The second type of model is the SEM aspect of the project.  In the regressions, theories 
of disclosure are not compared directly.  Researchers examine the implications of their 
findings to determine which model best explains the observed behaviour, based largely 
on the significance and magnitude of effect of the variables included.  In SEM, models 
are built specifically to represent each theory and the fit of each compared against each 
other to determine which theory best fits the observed results.  In these, the favoured 
theory is Signalling Theory.  In terms of significant variables, the models generally 
support the regressions, suggesting that the difference in most supported theory is the 
result of allowing variables to be correlated. 
 
In answer to the research questions, SEM has obtained a different result to the 
regressions, suggesting that correlation amongst common disclosure study variables is 
causing problems in regression.  Signalling Theory is the best supported of those tested, 
meaning managers are attempting to make their company stand out from others and 
obtain a deservedly better valuation in the market.  Among the variables suggested as 
drivers of disclosure behaviour, company size is of high importance, followed by 
multiple listing status and financial performance. 
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1.3: Layout 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the context of disclosure.  The chapter covers definitions of 
disclosure and some of the reasons put forward both for and against the practice.  
Additionally, the chapter includes a discussion of the difference between voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure, as well as the difficulties that occur in distinguishing between the 
two. 
 
Chapter 3 is the literature review for the thesis.  This mostly discusses literature on the 
determinants of disclosure, split into a few groups based on trends identified over time 
in literature.  In addition, a shorter section covers reasons given against disclosure.  
SEM literature is discussed along with the method in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 4 covers the theories of disclosure.  Five theories are emphasised here and each 
has a subsection discussing its origin and how it has been applied as an explanation of 
disclosure.  Each theory has additionally been examined in a number of disclosure 
papers, so an additional short literature review aspect is attached to each.  Once each 
theory is explained, a comparison method is used to determine the relationships between 
each.  The final part of Chapter 4 discusses other possible explanations of disclosure. 
 
Chapter 5 explains the data set and the methods of analysis.  This includes a discussion 
of where the data was sourced and how the sample was formed.  The next part covers 
each variable’s inclusion in the study and explains how each is measured.  In addition, 
Chapter 5 contains some basic analysis of the variables, although it does not go beyond 
investigating correlations and descriptive statistics.  The chapter finishes with a 
discussion of how the regression and SEM methods are applied, including a discussion 
on the use of SEM. 
 
Statistical analysis is split between two chapters.  Chapter 6 covers the basic models, 
including regression and the results of reconstructing them as SEM.  The chapter 
explains how the models were selected, discusses the obtained results, and investigates 
the results obtained from the process for possible explanations. 
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Chapter 7 covers the remaining models, all of which rely on SEM and in most cases 
model a theory directly.  Each model is explained, analysed, applied to the data, and the 
results investigated for a decision on which theory of those tested best explains the 
observed data.  This is then compared against the results of Chapter 6 to determine 
whether SEM has provided any new information. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by summarising the whole thesis and discussing the 
answers given to the various research questions laid out in section 1.1 above. 
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Chapter 2: Context of Disclosure 
As the chapter title suggests, the purpose of this chapter is to explain the context of 
disclosure.  There are a few specific matters that need addressing before analysis can 
begin.  It covers some important definitions in the area.  The next section, 2.1, explains 
the background of disclosure, including a definition of the concept of disclosure and 
some arguments given for and against the concept.  Section 2.2 discusses the difference 
between voluntary and mandatory disclosure and what it means in practice for research. 
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2.1: Background and definitions 
This section will explain the definition of disclosure in this context, covering the 
reasons for disclosure to some extent an explaining why it is considered useful.   Any 
discussion of these matters links to the related topic of why companies may voluntarily 
release information. 
 
This section asks a seemingly simple question, but one important to the research: What 
is meant by disclosure? By definition, disclosure is any release of information made by 
a company, although this is broad enough to be unhelpful.  Research into the voluntary 
release of an unusual piece of information takes a very different form to research into 
compliance with any statutory disclosure requirements, yet both are covered by the 
broad definition of disclosure above.   This thesis focuses on voluntary disclosure, so 
uses of the word “disclosure” used throughout this thesis generally refer to voluntary 
disclosure unless otherwise stated. 
 
The question of why companies choose to give more information than required is the 
focus of the thesis.  However, beyond the theories examined in chapter 4 there are other 
explanations given, generally based on the company’s directors believing there is some 
advantage to disclosure.  Healy and Palepu (2001), a good overview of disclosure 
research at the time, explain three of the most common in a wide-ranging literature 
review, providing some evidence for each as discussed below.  Many of these specific 
reasons for disclosure are consistent with one or more of the broad theories of 
disclosure discussed in Chapter 4 and cannot be considered unrelated.   
 
The first of the explanations is that disclosure improves stock liquidity.  The more 
information is made freely available about a company, the less likely an investor is to 
make an unwise trade with someone far more informed.  Essentially, the risks of 
making a suboptimal decision are reduced, making investors more willing to trade in the 
company’s shares.  Brown et al (2004) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) make explicit 
use of this idea, both papers finding the expected negative link between a measure of 
information asymmetry and disclosure.  As an example of the consistency with theory 
described above, the reduction of asymmetry makes the company a better investment 
decision to many potential investors, which is clearly in keeping with Signalling Theory 
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(described in section 4.3) and may be argued to work with other theories discussed in 
chapter 4. 
 
The second reason for disclosure is more common in the literature: disclosure reduces 
the cost of capital.  One potential mechanism for this idea involves an information risk 
premium (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994).  Under this idea, the market will request a higher 
return from those companies for which little information is available.  This is done to 
compensate for the risk of some unknown factor harming the firm and, by extension, 
any investment in it.  Essentially, the market assumes there is risk where there is 
insufficient information to be confident there is not.  Linked to the above explanation, 
Brown et al (2004) argue that investors may demand a higher return in low-disclosure 
firms in order to compensate for the risk of making a poor trade, further increasing the 
cost of capital. 
 
For a time, this explanation was widely accepted.  A number of papers use it without 
question (e.g. Gelb and Strawser 2001, Healy et al 1999).  More recently some papers 
have argued against the point and found evidence that calls it into question (e.g. Beyer 
et al 2010, Cheng et al 2006).  The likely causes of this uncertainty can be seen in the 
earlier papers testing the idea.  Botosan (1997) models the effect using empirical data 
and finds that the cost of capital does fall when companies increase disclosure but the 
effect is far more noticeable when the analyst following was low, suggesting that 
analysts have a role in revealing information about the risks of investing in a company.  
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) found that some disclosures reduce the cost of capital 
while others have no effect.  Either of these effects could cause mixed results in 
practice.  Regardless of the cause, the change in general opinion over time is apparent in 
two ICAEW statements.  In 1999 the organisation (ICAEW, 1999) encouraged 
companies to disclose risk information using a potential lower cost of capital as an 
incentive, but later (ICAEW, 2011) stated there is no evidence that disclosure has an 
effect on the cost of capital. 
 
The third and final reason Healy and Palepu (2001) give for voluntary disclosure is that 
it increases analyst following.  This idea is not discussed in detail here as the argument 
is used in section 5.2.7 to explain the use of analyst following as a proxy for disclosure.  
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To summarise, analysts serve as information intermediaries and this is useful to 
companies for various reasons. 
 
In addition to these potential reasons for disclosure, there are several possible reasons to 
not disclose.  Lundholm and van Winkle (2006) offer a few simple possibilities based 
on a lack of knowledge.  If managers do not know some piece of information, it cannot 
be disclosed.  Similarly, if managers do not know the importance of something, it is 
unlikely to be considered for disclosure.  A third possibility given is that the managers 
do not care enough to disclose, although this raises questions about their competence 
and dedication to their role. 
 
A more common argument against disclosure, particularly mandatory disclosure, is 
based on proprietary information and competitive disadvantages (e.g. Dye, 1986).  The 
basic argument is that a company may be forced to release some information that its 
competitors can use against it.  The damage that can be caused is limited if the 
competition must also reveal the same information as the company and its competitors 
are in the same situation.  For example, if strategic information is part of the mandatory 
disclosure package then two competing companies, Company A and Company B, must 
each release information about their strategy and each can use the other’s disclosure 
against them.  For similar companies, this is fair as each has comparable capability to 
act on the information and affect their competitor.  For less similar companies, one may 
have more potential to harm the competitor than the other; if Company A is much larger 
and works in multiple lines of business, then it is likely able to take a loss in one area in 
order to undercut or otherwise outperform Company B.  The problem becomes more 
pronounced when the competition is subject to different rules, for example being 
located in a country that does not require the same information to be disclosed.  In this 
case, Company A receives detailed information on Company B’s plans, but Company B 
does not receive comparable information on Company A. 
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2.2: Voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
While the thesis refers only to “disclosure” in most cases, an important divide between 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure exists and is discussed here.   As the names 
suggest, mandatory disclosures are required by the regulators or other authorities to 
whom a given company is subject, while voluntary disclosure is any information 
released beyond that required of the company.  While this seems like a simple definition 
of the two, in practice they can be difficult to disentangle. 
 
The line between voluntary and mandatory becomes less clear when a company is 
subject to multiple authorities, usually as a result of listing in multiple locations.  Two 
different countries may have different listing requirements, including different rules on 
what information must be released in order to retain listed status.  For example, a 
company is listed in one country that requires risk management information be 
disclosed as part of the annual report and another that requires information on the board 
of directors in the annual report.  While each country requires only one of these pieces 
of information, the company’s managers are likely to release one report that covers both 
sets of requirements and to release this in both countries.  While tailoring reports to 
each country’s rules would be possible, report users in each would be able to use the 
additional information released in the other to inform their investment decisions.  While 
no information has been made available that the company was not required to release 
overall, to investors in each of the listing locations there is something available that was 
not required of the company.  The release of risk information is effectively a voluntary 
disclosure in the country requiring only director details, and the director information is 
voluntary in the risk management country, but to the company’s managers both were 
mandatory disclosures.   
 
The distinction blurs further when additional effects are considered.  Best practice 
guides and the disclosure policy of competitors can each create a form of non-statutory 
mandatory disclosure.  Once investors have come to expect a certain level of disclosure 
or specific items of information to be available, failure to meet the expectations will 
lead to a negative opinion.  Holland (1998) describes this as companies competing for 
credibility; one that discloses less than comparable firms is seen as less credible than its 
competition.  The result is that a supposedly-voluntary disclosure can become 
effectively mandatory. 
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In addition, there are questions of how mandatory and voluntary disclosures interact 
(Patelli and Prencipe, 2007).  The question is whether the two types are complements or 
substitutes.  The substitution argument holds that a given company’s managers will 
reveal a fixed quantity of information in total.  If regulation forces some information to 
be released, this reduces the voluntary disclosure level.  As a simple example, a 
company chooses to release two pieces of information, its strategy and the composition 
of the board of directors.  If regulation is introduced requiring that the company disclose 
risk information, the managers will still release only two pieces of information.  The 
disclosure total will then become the mandatory risk details plus only one of the board 
or strategic details.  Alternatively, the complement argument holds that the company 
discloses whatever information its managers consider appropriate rather than working 
towards a total level of information.  In the same example, the addition of a requirement 
to disclose risk information makes no difference to the voluntary disclosure and the 
company continues to show the board composition and its strategy in addition to the 
mandatory risk information. 
 
If the substitution argument describes actual practice, mandatory disclosure may have 
clear adverse effects on the overall information released.  The company managers have 
chosen to reveal what information they consider most appropriate, but stop providing 
some of this information if forced to reveal something else.  There is only a net gain if 
the information mandated is more useful than whatever the company stops revealing.  
This may not be the case for all companies; some may end up giving more useful 
information overall, while for others the previous disclosure package was optimal for 
investors and replacing one piece of information with another reduces the overall 
usefulness of the information released. 
 
If the complement argument instead holds, there is much less of a problem.  Any 
mandatory information is revealed in addition to whatever the company managers have 
previously decided is appropriate.  It is possible, though rare, that the new information 
is confusing to investors in some way.  There is also potential for the mandatory 
information to be of little use, such as risk information in a particularly low-risk 
enterprise, but not harmful to investor understanding, in which case the mandatory 
disclosures are neither useful nor harmful to investors. 
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The discussion above assumes that managers are revealing information with good 
intentions, aiming to spread information the market will find relevant, and has correctly 
identified what information will be useful to this end.  Should either of these conditions 
not hold, the mandatory disclosure may be more useful to investors by releasing 
information of value to them that managers have not been making available. 
 
The testing performed in later chapters (6 and 7) refers to voluntary disclosure.  In 
practice mandatory disclosure cannot be distinguished from voluntary due to the use of 
a proxy measure of disclosure in this study, analyst following (explained in section 
5.2.7).  Mandatory disclosure is required from all companies, making it a baseline level 
of disclosure, and the proxy should respond only to information released voluntarily 
beyond that required by disclosure regulations.  However, the two are impossible to 
fully separate.  Levels of compliance with otherwise mandatory standards vary among 
companies as some managers will comply with the letter of the rules and disclose 
exactly what is stated as required while others comply with the spirit and may discuss 
matters not directly stated but clearly related.  Compliance with mandatory disclosure is 
a complex issue that cannot be given sufficient treatment here.  The assumption 
throughout the thesis is that mandatory disclosures are enforced and serve as a 
comparable baseline for all companies, making it comparable to the constant in a 
regression equation, but this may not be the case in practice.  Further, there may be 
additional influences on disclosure that come from sources other than managers; Ahmed 
and Courtis (1999) do not observe a significant direct effect on disclosure practices 
from a company’s auditor, but find this to have a moderating effect that results in better 
mandatory disclosure from those engaging a larger and more prestigious auditor. 
 
The inability to fully distinguish between voluntary and mandatory disclosure is not 
unique to proxy measures (either this specific one or in general).  The alternative 
approaches, discussed in section 5.2.7, will encounter many of the same challenges.  In 
part, this is due to the above discussions.  Differing compliance levels mean some 
mandatory disclosure is effectively voluntarily, while intra-industry effects and the 
publication of guidance documents mean some voluntary disclosure is effectively 
mandatory.  Any measurement of disclosure will encounter challenges with the 
voluntary/mandatory divide due to these effects.  A disclosure index approach can either 
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not score a mandatory item, missing any variation in how this is reported, or attempt a 
highly subjective approach of only scoring sufficiently detailed reports.  The other 
common approach, using a pre-existing scoring system, may or may not take these 
matters into account depending on whether the original designer considered them. 
 
There is some literature that suggests finding ways to measure the quality of disclosure 
rather than the (often implicit) quantity approaches commonly used.  Beattie et al (2004) 
discuss several possibilities, ranging from content analysis approaches to using the 
common disclosure indices with a weighting system that rewards particularly clear and 
obvious information.  As an alternative, Linsley and Lawrence (2007) discuss the use of 
a readability index for annual reports, a measure of how clear the report is that should 
provide a quality measurement by penalising examples where information is unclear.  
Disclosure quality measurement is a field of study in itself and cannot be treated with 
the detail it needs in this thesis. 
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2.3: Conclusion 
Disclosure, for the purposes of the thesis, is defined as voluntary releases of information 
above and beyond that required by regulation.   
 
The information in this chapter is a combination of discussion of voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure and some arguments for why a company’s reports may contain 
further information.  Research in the area has examined not only whether more 
information than required tends to be disclosed, but also attempted to determine which 
companies are most likely to do so and test the proposed explanations for why this 
practice occurs.  These matters are discussed in the next chapter. 
  
20 
 
Chapter 3: Literature 
The chapter focuses only on literature on the driving forces behind corporate disclosure.  
While other lines of research are used in the thesis, such as papers defining and using 
the theories discussed in chapter 4 and a discussion on the use of SEM in chapter 5, 
these are placed in the relevant chapters.  Research into disclosure has been split into 
three broad groups based on the purposes and themes of the research. 
 
The first group consists of the early papers in the area.  The generally accepted start of 
research into the determinants of disclosure occurs in the early 1970s, and over the next 
decade further researchers attempted to expand on the initial work in various ways.  
These efforts collectively make up the exploration group and are characterised by their 
exploratory nature.  Researchers are generally trying new things at this point, but 
quickly create what would become standard practices for later researchers.  This is 
termed the exploration group as a reflection of its early nature and is discussed in 
section 3.1. 
 
The early 1980s saw research in the area reduce in frequency.  By contrast, the end of 
the decade marked the beginning of a resurgence which continued through the 1990s.  
There does not appear to be any single event that explains the reappearance of such 
research, but the nature of the research offers a possible explanation: the timing 
coincides with the spread of accessible computing power while the research tends 
towards large samples and statistical techniques.  Regardless of the explanation, the 
papers in this group usually take the methods established by the first set and apply them 
to new, large data sets.  This is termed the core group as it generates much of what 
becomes common knowledge of disclosure and is discussed in section 3.2. 
 
As the 2000s began, the path of research forked, leading to two concurrent groups of 
papers.  One of the new paths is a straightforward extension of the second group.  
Papers to that point had largely focused on general disclosure in a few countries, 
particularly the USA.  The extension of the group took the now firmly established 
methods and variables, but adds something unusual each time.  A given paper may 
focus on a country not previously tested or perform an international comparison, 
examine a very specific form of disclosure, or restrict the companies examined in some 
way to investigate specific subsets of the market.  These papers, which are considered a 
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separate subgroup, are characterised by a combination of a late 1990s or later date and a 
focus unlike that of earlier papers.  A rare few try different methodologies, but the 
majority apply established techniques to different samples.  This is named the expansion 
group as it takes the core group ideas to new areas.  The group is discussed in section 
3.3, which is further split into papers looking at different countries and papers using 
specific forms of disclosure instead of a general measure of all information a company 
releases.  The other path taken by many is a response to new regulation and guidance 
encouraging new forms of reporting, primarily relating to risk information.   
 
As the man body of the second group reached publication in the early 2000s, a number 
of changes to the disclosure environment occurred.  In the USA, Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (often shortened to Regulation FD or just FD) was enacted 2000, while the 
Enron scandal led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.  Each had some effect on 
disclosure, FD by making private disclosure to privileged parties largely impossible and 
SOX by making it easier to sue directors for information they have not revealed, leading 
to a reasonable expectation of changes in disclosure practices.  Elsewhere in the world, 
the EU officially adopted IFRS as union-wide financial reporting standards in 2005 
after several years of laying foundations for this move.  In the UK, the Accounting 
Standards Board at the time was encouraging narrative reporting with an emphasis in 
risk management (e.g. ASB, 2007a).  All of these and similar events led to disclosure 
papers that examine the effects such changes had on the disclosure environment.  Many 
compared disclosure before and after the relevant change occurred (e.g. pre- and post-
Regulation FD) to directly examine changes.  This group is named as the response to 
changes as the papers always examine disclosure practices following some change to 
the overall environment and discussed in section 3.4.  It is not discussed in detail, 
however, as the papers tend to focus more on the changes than the disclosure itself and 
are of less relevance to this thesis.  Papers are generally included if they have some idea 
that has been used elsewhere in the thesis, such as explaining the use of a particular 
variable. 
 
  
22 
 
3.1: Group 1: Exploration of the concept 
A small number of papers are frequently cited by later works as starting points for the 
research.  These three early papers are summarised in table 3.1 below 
 
Table 3.1: Exploration Papers 
Paper Sample Dependent 
Variables 
Significant 
Variables 
Theories 
mentioned 
Singhvi and 
Desai 1971 
155 listed and 
unlisted US 
firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Size +  
Shareholders + 
Listing + 
Profit + (2 
measures, EM 
and P/S) 
Big X Auditor 
+ 
Reduction of 
information 
asymmetry 
Buzby 1975 88 US firms, 
equally listed 
and not 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + None, critique 
of previous 
paper 
Firth 1979 180 UK firms, 
mix of listed 
and unlisted 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Listing + 
 
Speculates 
about costs and 
benefits 
 
As mentioned earlier, the literature frequently credits Singhvi and Desai’s 1971 analysis 
as the beginning, although it should be noted that this paper explains that it is built on 
an earlier work.  However, accuracy of the claim notwithstanding, Singhvi and Desai’s 
paper is the agreed starting point for the entire line of research.  It is a clear and 
relatively straightforward piece of research that justifies its ideas well enough that the 
majority of later works in the field build on the paper.  For these reasons, it is a good 
starting point for researching the area of study. 
 
The paper compares six company characteristics against the company’s disclosure for a 
total of seven variables, almost all of which would be used repeatedly in later research.  
The disclosure is measured with reference to an index that the authors have created and 
searching for items in the annual reports, making it a quantity of information measure.  
The explanatory variables are more mixed.   
 
Company size is measured as total assets as recorded in the annual report.  It is justified 
with multiple reasons.  First, a larger company is more likely to gather such information 
in order to make overviews of operations for senior managers who cannot realistically 
23 
 
oversee the entire business.  Second, larger companies are more likely to raise funding 
in securities markets, so benefit more from an informed market.  Third, the sensitive 
information argument sometimes used against disclosure (see 2.1 above) is here said to 
be worse for smaller firms, making them less willing to reveal information.  Size is used 
in nearly all later papers using similar research methods, although the exact 
measurement varies. 
 
The second explanatory variable is the number of shareholders.  Having more 
shareholders is argued to mean more visibility and the resulting pressure, plus the 
potential for new disclosure regulations if the company is not seen as giving enough 
information.  Shareholders are stated to be more likely to be concerned with social 
responsibility than managers, meaning that they want to see such information disclosed.  
Further, the paper suggests the simple matter of marketability of shares.  This variable is 
one of the few that has not been commonly adopted by later researchers. 
 
The third variable tested in the paper is listing status.  The reason given is that listing 
rules require some information to be released, so higher disclosure is expected among 
these companies for that reason.  While a reasonable item to study, this variable 
represents a possible self-selection problem in the sample.  The unlisted firms in the 
sample were initially chosen randomly, but the lack of publicly available information 
meant that the companies in question had to agree to provide information, leading to a 
possible response bias.  For this and similar reasons, later papers have generally not 
used listing in this sense.  Where it is used, the variable tends to be multiple listing in 
some form. 
 
The fourth variable is named as CPA firm.  This essentially asks which financial 
services company is providing aid with the financial reporting process.  The justification 
given is that a larger, more prestigious accountant is more likely to exert influence to 
reveal more information.  The larger firms have their own reputations to uphold and 
making detailed accounts of their clients is a possible means to demonstrate their own 
competence.  Later research frequently uses a slight variation on this idea, examining 
the auditor rather than the accounting firm, but otherwise using the same reasoning.  
The only other difference is one of changes to the financial services sector over time.  
Singhvi and Desai (1971) measure the CPA firm as a binary large or small 
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classification, where large means the CPA firm is one of the Big 8.  Variables like this 
have changed a little over time as the Big 8 financial services providers have merged 
with each other, so later papers using the same concept will refer to the Big 6, Big 5, or 
Big 4 depending on the timing. 
 
The fifth variable is the rate of return, measured as a ratio of profit to worth.  A high 
ratio will be seen as a sign of good management and encourage managers to disclose 
more information.  Similar ideas have been used in later papers, although the means of 
measuring the return vary greatly and tend to be named as financial performance 
measures. 
 
The final variable used is the earnings margin, the ratio of profits to sales.  The paper 
argues that the rate of return shows overall performance while this covers the ability to 
deal with rising costs and therefore stability.  A low ratio makes it easy for the 
competition to squeeze the firm out with pricing wars, while a high one allows the firm 
to reveal more about its operations since it will still be hard to pressure them out of the 
line of business and this reassures the shareholders of stability.  While this variable is 
used in later papers, it usually appears as a financial performance measurement. 
 
These variables are analysed in two different ways.  The first method is the simpler of 
the two.  Each variable is split into a few size categories and compared against similar 
categories for disclosure, giving a general relationship in each case that matches the 
expectations mentioned in the explanations of each variable. 
 
The second method is a regression analysis, using the six variables to attempt to explain 
the disclosure behaviour more directly, the method adopted by later papers analysing 
the situation.   These results suggest (at first glance; see Buzby (1975), below) that the 
size and listing status of the company are the most important of all explanations. 
 
Two problems stand out on closer analysis.  First, the regression coefficient R
2
 is 
somewhat low at 0.43.  While this indicates some explanatory power, the model is 
explaining a little under half of the total variation in disclosure observed in practice.  
However, later research has tended to obtain similarly low values.  This is discussed in 
more detail under 3.6 below. 
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The other problem comes from further analysis Singhvi and Desai performed.  When 
looking at the power of individual variables, the R
2
 contribution of listing status was 
identified as 0.38 (out of a total of 0.43), making it firmly dominant.  Buzby (1975) 
argues that this strong effect indicates problems in the analysis.  While listing status 
should be expected to have an effect, Buzby holds that the link between disclosure and 
size should be far more powerful than is demonstrated.  To back up this argument, 
Buzby tests the correlations of firm size and disclosure levels.  For listed firms, the 
correlation is 0.515, while unlisted firms have a lower 0.370.   These numbers are high 
enough to suggest that a stronger relationship would be expected, leading Buzby to 
speculate as to why Singhvi and Desai (1971) did not find one.  The main suggestion 
given is that size and listing are themselves linked, leading to a situation where the 
effects one has on disclosure are difficult to identify separately from those of the other.  
If true, this could explain the difference between Buzby’s (1975) expectations and the 
original paper’s results.  The assumption of independence among explanatory variables 
may not be true in this case.  However, while the arguments are good, Buzby does not 
test the ideas at all, leaving the research as a series of logical but untested reasons why 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) may not have obtained meaningful results. 
 
Firth (1979) uses the questions of independence in a UK-based study based on Singhvi 
and Desai’s (1971) work.  Firth argues that the majority of the variables tested are likely 
to be related to size and cuts three to leave size, listing, and auditor, noting that listing 
status is likely to be related to size.  The use of auditor rather than more general 
financial service provider is argued using prestige.  The auditors themselves have 
powerful reputations that keep them in the Big 8 group (as it was at the time), so will 
likely pressure clients to release more information in order to keep that reputation.  The 
client, meanwhile, wants the prestige of passing the strict standards of one of the Big 8’s 
strict rules, so will tend to follow any auditor advice given on disclosure.   
 
Firth’s analysis is quite different to the paper he is building on, not performing any 
regression.  Instead, Firth performs a correlation test of size and disclosure, similar to 
Buzby (1975).  The other two variables are different in nature as listing status and Big 8 
auditor usage are binary variables.  To examine the effects of these on performance, 
means differences tests are used.  The sample consists of 40 listed firms and 40 unlisted 
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firms that are each as similar to one of the listed ones as possible.  A significant 
difference in disclosure is found when testing listed versus unlisted; as expected, listed 
firms disclose more.  The Big 8/other auditor grouping, by contrast, displays no 
significant difference.  Firth does not speculate as to why this is the case. 
 
At this point, the research into disclosure has been limited in scope and a conclusion is 
difficult to draw, largely due to the small number of papers involved.  Two possible 
methods have been explored: Buzby (1975) and Firth (1979) investigate correlations 
among variables to determine how disclosure reacts to changes in other variables, while 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) explore a multivariate regression model of disclosure.  In 
terms of findings, listing status and the size of the company are identifiable as the main 
determinants of disclosure.  Later papers build on both the method and the variables 
examined, as discussed below. 
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3.2: Group 2: The Core Research 
As the line of research picks up into the 1990s, certain standard practices emerge.  Most 
papers take a sample within a single country.  While exceptions exist, the focus at this 
point is largely on finding out what is happening in a single location, and in some cases 
within a single industry.  A common set of variables can be drawn up, largely based on 
Singhvi and Desai’s (1971) set of variables.  Size is in almost all papers, included as a 
control variable even where it is not of interest to the researcher, and is almost always 
positive with disclosure.  One of the few exceptions comes from Malone et al (1993).  
This research is typical of the area aside from a focus purely on oil and gas companies, a 
subset for which size does not link to disclosure practices.  The three significant 
variables here are stock exchange listing, number of shareholders, and the use of debt 
finance. 
 
Some form of listing variable is common, although the difficulties of getting 
information about unlisted firms means that over time multiple listing becomes more 
common than anything involving unlisted firms.  Whichever is used, a generally 
positive relationship is found.  Some measure of the firm’s profitability is commonly 
included, although it is insignificant about as often as significant, and even among 
significant results it is positive as often as negative.  CPA firm is largely replaced with 
an auditor size measure following Firth (1979), with a generally positive result.  Various 
stakeholder measures, including Singhvi and Desai’s (1971) number of shareholders 
among others, are common but somewhat inconsistent in their effects on disclosure. 
 
In addition to these, a few other common variables have emerged.  The use of debt 
finance in the firm has become a common variable, first appearing among identified 
papers with Malone et al’s (1993) study and appearing commonly from that point, 
although its results are inconsistent between papers (note that, as explained in Chapter 
5, the predictions with this variable suggest either positive or negative effects depending 
on the arguments used).  Corporate governance measurements have become more 
common over time, again first appearing in Malone et al (1993) among the identified 
papers, but unlike debt finance there is a delay before it appears in another identified 
paper (Bushman et al, 2004).  It is found to be generally positive with disclosure, 
suggesting that information release is seen as responsible management.   
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Industry membership has become a common control variable as researchers have 
identified that different industries have different practices, first seen in the identified 
papers with Clarkson et al (1994).  Similar variables are common for the next decade, 
but become less frequent after Field et al (2005).  As a categorical variable it is difficult 
to summarise its effects on disclosure beyond observing that industries the researcher 
expects to disclose more generally do so.   
 
The final common variable relates to the volatility of the company’s earnings, although 
this has inconsistent effects overall.  Among identified papers this is first seen in 
Clarkson et al (1994), but is not used again for a number of years (Gelb and Strawser, 
2001), after which it appears with some frequency. 
 
Although research on the matter is less common, it is thought that companies could 
increase disclosure in advance of any market activity they perform such as share issues 
in order to make their stock more attractive.  This is tested with indicator variables of 
market activity within the next year or two and is generally supported, but Frankel et al 
(1995) offers a strong counterargument.  Rather than altering disclosure levels for 
immediate gains, Frankel argues that changing the disclosure practice is a rare and 
possibly unpopular event.  Instead, a time series analysis suggests that disclosure comes 
from a disclosure policy rather than the usual variables, although the policy will be set 
in accordance with company characteristics.  This ultimately changes very little 
compared to past research as the same variables seen in other papers have the same 
overall effects on disclosure.  The only difference is that these variables are used to set 
the disclosure policy and this is a slow process, rather than the usual assumption that 
disclosure can vary year-on-year in response to changes to the variables. 
 
Other, less common variables appear on rare occasions and tend to be core aspects of 
the research in question.  Zarzeski (1996) offers a good example of this.  While the 
paper ultimately becomes an example of a disclosure regression, its stated purpose is 
investigating the harmonisation of accounting practices.  This means most of the 
“normal” variables are included for control purposes only and the variables of interest 
are four cultural factors identified by Hofstede (1984) and later translated into likely 
effects on accounting systems (Gray 1988). 
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A summary of papers in this group is presented in table 3.2 below 
Table 3.2: Core Research 
Paper Sample Dependent 
Variables 
Significant 
Variables 
Theories 
mentioned 
Cooke 1989a 90 Sweden-
listed firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Mult.  Listing + 
Foreign 
operations + 
Focus on 
importance of 
listing status 
Patten 1992 21 US-listed 
oil firms 
Content 
analysis  
Size + 
Involvement in 
crisis + 
Explicitly 
names 
Legitimacy 
Theory 
Malone, Fries 
and Jones 1993 
125 oil and gas 
firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Stakeholders + 
Listing + 
Debt finance + 
Looking for 
differences in 
disclosure 
levels 
Clarkson, Kao, 
Richardson 
1994 
905 Canadian 
firm-years 
Existence of a 
voluntary 
forecast 
Size + 
Market action + 
Volatility + 
Industry effects 
Importance of 
financial market 
considerations 
Frankel, 
McNichols, 
Wilson 1995 
1880 US-listed 
firms 
Probability 
and/or 
existence of a 
voluntary 
forecast 
Debt finance + 
Market action + 
Importance of 
finance needs to 
disclosure 
decisions 
Ahmed and 
Courtis 1999 
29 papers Meta-analysis; 
other papers’ 
dependents 
Size + 
Listing + 
Debt + 
Big X auditor + 
Meta-analysis 
Botosan and 
Harris 2000 
107 US firms 
with multiple 
segments 
Existence of 
quarterly 
reports  
Industry effects Asymmetry; 
reasons for 
quarterly 
reports 
Gelb and 
Strawser 2001 
233 US listed 
firm-years 
AIMR rankings CSR rating + 
Performance + 
Indirectly 
supports 
Legitimacy 
 
Cooke (1989a) is one of the early papers in this second group of papers.  The research 
contains an unusual listing variable, which is the focus of the research.  In this case, 
there are three listing categories: unlisted, listed, and multiple listed, which is included 
because it is expected to increase disclosure.  The sample is drawn from the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange which, at the time, had an unusually large number of multinational 
companies listed.  This non-US focus is, as table 3.2 suggests, very unusual for the time. 
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While other variables are mentioned, the final models here have only two: listing and 
size.  The results agree more with Singhvi and Desai (1971) than Buzby (1975), finding 
that listing status is very powerful as a determinant of disclosure.  In addition, this is a 
more powerful test, having R
2 
0.60, far above the 0.43 of Singhvi and Desai (1971) and, 
notably, meaning that the model here explains over half of the disclosure variation in 
the sample. 
 
Clarkson et al (1994) offer a number of notable points.   Their paper is limited to 
examining the specific disclosure of a forecast for future results.  In a sample from the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, the firms found to make forecasts most often tend to be larger 
and found in certain industries more than others.  This latter point is not given much 
attention in the paper, but it is worth noting that the industries least likely to forecast 
tend towards extraction (e.g. mining, oil and gas), while those most likely to forecast are 
service industries (management, financial services).  Generally speaking, it appears that 
the forecasters are more intangible in nature, although the paper does explain that the 
resource extraction industries tend to have fluctuating prices for their outputs that make 
accurate forecasts very difficult. 
 
The research further examines the tone of forecasts, dividing them into positive, neutral, 
and negative (indicating, respectively, increased income, similar to previous results, and 
lower income).   Just over two-thirds of all forecast disclosures are positive in nature, 
with the other two splitting the remaining numbers roughly equally.  Interestingly, when 
the tone of past forecasts is compared to the actual results, there seems to be an upwards 
bias.  Approximately a third of positive forecasts are incorrect, while the majority of 
neutral forecasts are later proven to be negative results. 
 
Negative forecasting may appear harmful to the company as it will lead to lowered 
expectations in the market and requires managers to admit to failure.  However, there is 
a point early on in the paper that, with any information release, companies are 
attempting to balance the need for finance with the need to discourage potential 
competitors.  This results in the company disclosing good news for the investors and 
bad news to suggest to other firms that they should not enter this competitive space, 
attempting to find the perfect balance of these two aspects.  Gigler’s (1994) model of 
disclosure includes the same concept and ultimately concludes that disclosure must be a 
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fine balance between pleasing investors with promising future outcomes and deterring 
potential competitors with low expectations.  Clarkson et al’s (1994) results are an 
analysis-derived confirmation of the model.   
 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) offer a useful summary of disclosure research of this form to 
the time of publication.  The primary methodology in use here is a meta-analysis, 
effectively attempting to merge existing results together in a new, more wide-ranging 
regression-like summary that will highlight the most significant and powerful of the 
commonly-used variables.  The results of this research are effectively an average of past 
papers, weighted by their sample sizes.  The size and listing status are by far the most 
important variables across the research to that point.  Size is found to be quite powerful 
but with a large variance and surprisingly low explanatory power, suggesting that other 
variables may be necessary for a full explanation of disclosure.  Listing is less powerful, 
but explains more variance in disclosure, in keeping with Singhvi and Desai’s (1971) 
results.  The third commonly-tested variable that this analysis finds to be significant is 
the debt finance ratio, which is somewhat unexpected as past research has found this to 
have inconsistent effects.    
 
As with any methodology, meta-analysis has its own flaws.  In using studies from 
various time periods and international contexts together, there are obvious questions 
about whether the component research papers can be considered directly comparable.  
Further, any research method based on large samples will result in potentially 
interesting and meaningful details about individual cases being glossed over; this is the 
disadvantage of large sample techniques.  With meta-analysis, this becomes even more 
pronounced as the details of entire studies are passed over.  However, the core 
advantage of large sample methods is that the results can be generalised across a wide 
range of cases, and meta-analysis similarly amplifies this aspect by effectively using a 
range of samples. 
 
In addition, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) discuss variable interaction.   The paper 
mentions that some of the common variables in disclosure research may be related to 
each other.  The main aspect mentioned is moderation, in which the relationship 
between two variables is influenced by a third.   The typical example of moderation is a 
case where X causes Y, but the strength of the effect depends on the value of some 
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additional variable M.  The argument here is that, for example, the company’s auditor is 
not significant overall because its effects depend further on where in the world the 
company is located and the local accounting system.  The usual effect of uncontrolled 
moderation is to reduce the significance of the affected variables.  Three possible 
moderation effects are suggested in the paper and tested, finding some validity to the 
ideas, albeit with a somewhat low effect in most cases.   
 
It should be noted that the paper does not discuss the related problem of mediation.  
This is similar to moderation in that the relationship of two variables is influenced by a 
third, but in a very specific way.  Using the same example variables above, a mediation 
relationship is characterised by X having a causal effect on both Y and the additional 
variable M, plus M having a causal effect on Y.  In effect, the explanatory variable X 
may affect Y both directly and indirectly through its effects on M.  The usual effect of 
mediation is to overstate the importance of X, as its effects on Y are a total of both its 
direct effects and the indirect effects through M.  This represents a problem for existing 
research; regression methods do not allow for such interactions, and if they are 
genuinely occurring then the common research techniques are not entirely appropriate. 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) offer a second overview, in this case taking the form of a 
wide-ranging literature review; many aspects of disclosure are covered, but few in great 
detail.  As discussed in chapter 2, the topics covered include the common determinants, 
managerial incentives, and the actual effects of disclosure on, for example, the 
company’s cost of capital.  Some of the major theories of disclosure are mentioned 
throughout.  This is given more discussion later when covering disclosure theories. 
 
Core (2001) offers a critique of the previous paper, however.  The main point is that 
Healy and Palepu (2001) were not critical enough of the research being examined.   In 
all of this, Core (2001) makes an excellent point: Disclosure policy is an assurance of 
disclosure quality.  A firm that commits to disclosing as much information as possible 
will by definition produce detailed, high-quality information in its disclosures.  By 
contrast, one that has a policy of allowing managers to screen the disclosures will tend 
to see less information come out if they have any incentive to hide bad news, making 
the company’s disclosures less meaningful. 
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Core’s (2001) stated purpose is to complement Healy and Palepu’s (2001) work.  The 
aim is to provide more detail to add to their discussions of voluntary disclosure, adding 
the depth lacking from the original.  The main point of contention is that Healy and 
Palepu (2001) focus on an argument that states disclosure can only be a good thing as it 
provides more information, while Core (2001) is more willing to look at the negatives 
involved – usually direct costs of gathering information or providing incentives.  This 
argument is logically extended to the implication that stable firms are likely to disclose 
less than growing companies simply because disclosure as a form of information release 
is useful for attracting new investors, but the costs involved mean that it will be less 
appealing where the company is stable and has less need for such. 
 
Botosan and Harris (2000) take a different approach to measuring disclosure.  In this 
case, rather than any indication of the overall quantity of disclosure given out, the 
researchers have looked at the frequency of disclosure.  The research question here is 
about which companies will tend to disclose quarterly instead of the lower frequency 
normally mandated by regulators.  The set of explanatory variables is similarly unusual.  
While conclusions can be drawn, primarily finding that firms identifying information 
asymmetry are most likely to use this practice, this is not easily fitted into the wider 
picture being drawn from more standard approaches.  In addition, there is a noted 
follow-the-leader effect in that industries with a history of quarterly reports seem to 
encourage those making less frequent disclosures to increase frequency, which suggests 
that disclosure levels are in part determined by factors external to the disclosing firm. 
 
In closing, this group of papers represents a maturation of the ideas from the first papers 
discussed in section 3.1.  The ideas have spread and been used in a large number of 
papers.  The volume of research allows generalised conclusions to be drawn, leading to 
at least one meta-analysis of other papers.  However, little changes compared to the 
initial findings.  Company size remains a major determinant of disclosure activity.  
Listing status begins to change form, moving away from listed versus unlisted 
companies and becoming listed versus multiple-listed companies, but largely retains its 
significant effect on disclosure.  New variables are often included, e.g. debt finance 
levels, but in general do not demonstrate a consistent significant effect. 
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By the end of this group, the general case of disclosure in primarily Anglo-American 
accounting systems was well-studied.  Later changes in the overall disclosure 
environment caused by new regulations or a shift in information demands may lead to 
new conclusions in later years, but the determinants of disclosure in the early 2000s 
were well-established.  The next development was to stop looking at the general case 
and turn to specific, non-Anglo-American samples to investigate disclosure in other 
circumstances. 
 
3.3: Group 2 extension 
Late in the second group of papers, researchers begin to take their work in new 
directions.  Most of these move away from the standard in some way, usually either 
looking into specific types of disclosure such as risk information or looking at countries 
not examined previously.  While the bulk of non-US/UK studies and international 
comparisons fall into this extension of the group, a few came earlier and are mentioned 
here for comparative purposes.   
 
The discussion of papers that extend the ideas of the second group into new areas has 
been split into those that look beyond the primarily USA samples into other countries 
and those that look at specific forms of disclosure.   
 
3.3.1: Different Countries 
Most papers mentioned so far have taken their samples from countries using the 
shareholder-focused Anglo-American accounting model as opposed to the more bank-
oriented Continental model.  A number of researchers have examined such countries, 
however, with mixed results that may reflect the varying national contexts involved.  
The papers using non-USA/UK samples are summarised in table 3.3 below. 
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Table 3.3: Non-USA papers 
Paper Sample Dependent 
Variables 
Significant 
Variables 
Theories 
mentioned 
Biddle and 
Saudagaran 
1989 
207 from eight 
countries 
Listing on a 
given exchange 
Comparison of 
home and 
second listing 
location rule 
strictness 
Unique theory; 
companies list 
where 
additional 
disclosure 
requirements 
are low 
Meek, Roberts, 
Gray 1995 
226 firms 
across US, UK, 
and Europe 
Disclosure 
index focused 
on strategic 
information 
Size + 
Mult.  listing + 
Debt finance – 
Industry effects 
Country effects 
Search for 
international 
differences 
Raffournier 
1995 
161 Swiss 
listed firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Foreign 
operations + 
Agency and 
PCH used in 
justifying 
variables 
Saudagaran and 
Biddle 1995 
459 
multinational 
firms across 
eight countries 
Listing on a 
given exchange 
Comparison of 
home and 
second listing 
location rule 
strictness 
As 1989 paper 
by same 
authors 
Zarzeski 1996 256 firms 
across seven 
countries 
worldwide 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Foreign 
Operations + 
Debt – 
Cultural 
factors 
influence 
disclosure 
decisions 
Adams, Hill, 
Roberts 1998 
600 firms in six 
European 
nations 
Disclosure 
index focusing 
on CSR  
Size + 
Industry effects 
Legitimacy 
supported but 
incomplete  
Depoers 2000 102 French 
listed firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Foreign ops + 
Big X Auditor 
+ 
Labour pressure 
- 
Interest in 
French 
situation, no 
named theory 
Robb, Zarzeski,  
Single 2001 
192 firms 
across Canada, 
USA, and 
Australia 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Country effects 
Cultural 
commonality 
and disclosures 
Archambault 
and 
Archambault 
2002 
621 across 33 
countries 
Existing 
disclosure 
score system 
Mult.  listing + 
Foreign ops + 
Big X auditor + 
Cultural factors 
Cultural 
effects on 
disclosure 
decisions 
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Depoers (2000) ran a typical analysis on a French sample.   The results are in keeping 
with the Anglo-American model papers in many respects.  Size is an important and 
positive determinant of disclosure and a Big 6 auditor has a positive effect.  However, 
perhaps due to the accounting system, debt finance and shareholder numbers have no 
particular impact on disclosure. 
 
Raffournier (1995) offers a similarly typical test focused on Switzerland.  The country 
is chosen because of an existing gap in knowledge relating to the nation, and the time 
period studied is just before a tightening of rules.  There were few requirements for 
disclosure before the change and as a result almost all disclosure could be considered 
voluntary.   The observed results are that size and international operations are the only 
significant variables.  Size is then removed from the model.   While this removes an 
important variable, the authors believe it may act as a proxy for other potential 
determinants of disclosure and could dilute the effects of other variables.   However, 
this alteration does not change anything.  While the significance of some other variables 
rises, they are only significant at the 10% level and not the stricter and more commonly 
used 5%, making them potentially significant with further changes to the model but still 
not clearly supported.   
 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) study Portuguese practices.   The authors are very clear 
about the fact that their sample is quite removed from the USA context in which the 
research format was designed and the theories of disclosure were developed, so 
different results should not be problematic.  Despite this, the results are mostly in 
keeping with other papers, the main point of difference being that a corporate 
Lopes and 
Rodrigues 2007 
55 Portuguese 
firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Size + 
Mult.  List + 
Big X Auditor 
+ 
Industry effects 
Some indirect 
Signalling 
support 
Dobler, Lajili, 
Zeghal 2011 
160 firms split 
between UK, 
Germany, US, 
Canada 
Disclosure 
index based on 
risk sentence 
count 
Size + 
Country effects 
Comparison of 
countries 
Jiang, Habib, 
Hu 2011 
103 New 
Zealand firms 
Bid-ask spread 
as disclosure 
measure 
Size + 
Stakeholder – 
 
Ownership 
concentration 
effects on 
disclosure; 
Agency links 
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governance variable (measured primarily as independent directors on the board, with 
another two measures based on independent recommendations for better governance) 
has been used and found to be insignificant.  Note that the research uses a small sample 
of only 55, however. 
 
As different national contexts were examined, some researchers inevitably tried 
international studies comparing two or more different countries.  An example comes in 
Adams et al (1998), although the focus here is on the company’s social and 
environmental reports alone.   Further, the main determinant of disclosure examined is 
the home country.  This makes it very difficult to compare this paper with others, 
although a strong and positive size effect is noted. 
 
Meek et al (1995) is a more typical example, building on standard tests with a multiple-
country comparative aspect.  The sample is split into firms based in the USA, UK, and 
(continental) Europe, though the entire sample consists of multinationals and renders 
the categories harder to distinguish as some operate in more than one of these regions.  
Multinationals are preferred because their voluntary practices have allegedly pre-
empted actual regulations in many cases, so this examination is considered indicative of 
what the future might bring in terms of disclosure regulations.  Despite this slightly 
unusual focus, nothing especially different is found compared to other papers.  The 
company size and (international) listing status remain major determinants of disclosure, 
although home country is also significant.  Industry is additionally found to be 
somewhat significant, although it depends heavily on the type of information being 
disclosed.  For example, oil companies commonly release more environmental 
information than other industries. 
 
Dobler et al (2011) perform one of the most wide-ranging international comparisons.  
While their intent is mostly to compare the countries involved – the UK and Germany 
as representations of Europe and the US and Canada as representations of North 
America – the methods are standard and demonstrate the usual results occurring in all 
four locations, albeit with some national variations.  On the whole, US disclosures are 
the most detailed, Germany is second, and for some specific information the UK gets 
most detail (specifically environmental information and risk management systems). 
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Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) (and the same authors’ very similar 1995 work) offer a 
different form of international comparison.  Their paper focuses solely on the 
multinational listing variable as an explanation for disclosure.  The usual justification 
for multiple listing as a determinant of disclosure is essentially companies taking the 
path of least resistance.  For example, a firm is listed in two countries.  One requires as 
part of its listing requirements the disclosure of items A, B, and C, while the other 
requires B, C, and D.   Between the two, the firm has to collect and produce information 
on four items.  It is thought that the cheapest approach is to produce one information 
package that covers the requirements of both rule sets, leading the firm to effectively 
disclose voluntarily in each location. 
 
Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) suggest a different relationship, however.   Instead of 
multiple listing generating added disclosure relative to each set of rules, a company will 
tend to cross-list where the added disclosures will be minimal compared to its home 
area.   To test this idea, the authors examine the cross-listing decisions of a number of 
companies across eight countries (all in North America and Western Europe).   In 
between these two extremes, the main observation is companies generally selecting to 
list in locations that are less strict than their home with regard to disclosure regulations.   
However, note that the US companies should not be considered representative of non-
US firms; these companies do not have the option of moving somewhere stricter in this 
sample.   Additionally, little is made of the fact that some companies voluntarily list 
outside of their home nation for other reasons, e.g. listing in New York after a period of 
expansion into the US. 
 
A notable oversight here is that the theory being formed is based only on the home 
nation and not taking all disclosure requirements into account.   For example, a Swiss 
company (historically minimal disclosure) finds a need to list in the USA (maximal 
disclosure).   The theory as written holds that this company would still be unlikely to list 
anywhere else because of the additional regulation this would impose compared to its 
native Switzerland.   However, at this point the company has to meet the comparatively 
strict US regulation and may then be willing to report anywhere else as this adds little 
compared to the company’s current regulatory burden. 
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Related to this, Lang et al (2003) have a very clear finding that US listing leads to 
analyst following, which is often taken as a sign of disclosure (see Lang and Lundholm 
1996, discussed in 5.2.7).  It is less clear whether this is due to the American rules on 
disclosure leading to greater analyst interest or just the fact that the USA is a very large 
market with a well-developed financial sector combined with a shareholder-centric 
accounting system.  It is possible that any of these factors will lead to a greater analyst 
following.  
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3.3.2: Specific Forms of Disclosure 
As mentioned above, some papers examine different forms of disclosure.  These are 
summarised in table 3.4 and discussed below. 
Table 3.4: Specific Cases 
Paper Sample Dependent 
Variables 
Significant 
Variables 
Theories 
mentioned 
Chen, DeFond, 
Park 2002 
2551 US Existence of 
balance sheet 
forecast 
Profit – 
Ext finance + 
Volatility + 
Disclosure 
when earnings 
uncertain 
Watson, 
Shrives, 
Marston 2002 
313 UK firms Logistic 
probability of 
ratio disclosure 
Size + 
Industry effects 
Agency and 
Signalling 
tested,  
Field, Lowry, 
Shu 2005 
166 US 
lawsuits over 
information 
releases 
Litigation risks Profit + 
Volatility – 
Industry effects 
Disclosure 
effects on 
preventing 
legal actions 
Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006 
104 Singapore 
listed firms 
Disclosure 
index 
Governance + Board 
composition 
and disclosure; 
Agency 
overlaps this 
Ali, Chen, 
Radhakrishnan 
2007 
177 US firms, 
all family-
owned 
Accruals 
quality 
Profit – 
Volatility + 
Family owner 
Disclosure by 
family owned 
firms; Agency 
Brown and 
Hillegeist 2007 
423 US firms Information 
asymmetry 
Disclosure + 
Size + 
Unusual ones 
Disclosure as a 
reduction in 
asymmetry 
Grüning 2007 60 firms split 
between 
Germany and 
Poland 
Existing 
disclosure 
index 
Mult.  List + 
Industry effects 
Country effects 
Unusual 
methodology, 
size influences 
listing 
Armitage and 
Marston 2008 
78 UK 
financial 
managers 
Interview 
approach; no 
conventional 
dependent 
Size + 
Stakeholders + 
Interview 
approach as 
main method 
Chen, Chen, 
Cheng 2008 
1311 US firms, 
4415 reports 
Probability of 
various forms 
of voluntary 
disclosure 
Profit – 
Ext.  Finance + 
Governance + 
Family firm 
focus; better in 
some ways, 
worse in others 
 
Chen et al (2002) look solely at the inclusion of a preliminary balance sheet with 
interim reports.  The paper shows that it is mostly firms with unpredictable earnings that 
perform this type of disclosure, which implies that to some extent disclosure is used to 
appear more favourable to the stock markets (in this case, by preventing surprises).  
However, no further discussion of the result is made and the paper concludes rapidly 
once the results are obtained. 
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In a slight variation on the normal research, Robb et al (2001) look only at non-financial 
information disclosure.   The research is otherwise in keeping with the literature 
discussed above in sections 3.1 and 3.2, using similar explanatory variables to others.   
The main problem observed here is the unusual choice of significance level.   Where 
most papers (across this topic, wider accounting, and social sciences in general) use the 
5% level, the authors in this case accept the weaker 10%.   Many of the findings would 
not be considered significant under the more stringent rule normally used in practice. 
 
The actual purpose of the paper is to examine disclosures by type, counting multiple 
forms of information separately (e.g. strategy, production information).   The paper 
concludes that the companies most likely to go against their home country’s practices 
and disclose plentiful information are large and geographically diverse, and located in 
certain industries.   Taking the more typical 5% significance level into account, these 
are still true but the effects are not as strong.  Using the 10% rule means these variables 
are significant across most or all of the classes of dependent variables, while under 5% 
they are significant across only a few.    
 
Watson et al (2002) investigate the disclosure of accounting ratios.  Despite the narrow 
focus, the results are largely in line with other research into disclosure.  Size and 
industry classification are the most powerful determinants (listing is not tested here), 
with profit ratios and debt finance having results in some of the years studied but not 
others.    
 
Walker and Louvari (2003) look at when disclosure of earnings per share numbers are 
likely to occur, which they find to be under similar circumstances as when disclosure in 
general is likely, suggesting that EPS disclosures are part of the wider disclosure 
environment.  Note that this paper adds a few unusual variables, such as the firm’s 
overall risk and the use of intangible assets.  However, none of the hypotheses 
surrounding these are supported.  The only unusual variable that the results find 
important is one that measures the overall level of less specific disclosure, which is 
found to have a positive effect on EPS disclosure.  While the results offer some 
additional details due to the extra information available, the overall outcomes are still in 
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line with past research; the added details add explanatory power but do not suggest the 
‘standard’ results are acting as proxies for something not included in the model. 
 
A very different look at disclosure comes from Armitage and Marston (2008).  Rather 
than the usual practice of testing observable company characteristics as explanations for 
some observable measure of disclosure and forming or testing theories based on this, 
the researchers here simply ask managers why they disclose.  The results are somewhat 
unexpected.  One of the common reasons hypothesised for disclosure is a lower cost of 
capital.  If the market perceives a lack of information on a given company, it will 
assume there is some potential risk contained in what it does not know and charge 
accordingly (Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  This information risk premium is easily 
reduced with additional information. 
 
However, the managers asked in this study mostly state that their aim is a reputation for 
openness.  This may have knock-on effects that lead to a lowered cost of capital for the 
firm, but the managers are not specifically aiming for this effect.  The smaller sample 
necessitated by the interview approach does make this result less generalizable than 
others, but the added detail from interviews has raised a number of points not seen in 
other works. 
 
The paper also contains a reversal of one of the common variable justifications.  Many 
have suggested company performance as an explanatory variable on the assumption that 
managers in well-performing companies will disclose to demonstrate that their 
leadership was responsible, while poor performance leads to less information so that 
blame is harder to assign.  One of the common themes in the interviews is the complete 
opposite: companies with poor performance have dissatisfied shareholders who want to 
see the managers acknowledge the problems and show how they are being solved, while 
those with good results are not subject to the same scrutiny.  One participant calls 
silence in bad times as an action that would “look stupid”.  Bergman and 
Roychowdhury (2008) find evidence that firms sometimes disclose with the goal of 
improving the market’s opinions about the company, which is loosely in keeping with 
Armitage and Marston’s findings. 
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A few papers have looked at the disclosure practices of family-owned companies, such 
as Ali et al (2007) and Chen et al (2008).  These are usually separated from others 
because the family ownership means that a small number of closely related shareholders 
will collectively have a powerful or possibly controlling interest even if no single 
shareholder has a significant holding.  Further, the family is likely to have at least one 
member acting in a senior managerial position.  This family can therefore be considered 
a single controlling interest as they collectively hold a large number of votes and hold 
similar motivations, and the existence of such a controlling interest may in turn reduce 
the overall disclosure.  The argument is comparable to the arguments given for heavy 
use of debt finance reducing disclosure.  Since the debt owners are almost exclusively 
large and powerful entities that can get information by pressuring managers directly and 
not rely on them revealing information.  The family is likely to effectively be an insider 
if the managerial members share information with relatives, making the entire group 
well-informed and not in need of disclosure of information.  They act as a limit on the 
demand for information among those with power over the company in this regard.  In 
addition, each paper analyses corporate governance through a measurement of 
independent directors on the board, generally finding that more such directors increase 
the company’s willingness to disclose, but family firms tend to have fewer of them than 
other companies. 
 
Overall, however, the results of tests performed in such cases are not much different to 
more widely-owned companies.  While the presence of powerful shareholder blocks 
does appear to change how much information is revealed, it is still influenced heavily 
by the size and listing status of the company.  Patelli and Prencipe (2007) examine the 
similar situation of there being a single dominant shareholder, with the result that size is 
the only typical variable that is significant.   The most important one variable is a rare 
one, the proportion of independent directors on the board.  The given hypothesis is that 
independent directors can pressure the most senior managers to serve all shareholders  
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3.4: Group 3: The response to Changes 
The third group of papers follows major changes to the disclosure environment in the 
early and mid-2000s.  In the USA, Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) resulted in papers that compare disclosure before and after 
one or both came into force.  In the UK, the major changes examined in literature in the 
same period were mostly non-mandatory.  The ICAEW investigated how risk and risk 
management reporting was performed and could be improved (ICAEW, 1999).  The 
Operating and Financial Review document at the time encouraged the reporting of 
major trends and risks, and was a mandatory part of the annual report for a brief period 
in 2006, but continued to exist as a form of guidance for best practice. 
 
In addition to these rules, various changes in regulation occurred soon after such as the 
EU adoption of IFRS.  The research wave is effectively a broad series of studies on the 
specific effects on disclosure following various regulatory changes in the early and mid-
2000s.  These are summarised in table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Regulation research 
Paper Sample Dependent 
Variables 
Significant 
Variables 
Theories 
mentioned 
Baginski, 
Hassell, 
Kimbrough 
2002 
751 firms in 
USA and 
Canada 
Existence and 
time horizon of 
voluntary 
forecasts 
Size + 
Profit – 
Volatility + 
Potential 
litigation 
discourages 
disclosures 
Linsley and 
Shrives 2006 
79 FTSE 100 
firms 
Level of risk in 
firm; risk 
sentences in 
report 
Size + 
Overall risk + 
 
Do risky 
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Baginski et al (2002) examine changes in disclosure practices following the passing of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure.  Before FD, companies would often pick a small number of 
preferred intermediaries to receive information in advance of others.  However, one of 
the new regulation’s rules forbade this practice, stating that any information released to 
any party must be available to all parties immediately, although a few exceptions may 
still have privileged access.  The research question is the obvious one for the time, 
asking how disclosure practices changed following the regulation. 
 
The test involves a sample of firms from the USA and Canada.  It is stated that the two 
countries are very similar and often identical in terms of business practices, but 
Regulation FD was an American rule only.  Effectively, the Canadian firms are serving 
as a control group here as they are a comparable population not subjected to the change.  
The results show a clear change over time.  While the American companies have 
continued to disclose, bad news is revealed almost immediately and all disclosures are 
skewed towards negative information, which is thought to be a measure against 
litigation as it makes it difficult for an outside party to claim that even potential bad 
news is being hidden.  By contrast, the Canadian sample is more likely to forecast at all 
times, but especially if the forecast is positive in nature.  However, the research is now 
somewhat dated and further changes may have occurred to either part of the sample.  
Further, the paper was published in 2002, meaning the research occurred before the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which further changed US company disclosures. 
 
A number of papers have, rather than investigating on the general concept of disclosure, 
focused exclusively on risk disclosures.  A wave of such research occurred in the mid-
2000s in the context of the UK, driven by changes to the regulatory environment at the 
time which included new disclosure requirements.  Linsley and Shrives (2006) offer an 
early example of such research, although in practice it is not much different to general 
disclosure papers, having similar variables and similar results.  At the same time, these 
authors participated in another project (Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006) which 
focused on risk disclosure among UK banks alone, which again showed little out of the 
ordinary.  Abraham and Cox (2007), when studying UK risk disclosures among 
companies in general, find the same results as usual, with some extra information 
provided by the well-justified additional variables included in their model.   Taken with 
the more generalised disclosure research, these papers demonstrate that risk disclosure 
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is likely considered part of the general disclosure package.   A company that discloses 
risk in detail is likely to be one that maintains a policy of thorough disclosure in general 
terms. 
 
In more recent years, Taylor et al (2010) have performed a related test in the Australian 
environment to see whether risk disclosure improved over 2002-2006, a period covering 
the adoption of IFRS in the country.  The general observation is an increase over the 
period, but the list of control variables includes many of the usual disclosure study 
variables.  In a difference from the norm, size is important but multiple listing is not, 
and actually appears negative.  This is explained as a quirk of the sample, which is 
entirely made up of resource extraction companies.  Such firms have to deal with 
fluctuations in material prices, meaning that in terms of the risks involved foreign 
exchange is comparatively minor and as such not likely to change much.    
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3.5: Non-Disclosure 
To conclude this section on why companies disclose, we now look at the opposite.  
Rather than asking why companies disclose, a few papers instead look into why a 
company might not disclosure, such as Lundholm and van Winkle (2006).   The paper 
begins on a logical argument that, if it holds in practice, makes it clear that disclosure is 
generally advantageous to almost all companies.  The example is a situation where 
investors have information about the overall quality of the market, but not the individual 
companies that make it up.   Effectively, the investors know how many “good” and 
“bad” investment options are available but not which companies fall into each category.  
Every company is then offered an average cost of capital.  In this case, companies that 
are “good” investments could improve their cost of capital by giving more information 
about operations, making potential investors aware of the lower risks and obtaining a 
more accurate, lower cost of capital.  Should this happen, the pool of firms still being 
given the average cost of capital is now known to consist only of those which should be 
given a higher cost of capital and the average rises appropriately, meaning that some 
firms in this reduced pool could now receive a lower cost by giving more information 
about their operations.  This pattern repeats until nearly all firms are disclosing plentiful 
information.  In the example the paper gives, only one of the five companies used for 
the illustration does not disclose, but at that point it does not matter because it alone is 
used to form the average cost of capital and more information would change little. 
 
Even so, there are cases where companies give little information.  Lundholm and van 
Winkle argue that there are three basic reasons for this, all relating to the managers.  
The first is that they do not know something; information they do not have cannot be 
disclosed for obvious reasons.  The second is that they cannot tell something, usually 
meaning that they have the information but lack knowledge about if it is important and 
useful or not.   The third and final reason suggested is that the managers simply do not 
care about some piece of information, which stems in many cases from their incentives 
to disclose not being sufficient.   Additional suggestions have been made in other 
papers, however.  Gigler (1994) points out that firms are wary about giving their 
competitors too much information, and competitive harm potential is one of the 
arguments often raised against heavier disclosure regulations.  If a given country 
demands greater information than others, companies listed in the heavier-burden nation 
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suddenly have to reveal information that their competitors based elsewhere need not 
discuss, giving some informational advantage to any international competitors. 
  
49 
 
3.6: Problems Identified In Literature 
The quantity of papers available on the determinants of disclosure should make for a 
comprehensive understanding of the topic.  The tests have been largely standardised and 
applied to a variety of contexts ranging from large-sample international comparisons to 
studies of specific industries, and examined over a period over 40 years long. 
 
While the variables present a clear story of what defines disclosure, the fit values 
suggest it is not the full picture.  At the start of the line of research, Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) obtained an R
2
 value of 0.434.  While this demonstrates that the regression is 
explaining a large amount of variance in the dependent variable, it is a little under half 
of the total.  There is room for further explanation.   
 
However, with studies from various points in time, different samples, new explanatory 
variables, and even different means of measuring disclosure, Singhvi and Desai’s 
(1971) results are better than most.  Raffournier (1995), in a Swiss study, obtains a 
comparable R
2
 of 0.42.  More commonly, results are between 0.2 and 0.4, such as Jiang 
et al (2011, R
2
 0.37), Chen et al (2008, R
2
 0.3), and Clarkson et al (1999, R
2
 0.216).  A 
few papers obtain lower values; Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) find an R
2
 of 0.13, 
suggesting that the Portuguese experience is less predictable than most.  Better fits tend 
to come from very specific cases.  Cooke (1989a) has an unusual result, finding an R
2
 of 
0.6 in one model despite the study being quite standard for the area other than the focus 
being the Stockholm stock exchange.   
 
Archambault and Archambault (2003) make an interesting contribution to this 
discussion because multiple models with different variables are tested.  One model uses 
three common variables – size, debt, and a measure of foreign operations – combined 
with Hofstede’s (1984) cultural factors, obtaining an R2 of approximately 0.3.  Another, 
however, adds a large number of additional cultural variables to the list and obtains a 
much higher R
2
 of 0.54, a clear example of the “normal” variables providing a useful 
but incomplete picture of disclosure.  Depoers (2000) has a broadly similar result.  Her 
work is a mostly standard disclosure study based on a French sample, but the 
explanatory variables include barriers to industry entry and potential labour pressure.  A 
strong correlation is noted between size and entry barriers, so two regressions are run 
and one of the two is removed from each model.  Without size, but with both of these 
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unusual variables, the R
2 
is a high 0.54.  Removing entry barriers to include size, 
making the study comparable to the general body of research, increases R
2
 to 0.65.   
 
Higher fits have additionally been observed where the dependent variable is more 
specific than general disclosure.  Abraham and Cox (2007) obtain a higher than normal 
R
2
 of 0.55 overall, but the study is focused on risk information disclosures and contains 
a number of variables expected to impact on risk disclosure rather than more general 
information releases.  Taylor et al (2010) obtain an R
2
of 0.575 when examining risk 
management disclosures, again with a few unusual variables to better explain the 
specific form of disclosure.  Similarly, Dobler et al (2011) obtain R
2 
of 0.48 when 
studying risk disclosures across multiple countries. 
 
Finally, it appears that some countries may be more predictable than others.  Zarzeski 
(1996) performs an international comparison that includes cultural factors and reports 
both overall and country-specific R
2
 values.  The fit for the entire sample is 0.48, 
suggesting that compared to other papers the cultural measures have added a little 
explanation.  Individual countries vary greatly around this, however.  The UK appears 
representative of the sample, having a sub-sample R
2
 of 0.47.  At the upper extreme, the 
fit for Norwegian companies is 0.64, one of the highest identified fits.  At the low end, 
the Hong Kong sub-sample has R
2
 0.06, indicating that disclosure in this location 
requires entirely new explanations. 
 
The low fits obtained in many papers may be due to variables that cannot be readily 
measured.  Gibbins et al (1990) examine factors that may encourage or discourage a 
company from engaging in voluntary disclosure.  While some measurable company 
characteristics such as size and listing status have an effect on disclosure practice, the 
remainder of the explanation of variance may lie in additional concepts that are not 
readily measurable, such as the company’s history and use of consultants as suggested 
in this paper. 
 
Kim (1993) has another alternative explanation.  Using a modelling approach, the paper 
suggests that the company will ultimately disclose to the level that its shareholder base 
desires.   This desire depends on the nature of the shareholders.  Each individual 
shareholder can have high or low risk tolerance, and independent of that may have 
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cheap or expensive data collection.  Those with low tolerance will want as much 
information as possible and will therefore press for information releases, especially if 
they fall into the expensive collection category.    
 
In addition, there are issues beyond low fit in many papers.  In general terms, there has 
been a US focus in the research to date.  While other nations and international 
comparisons have been performed, there have been a disproportionate number of papers 
using only the USA.  This can be explained to some extent by the US accounting 
system.  Where financial reporting is aimed at the banks and similar generally 
institutional owners of a company, the release of information is not as useful as it would 
be for small individual shareholders.   
 
In addition, there are questions over the now-standard methodology.  The paper 
commonly cited as the first, Singhvi and Desai (1971), came under immediate criticism 
from Buzby (1975) for using two correlated variables in a regression.  While Buzby 
(1975) is to some extent criticising what he sees as unexpected results, the core of the 
argument has merit.  It was later backed up by Ahmed and Courtis (1999), who observe 
signs of a moderation relationship with some of the variables commonly used.  The 
typical testing method of OLS regression should therefore be called into question as it 
assumes that all explanatory variables are completely independent of one another.  
While in practice small violations of this rule are not problematic and known larger 
ones can be worked around, there is little sign of any awareness of this problem in 
research to date.  The extent of any problems caused by this is unknown. 
 
Grüning (2007) recognises the problem and attempts to resolve it.  In many regards, the 
research is typical of the area.  A measure of disclosure derived from annual reports is 
defined and applied to the sample firms.  The sample is drawn from Germany and 
Poland, a little unusual given the US bias in the overall line of research but not a flaw 
by any measure.  However, Grüning questions the use of regression analysis, 
mentioning co-linearity of variables as an argument for other approaches.  In particular, 
Grüning argues that size and listing status are too strongly correlated to be considered 
independent. 
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Between the questions over the appropriateness of regression and the model being 
something it cannot handle, Grüning instead uses structural equation modelling (SEM).  
This is effectively a more general case of regression usable where the model does not 
meet the explanatory variable independence assumption.  One of its main flaws is that 
where regression has the convenient R
2
 fit indication statistic, there is no clear 
equivalent for SEM.  Various alternatives have been suggested, and some papers 
recommend using a range of fit measures for a rounded view of fit (e.g. Marsh et al 
1988, Bollen 1990, Shook et al 2004).  Grüning does not report on fit to any notable 
extent, however, leaving the quality of the model in question. 
 
The model tested uses the common variables of size and industry class.  Multiple listing 
is included but in the unusual form of being listed in both countries involved only.  In 
addition, a home country effect is examined by including this as a variable.  However, 
size is not allowed to act on disclosure.  Instead, it is considered to be a cause of listing, 
meaning size may have indirect effects only by acting through another variable.  Given 
past research results, there is little reason why size could not be allowed to act both 
indirectly and directly on disclosure. 
 
The results of the model support the connections between size and listing and between 
listing and disclosure.  That is, the size of a company influences its listing decisions and 
this is the major cause of disclosure activity.  However, Grüning expresses some 
misgivings about the results.  This is not a modelling problem, but a data collection one; 
like many, he has measured disclosure by examining annual reports for a number of 
items that appear in a disclosure index.  Grüning is concerned with the subjectivity of 
this approach, which requires judgement as to whether or not a given item is in the 
report, and has since moved on to researching ways to solve this problem with 
automated search procedures, such as his 2011 work on a method known as Artificial 
Intelligence Measure of Disclosure. 
 
Al-Tuwajiri et al (2004) express similar concerns when studying social and 
environmental disclosures.  The knowledge that some of the variables are endogenous – 
that is, to some extent caused by others in the model – leads them to conclude that OLS 
regression is not appropriate.  Rather than SEM, they use three-stage least squares 
regression.   This allows for indirect influences, though not models on the same 
53 
 
complexity as SEM.  The results here support the authors’ prior estimate that several 
key factors in environmental reporting actually influence each other and as such 
alternative methods are required, but say little about what influences disclosure in any 
respect.     
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3.7: Conclusion 
In the study of the causes of disclosure, there is a gap in methods.  Regression works to 
some extent, but there is some concern that the variables involved are not independent 
of each other.  This need not be a large problem.  Small violations of the independence 
assumption are not necessarily problematic as this means the results of the model are 
slightly inaccurate, but likely not enough to make the results unreliable unless some 
variables have a p-value near to the chosen significance level.  In addition, techniques 
exist such that a link between variables known in advance can be worked around, 
although this is rarely seen in the research to date.  However, this is reliable only if the 
variable correlations are small and/or known.  For many papers, correlations are 
unknown; the analysis has either not been performed or not been reported. 
 
A minority of papers have discussed potential multicollinearity in the variables.  Some, 
such as Abraham and Cox (2007) and Gelb and Strawser (2001) each find little 
evidence of it among their samples.  In other cases, the possibility of multicollinearity is 
given as a reason to take or not take a specific action, such as Depoers (2000) excluding 
one variable from each model because of the potential, although the paper includes no 
analysis that would confirm the presence or absence of multicollinearity. 
 
In addition to variable correlation, there have been a few rare papers examining the 
possibility of mediation or moderation effects.  Ahmed and Courtis (1999) offer the 
clearest example of this following a meta-analysis of other research.  There is some 
evidence that variables commonly used to investigate disclosure are acting through each 
other and having indirect effects on the disclosure variables used as the dependent in the 
literature. 
 
The variables identified and commonly used are all valid.  While not all of them 
demonstrate consistent effects on disclosure, each has been tested multiple times across 
a range of studies.  Further, and more importantly, every one of them has a good 
justification for inclusion in a study of disclosure.  Without exception, all variables can 
be argued to have an effect on disclosure.  They need to be studied in practice in order 
to determine the truth, as the justifications are expectations that may not be true.  
Further, some are sensible arguments on the assumption that a given theory explaining 
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disclosure is valid, but would have no effect if a different explanation of disclosure 
activity is true. 
 
Grüning (2007) has a good approach with the use of SEM despite the problems in the 
paper.  With care, SEM would be a useful method for solving the problems seen so far.  
Some means of reporting fit would be necessary to make for useful results.   
 
The extent of indirect effects among variables has barely been examined, although there 
is a small body of evidence that some exist.  Analysis of this would be best performed 
using multiple models.  If one allows variables be connected while another does not, 
some useful information would be obtained from the difference in fit between the two.  
Alternatively, methods exist that would allow models to be altered.  One model 
allowing all variables to be connected could be drawn up and connections removed as 
they are found to be insignificant.  A third option exists in that there are ways of 
identifying links that should be added to a model after it has been analysed, allowing for 
a basic model that initially allows no correlations to be altered to include those 
correlations identified as important. 
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Chapter 4: Theory 
This chapter covers the theories of disclosure that are tested later in the paper.  Five 
theories explaining voluntary disclosure by companies have been selected for study.  All 
five are theories initially formed to explain some aspect of accounting or finance other 
than disclosure, but that have been noted to have potential applications in explaining 
disclosure. 
 
Other explanations are available, mostly relating to various immediate advantages a 
company may obtain in capital markets by releasing information.  Healy and Palepu 
(2001) cover many of these in detail, as discussed in section 2.1.  These effects are not 
chosen for study here because they can generally be explained as an effect of one of the 
theories that is studied.  For example, one of the effects of disclosure is a lower cost of 
capital.  Healy and Palepu refer to other research which suggests this happens because 
of an information risk in the event of non-disclosure; investors with imperfect 
knowledge have a risk of inaccurate forecasting and require a higher return to 
compensate.  With disclosure, the risk lowers and the required reward falls 
appropriately.  Ultimately, the reduced cost of capital can be explained as an effect of 
reduced information asymmetry between company managers and investors.  Several of 
the theories discussed in this chapter (Lemons and Signalling in particular) rely on 
managers reducing information asymmetry and may therefore explain the effects 
described above.  The selected theories are each broad in nature, having been applied 
widely, and may provide broader explanations of other observations.   
 
Further, a given model result may be consistent with more than one theory rather than 
highlighting one as a clear best explanation of disclosure.  For this reason, the final 
interpretation of results is not necessarily as simple as finding the one best-fitting 
theory.  To allow for this, the theories are all compared against each other following 
Morris’ (1987) example.  The method used has four possible outcomes for comparison.  
Two theories may be identical, usually alternative wordings of the same observations.  
Alternatively, one theory may imply the other, suggesting that one is a subset of the 
predictions of the other.  It is possible for two theories to be completely unrelated, in 
which case one being demonstrated to have some explanatory power does not imply that 
the other either has or lacks its own power, and both may be valid explanations.  
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Finally, two theories may compete, in which case they cannot both be explanations of 
the events as one being true implies the other is false. 
 
The next section explains the method of comparison used later in the chapter.  It is 
explained first because it informs some of the decisions in what is included elsewhere in 
the chapter, primarily the need for conditions of each theory (see below). 
 
Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 each explain one of the five theories in detail, ordered 
by the date of first publication.  Each theory is described as originally written followed 
by how it has been applied or adapted to explain disclosure behaviour.  Next, literature 
providing evidence either supporting or rejecting the theory as a disclosure explanation 
is discussed.  The following sub-section discusses the expected signs of each theory in 
terms of the variables used in the study, i.e. the evidence that would support the theory 
if observed in testing.  The final sub-section of each theory section explains the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of each theory as this is vital to the theory 
comparison method employed. 
 
Section 4.7 uses the comparison technique to compare all pairs of theories.  Two pairs 
are immediately identified as being identical (at least in practical terms regarding 
disclosure or due to an inability to model them sufficiently differently with the data 
used in this thesis).  This reduces the number of required comparisons; if theories A and 
B are identical, then comparison of each to C should have the same results. 
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4.1: Theory Comparison Method 
Morris (1987) provides a means of making detailed comparisons of theories.  Any 
theory can be broken down into a list of the necessary conditions and sufficient 
conditions required for the theory to hold.  These lists can be compared and any overlap 
between the two offers insight into the relationship between the two.  Morris (1987) 
uses a worked example using Agency and Signalling Theories in a disclosure context, 
making it a directly useful example in this thesis. 
 
For clarity, the terms ‘necessary condition’ and ‘sufficient condition’ are defined here.  
A condition X is necessary for some outcome Y if Y cannot occur unless X is true.  It is 
possible for an outcome to have several necessary conditions.  For example, a square is 
defined geometrically as having four sides of equal length and angles of 90
o
 at all four 
corners.  All conditions contained within this statement are each individually necessary 
for a shape to be a square, but all three are needed to define a square. 
 
A condition X is sufficient for outcome Y if Y being true guarantees X is true.  
Reversing the example above, a shape being square is sufficient for it to have four sides 
of equal length.  As with necessary conditions, it is possible for several conditions 
together to be sufficient when individually they are not.  Using the same example again, 
knowing a shape has both four equal sides and four corners of 90
o
 is sufficient to 
conclude that it is a square, but either condition alone may describe another shape.  Note 
that condition X being necessary for Y means Y is sufficient for X. 
 
Morris’ (1987) method compares the conditions of two theories and allows one of four 
relationships between them.  According to what is termed the axiomatic approach, two 
theories are identical if their necessary conditions are identical and at least a subset of 
sufficient conditions is also identical.  In this case, the theories are alternative 
descriptions of the same sequence of events and will make the same predictions; one 
being true means the other is true, while one being false means the other is also false.  
Both may therefore be explanations of the underlying observations as they are 
functionally identical. 
 
A subset match in both sufficient and necessary conditions creates an implication 
relationship; A implies B if the necessary conditions of B are a subset of those for A and 
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the same is true for sufficient conditions.  Theory A being demonstrated to be either true 
or false means B is the same, but B does not provide information about A in the same 
way.  In this case, both theories may be valid explanations but it is possible that one is 
valid and the other is not. 
 
Theories are consistent as long as the conditions (both types) do not conflict but 
otherwise do not have either of the relationships above.  Neither theory provides 
information about the other; theory A being true or false does not have any implications 
for theory B, and B similarly provides no information on A.  In this case, the two 
theories may both have some explanatory power over the phenomena examined, but 
will likely explain different aspects of the observations. 
 
Finally, theories compete if there is at least one conflict among the conditions.  In this 
case, theory A being true means theory B must be false, while A being false implies B is 
true.  The two theories are incompatible alternative explanations of the observed 
phenomena and cannot both be true. 
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4.2: Lemons Theory 
The origin of Lemons Theory is a paper by Akerlof (1970) focusing on the effects of 
quality and uncertainty within a market.  Akerlof uses the example of the market for 
second-hand cars for clarity, but makes clear that this is an aid to understanding rather 
than a strictly realistic example.  The example simplifies the used car market greatly as 
it assumes all cars are identical other than being either used or new and good or bad 
quality (independent of new/used status).  No further details such as brand, model, age 
or service history are included. 
 
The word “lemon”, in this context, is a slang term for a defective car.  It can refer to a 
poorly-designed model of which all examples have faults, but in most cases the term is 
used for faulty individual cars of a normally acceptable type.  Two other terms for the 
faulty examples are “Monday morning cars” and “Friday afternoon cars”, each based on 
the assumption that the car in question was built while the assembly line workers were 
thinking about the weekend rather than focusing on their work, with the result being a 
car that has many minor problems that collectively cause it to spend a large proportion 
of its existence being serviced rather than driven by the owner.  These lemons are the 
bad quality cars mentioned above.  In terms of the theory, the important part of a lemon 
is that the buyer only knows the car is one after the purchase is made.  Before purchase, 
a potential buyer cannot determine whether a car is a lemon or not, as it takes time of 
owning and using the car for problems to become apparent. 
 
Should the owner of a lemon decide to sell the car, some information asymmetry enters 
the market.  The seller knows that their vehicle is a lemon, but as above a potential 
buyer lacks this knowledge.  The seller has an incentive to set the price equal to that of a 
good car to obtain the maximum return.  Further, the value of a second-hand car cannot 
be equal to that of a new one of the same type, or the owner of a lemon could sell their 
faulty car and use the proceeds to immediately purchase an identical new car in the 
hopes of it not being a lemon this time.  The potential buyer, however, is aware that the 
car in question may be a lemon that the buyer is attempting to replace. 
 
The result of this relatively simple example is that all used cars are sold at one price 
and, due to the potential that a given car is a lemon, this is lower than the value of a new 
car.  This creates a new problem for the owners of good cars: they cannot get a fair price 
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if they sell.  In this simplified example, a good used car is functionally identical to a 
good new one, but the price for all used cars is lower than that of a new car as it is set 
between the fair price of a used lemon and that of a new car of (assumed) higher quality.  
They will not receive a fair price for a perfectly functional car and are less likely to try 
selling on the open market at all.  In this way, the lemons tend to drive the good cars out 
of the market. 
 
The effect becomes stronger if there are more grades of car than lemons and good ones 
available.  For example, if the set of lemons can be subdivided into those with minor 
and major defects.  The argument above tends to drive the owners of non-lemons out of 
the market, leaving only the two grades of lemon available.  With few good cars 
available, the price should now be set somewhere between the fair price of a minor 
lemon and that of a major lemon.  Minor lemon owners now have the same problem 
faced by the owners of good cars in the first example; the market price is below the fair 
value of their vehicles, which tends to push them out of the market.  With an infinite 
range of quality, the same effect occurs more often; each time the price is set to some 
weighted average, those with cars worth an above average price have little incentive to 
sell and leave the market, lowering the average and creating a new set of owners unable 
to get a fair value. 
 
In practice, car market participants would be interested in additional information beyond 
whether a given vehicle is new or used.  Including such information does not change the 
logic, however.  Rather than all cars receiving a single price, all cars that are similar 
under all information involved receive one price.  For example, all three-year-old red 
cars of a given make and model and comparable mileage would receive similar pricing.  
Further, the assumption that a used non-lemon should be identical to a new car is unfair 
as a used car will have some amount of use and the resulting wear on components, but 
the existence of lemons means the price will be much lower than is fair under conditions 
of perfect knowledge. 
 
The important part of the example is the way that information asymmetry favours the 
seller by obscuring which examples are good purchases and which are bad, and the 
resulting averaging of prices that may drive the better purchases out of the market.  The 
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theory from the paper is that the quality of items in markets deteriorates due to this 
effect, leaving only the worst options available. 
 
4.2.1: Lemons in disclosure 
In capital market terms, Lemons Theory suggests a steady decline in the quality of 
investments in the market over time.  When compared to the used car example, cars are 
replaced with listed companies, sellers with managers in the companies, and the buyers 
are potential investors.  Managers in a company have the most knowledge of the 
company’s potential for the future and its overall quality as an investment.  The 
potential investors set a price based on their limited knowledge, which tends to be 
similar to that given to comparable companies and slightly lower than the fair value of a 
good investment.  The sequence of events explained above for used cars then occurs; 
genuinely good investments are undervalued and, unable to get a fair price (or having 
the market demand a higher rate of return) than the firm’s quality warrants, the 
company’s owners leave the market. 
 
However, if the managers know the company has potential not reflected in its market 
price then they can communicate this knowledge.  Any evidence of the company’s 
quality can be made available to the market.  If details on the specifics of a given 
company are made available in this way then the market price for the specific firm is not 
subjected to average pricing to the same extent as others and may obtain a value that 
encourages the firm to stay in the market.  Effectively, by disclosing more information, 
a given company can avoid being considered a potential lemon and suffering the low 
valuation that would result (Meek et al, 1995).  Healy and Palepu (2001) state 
disclosure to be a potential solution to the lemons problem threatening to harm the 
entire market.   
 
4.2.2: Research evidence 
Lemons Theory is the least researched of those examined in detail in this thesis.  The 
theory is often named as a possible explanation of voluntary disclosure in papers that do 
not otherwise attempt to test the theory.  Core (2001) mentions a “lemons equilibrium”, 
a situation where no disclosure occurs.  Akerlof’s (1970) paper is named directly in 
explaining that adverse selection costs mean that a lack of disclosure is costly to 
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companies and may be a cause of demand for disclosure regulations.  These two 
comments represent the total direct mentions of the theory in the paper.  Similarly, 
Beyer et al (2010) name a lemons problem briefly in their introduction and otherwise 
make little use of the theory.  As noted above, Healy and Palepu (2001) note a few 
possible solutions to the lemons problem including disclosure, but like the others 
mentioned here make little further use of the theory. 
 
Meek et al (1995) is a rare example of a paper taking the theory beyond a background 
matter.  The paper investigates the determinants of disclosure in multinational 
companies.  The lemons problem is mentioned when discussing profitability as a 
variable; profitable firms have an incentive to disclose in order to obtain fairer costs of 
capital.  The regression later in the paper finds profitability to be insignificant, implying 
that Lemons Theory is not supported in this case. 
 
4.2.3: Variables Relevant to Lemons Theory 
The basic argument behind Lemons Theory is that firms which are better investment 
opportunities are likely to disclose more than others.  The main sign of support for the 
theory would therefore be a significant positive effect on disclosure from performance 
measures.  Good performance measures may be caused by competent management 
(inter alia).  High volatility means a company cannot offer consistent returns and would 
be a less attractive investment, creating an expectation of a negative effect on disclosure 
from this variable. 
 
Other variables may have less direct effects.  A larger company has more capability to 
diversify into additional lines of business or geographical areas, making it better able to 
absorb a loss in one area or survive a temporary market downturn.  While neither is a 
clear sign of good management, they each enable the firm to offer consistent returns 
where a more restricted company cannot, making size a possible determinant of 
disclosure under Lemons Theory.  Similar arguments apply to multiple listing, which is 
often a sign of international operations. 
 
Debt finance and industry sensitivity are not expected to have effects explainable under 
Lemons Theory.   
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4.2.4: Conditions for Lemons Theory 
Based on Morris’ (1987) analysis of other theories, the following list of sufficient 
conditions is formed for Lemons Theory: 
 
L1: All market participants are rational wealth maximisers.   
L2: The quality of firms competing for equity and debt funds in the capital markets 
varies. 
L3: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect the quality of firms in the second period. 
L4: The actual quality of firms is observable in period 2 only. 
L5: In period 1, information asymmetry exists between the manager of each firm and 
capital suppliers.  The manager’s information about the firm is superior to that of capital 
suppliers. 
 
The only truly necessary condition in this group is L5, information asymmetry.  
Condition L1 is included because it explains most of the behaviour Akerlof (1970) 
described as leading to Lemons situations.  Capital suppliers aiming to maximise wealth 
will make investments at the lowest value they consider reasonable, while managers 
gain from high firm values and are incentivised to claim their company is not a lemon 
even if it is one.  However, it is not necessary on its own; rational wealth maximisation 
does not imply that the theory holds.  Condition L2 allows variation in quality between 
firms, while L3 and L4 allows variation over time within a single firm while making it 
unclear which are the best investments until after the investments are made. 
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4.3: Signalling Theory 
Spence (1973) first described Signalling Theory in terms of the job market, which is 
described in the paper as “investment under uncertainty”.  Ideally, an employer would 
pay each employee an amount reflective of the individual’s marginal addition to overall 
productivity.  However, this is not knowable before hiring the potential employee.  
Even after hiring the true productivity may be unclear for a time as the employee takes 
time to learn the exact details of the position or receive specialist training and will not 
contribute fully in this period.   
 
An employer unable to know an individual’s rate of productivity instead generalises 
from other characteristics and offers an average wage.  A talented employee will be 
undervalued by this and has an incentive to make their abilities known before the hiring 
occurs in order to obtain a higher wage from the start of their employment (similar to 
Lemons, the better employees are offered an unfairly low wage based on averages).  
Signalling is the act of a job seeker adjusting their observable characteristics. 
 
Signalling is often costly.  Education is a clear signal of ability; an employee who has 
obtained a relevant qualification can be reasonably expected to be more productive than 
one who has not.  However, education is not free.  Even where there are no direct tuition 
costs, the time and effort spent obtaining the qualification carries significant opportunity 
costs as the potential employee could be earning from a full-time job during the period 
spent in education.  Signalling becomes a case of potential employees attempting to 
maximise the difference between the wages offered upon entering the workforce and the 
costs of the signals required for the wage increase. 
 
Spence (1973) makes very clear that the theory requires signals to be costly.  If all 
jobseekers can invest in a given signal to the same extent and obtain the same results 
then the signal carries little meaning.  Continuing the education example, a qualification 
that is hard to obtain will only be worthwhile to those talented or skilled enough to pass 
the required assessments.  For others, it would be time (and possibly enrolment/tuition 
costs) spent on failure.  A variable level of qualification serves a similar purpose by 
allowing different outcomes for a fixed cost; a university degree takes the same length 
of time for most students, but different awards at the end differentiate between skill 
levels. 
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In addition, Gibbins et al (1990) note that a free signal allows for false claims since 
there is no immediate penalty for a false signal.  However, Watson et al (2002) argue 
that even without costs signals should be reliable.  A manager caught falsely signalling 
high quality will lose credibility and further signals will be treated sceptically. 
 
4.3.1: Signalling in disclosure 
Signalling theory is directly applicable to corporate disclosure.  Spence’s (1973) 
example had an individual signalling to an employer, likely a company.  In disclosure, 
the roles are reversed as a company signals to potential investors who are likely to be 
individuals. 
 
Signalling as an explanation of disclosure carries a similar starting point to Lemons 
Theory.  Managers in a company seeking investment have the most reliable information 
on the fair value of the company.  Investors lacking this information cannot give perfect 
valuations to each company and instead value each based to some extent on 
generalisations.  The resulting values will be unfairly low for some of the better 
investment opportunities on the market.  The release of some of the managers’ 
privileged information should enable the market as a whole to give a more accurate, 
higher valuation to the better investment opportunities. 
 
The requirement for a cost of signalling is still present.  The process of disclosure will 
cover this requirement in most cases.  In order to make information available, it needs to 
be gathered and published.  In a company, this means at least one employee must spend 
time devoted to disclosure that could otherwise be spent being directly productive.  
Disclosure is therefore only economically useful if it is expected that the market 
reaction generates enough firm value to outweigh the costs involved. 
 
A second interpretation of the theory in disclosure terms has been used in a few papers 
(e.g. Healy and Palepu, 2001, and Dobler et al 2011).  The company’s managers may be 
signalling not the company’s status, but their own competence as managers.  This 
version of the theory has the same overall effects as the original version; managerial 
competence is observable from the company being profitable.   
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4.3.2: Research evidence 
Signalling is commonly tested as an explanation for voluntary disclosure.  Papers 
testing the theory directly are varied.  Many papers examine a specific form of 
disclosure (e.g. risk information disclosure) and find results that may not generalise to 
other types of disclosure. 
 
Ahmed and Courtis’ (1999) meta-analysis of research to the date of publication does not 
name the theory directly, but makes reference to a “signalling hypothesis” in which 
more profitable firms are most likely to reveal additional information.  This hypothesis 
is not widely supported.  Profitability measures have positive effects on disclosure in 
only a few papers, providing weak support for the hypothesis.  A suggestion is given 
that the hypothesis is likely to hold more power than the results suggest, however.  Most 
of the studies in the analysis use only the annual report as a source of information.  If 
companies use any other channels for good news then a possible effect is overlooked in 
the research used in this paper.  Healy and Palepu (2001), the other major overview 
paper in the field, make use of the management talent signalling interpretation.  
Analysis is limited to a comment that there is little evidence either for or against the 
concept in the literature to the time of writing. 
 
Lev and Penman (1990) discuss a signalling interpretation with regard to the disclosure 
of managerial forecasts.  In this case, the observation is that firms either forecast or do 
not, and this is unaffected by the presence of good or bad news.  A company that 
forecasts will therefore release both news that increases the stock price and news that 
will reduce it rather than focus only on the good news as Signalling Theory suggests.  
However, these results may indicate validity to a managerial competence signalling 
interpretation; while the release of bad news negatively impacts the company’s position, 
the managers have made clear that they were aware of the expected problem in advance. 
 
Muller and Pénin (2006) discuss the idea of knowledge disclosure rather than company 
information.  The paper is focused on which companies take part in innovation 
networks, loose co-operations between companies, universities, research institutes, and 
sources of finance to aid in research.  The disclosure of knowledge that would otherwise 
be held within the firm is seen here as a signal of the firm’s capabilities as a research 
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partner in order to attract other members to the same innovation network.  Effectively, 
the company’s managers are signalling its capabilities to others in order to build a 
reputation that attracts potential research partners. 
 
Watson et al (2002) examine Signalling as one of two theories that may explain the 
tendency for a company to disclose accounting ratios.  The results offer little support for 
the theory.  The paper examines both Signalling and Legitimacy Theories and most of 
the results are easily explained in terms of Legitimacy (see below).  The lack of a clear 
financial performance effect on disclosure gives little support to Signalling.  The 
authors suggest this may be due to timing, however.  The data for Watson et al’s (2002) 
study is gathered during a time of recession, which is suggested as having a dominant 
effect that obscures any other performance effects on disclosure. 
 
Hasseldine et al (2005) examine Signalling interpretations as explanations of social and 
environmental disclosures.  The theory is considered useful as a complement to other 
explanations, but not sufficient alone to explain disclosure.  As in other papers, the 
performance measure used in this study is rarely found to be a significant determinant 
of disclosure, suggesting that the theory is not a powerful explanation. 
 
While the evidence above suggests that Signalling is generally not a supported theory, 
the effect of financial performance measures on disclosure cannot be rejected at this 
point.  Each conclusion comes from insignificant effects from financial performance 
measures.  Such measures are a common variable in disclosure research and effects are 
mixed.  While other papers tend not to name the theory directly, the existence of 
positive effects from performance in some cases offers some (albeit limited) support. 
 
4.3.3: Variables Relevant to Signalling Theory 
The signs of Signalling Theory are very similar to those of Lemons.  The difference in 
the two is largely one of intentions.  Lemons Theory, as stated above, sees managers of 
good investments avoiding an assumption of being a bad investment and being valued 
accordingly.  Signalling, by contrast, has managers of good investments highlighting 
that they are good to attract investment.  In either case, the better investment 
opportunities are advertising themselves as such. 
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Accordingly, the expected signs of Signalling Theory are the same as those for Lemons.  
Positive effects from financial performance are the main indicators of the theory, while 
a negative volatility effect would confirm that the market generally seeks stable returns.  
Less directly, the ability to diversify from size or multiple listing aids in performance 
and may have some limited effects. 
 
Debt finance and industry sensitivity are expected to have little to no effects on 
disclosure under Signalling Theory.   
 
4.3.4: Conditions for Lemons Theory 
Morris (1987) sets out the following conditions for Signalling Theory (p50), 
considering the entire set to be sufficient: 
 
S1: All market participants are rational wealth maximisers. 
S2: The quality of firms competing for equity and debt funds in the capital markets 
varies. 
S3: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect the quality of firms in the second period. 
S4: The actual quality of firms is observable in period 2 only. 
S5: In period 1, information asymmetry exists between the manager of each firm and 
capital suppliers.  The manager’s information about the firm is superior to that of capital 
suppliers. 
S6: Signalling costs are inversely related to firm quality. 
 
Of these, Morris states that only condition S5 is necessary.  Without information 
asymmetry existing between managers and capital suppliers, there is no need for any 
signalling.  Wealth maximisation (S1) explains the motivation for signalling; those 
offering a better-than-average investment (be it shares, their skills as an employee, or 
anything else) would be content with receiving an average value without this, but 
knowing wealth maximisation occurs is not enough to predict Signalling Theory.  
Conditions S2, S3 and S4 collectively allow companies to vary in quality over time 
while making it unclear which firms are the highest quality.  Condition S6 is needed for 
Signalling Theory to function, but like wealth maximisation does not predict it will 
occur without other conditions also being present. 
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4.4: Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy Theory (Shocker and Sethi, 1973) does not explain disclosure as clearly as 
Lemons or Signalling above.  The original idea was explained in a paper on including 
the views of wider society when developing a corporate strategy. 
 
At the core of the theory is a basic contract that any social institution must follow, 
businesses included.  There are two important terms to this usually unwritten contract: 
The institution must provide something socially desirable to the broader society (i.e. be 
relevant), and it must distribute benefits to any groups from which it derives power to 
maintain its status as a legitimate organisation.  Adherence to this contract is vital to the 
continued existence and growth of the organisation. 
 
In practice, adherence is more complex than the simple contract suggests.  Maintaining 
relevance is complicated by changes in technology and society, either of which can 
render a once-vital product or service obsolete.  Maintaining legitimacy is complicated 
by the same changes as these can move the sources of power, plus the need to ensure 
that those benefiting from the business are socially acceptable, as aiding those 
considered unacceptable is itself considered unacceptable.  This final point is further 
complicated by the existence of subgroups within society which may have very 
different views on what counts as acceptable behaviour. 
 
The paper goes on to discuss a means by which companies can balance adherence to the 
contract with continued profitable business.  The method involves identifying important 
groups and their priorities and how a given action may impact on these.  At its core, the 
method involves making decisions based on weighted expected utility functions with 
the aim of maximising the total utility of all interest groups. 
 
4.4.1: Legitimacy in disclosure 
While Lemons and Signalling theories can be linked directly to disclosure, the link is 
less direct for Legitimacy Theory. 
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Legitimacy Theory can be used to explain disclosure due to the existence of subgroups 
in society with specific interests in particular issues.  These interests define the group’s 
view on what is acceptable behaviour and in turn what the company must do to retain 
legitimacy.  Over time, the set of groups that are important to a company will change; as 
the company changes to remain relevant and society itself is changed, so too will the 
sources of power for the company.  The emergence of a new group, decline of an 
existing one, or change in the relative importance of each to the company will change 
the underlying utility function that the company needs to maximise.  In order to 
maintain its position, the company needs to keep track of all of the information of this 
type.  One of the tools available is to communicate directly with the interest groups.  
The release of information about the company is a possible means to this end as it gives 
information to all possible groups and enables them to communicate any concerns to the 
company. 
 
The more common approach is to reveal information in order to satisfy society that the 
firm is not behaving badly.  By revealing more about what is occurring within the 
company, managers can show that the company does not break the implied contract and 
information can be directed towards showing specific interest groups that the company 
is listening to their concerns.  The company shows that it is behaving acceptably and 
should not be the focus of protest groups.  This process is often referred to as 
legitimation. 
 
The alternative application is to try to change attitudes.  In this approach, information is 
released that focuses on the positive outcomes of some action rather than showing how 
it fits with a particular interest group’s definition of good behaviour.  Rather than 
avoiding questionable behaviours, the intention is to legitimise them by showing the 
results in a positive light.   
 
4.4.2: Research evidence 
Legitimacy Theory has had some amount of research attention.  While there are many 
papers that mention it as a possible explanation of results (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005), there is a body of research that attempts to examine the theory in depth. 
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Patten (1992) offers a good example.  Patten studied the environmental information 
sections of annual reports of various oil companies before and after the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill in 1989.  Exxon, the operator of the ship involved, greatly increased the amount 
of environmental information after the incident.  However, Exxon was only one of a 
number of companies that collectively owned the consortium running the pipeline the 
Valdez was using at the time.  The other members of the consortium had similar 
increases in their environmental disclosures in the period, although smaller than 
Exxon’s.  In addition, most of the companies examined outside the consortium had 
increased their environmental disclosures, although again to a lesser extent.  In all cases, 
Patten’s interpretation is that the oil industry as a whole received attention over possible 
environmental problems and individual companies changed their disclosures in response 
to an expected focus on environmental conduct. 
 
Watson et al (2002) offer a good explanation of the theory’s relevance to disclosure 
(especially within the disclosure of accounting ratios) and make several references to 
the theory to explain observed results as potentially being companies undertaking a 
legitimation process.  However, the authors advise against the theory as an explanation 
of disclosure.  While considered a useful one for explaining some disclosure patterns, 
the theoretical underpinnings can be explained using a combination of Signalling and 
Agency theories.  Signalling is the more powerful of the two in this regard as companies 
are often considered to signal legitimacy.   
 
Adams et al (1998) offer one of the most direct tests of Legitimacy Theory.  The 
research question is whether corporate social reporting practices are a form of 
legitimation.  The final results suggest that there is a strong effect from Legitimacy 
Theory in determining social reporting practices, but the process is complex and cannot 
be fully explained by the theory alone. 
 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) make minor use of the theory in a study of Portuguese 
practices.  Legitimacy is one of several theories named early in the paper and discussed 
throughout.  However, it is not one of the main points of the paper, and ultimately the 
evidence is lacking.   
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Legitimacy Theory is used to justify the inclusion of an industry classification variable 
due to some industries having more pressures than others.  When analysed in various 
models, this variable is either insignificant or significant only at the 10% level, 
suggesting it has at most a weak effect within the sample.  However, this point is not 
applicable to many other papers that have made use of an industry classification 
variable.  While few explicitly name Legitimacy Theory as a reason to include the 
variable, similar reasoning for the variable is used and in many cases a significant effect 
is observed (e.g. Meek et al 1995, Field et al 2003).  There is some support for 
Legitimacy Theory as an explanation of disclosure from these examples. 
 
4.4.3: Variables Relevant to Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy Theory as an explanation of disclosure can be summarised as companies 
faced with any significant controversy tending towards higher disclosure.  The expected 
effects follow from this. 
 
The sensitive industry variable is the main indicator of the theory.  The variable is 
specifically designed to capture sensitivity to public opinions and captures those firms 
with great environmental impacts through resource extraction and those that directly 
deal with the public, as this makes them directly subject to public opinion.  
Accordingly, a positive effect from the industry variable is the most important sign of 
Legitimacy Theory in the models presented here.  A lack of effect would provide 
evidence against the theory. 
 
Aside from this, other effects are mostly comparable to those expected in the Political 
Costs Hypothesis below due to the same assumptions of what will generate suspicion 
among the public.  Size is therefore included as major cause of disclosure under this 
theory.  Multiple listing is linked to size and included for control reasons; a larger 
company has more resources to set up foreign operations, and a multinational has access 
to more markets and therefore growth potential.  In addition, there is a possibility of a 
multinational company acting in a manner that is appropriate in one culture but 
criticised in another in which it operates.    
 
Debt finance and volatility are not expected to have any effects under this theory.  
Volatility may displease investors, but is not a matter of controversy.  Similarly, debt 
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finance may lead to a focus on institutional investors, but is generally not a 
controversial matter. 
 
4.4.4: Conditions for Legitimacy Theory 
The collective set of sufficient conditions for the theory is as follows: 
 
L1: Market participants are rational wealth maximisers.  This is not necessarily true for 
other types of stakeholders in a given firm, who are not market participants with regard 
to the company in question. 
L2: Companies must produce something of value to remain relevant and must distribute 
rewards to those who granted it power or lose support. 
L3: All companies operate in two time periods.  Managers make investment and 
production decisions in the first period which affect perceptions of the company’s 
relevance and appropriateness in the second period. 
 
Condition L2 is the only necessary condition of the set.  If companies can act without 
regard to societal views then there is no need for legitimation methods.  As in other 
theories, condition L1’s wealth maximisation is needed to explain the company’s 
behaviour.  The goal of the company is to generate profit, which in turn is passed on to 
its investors to some extent, which is not achievable under this theory without support 
from other parties.  While those uninvolved in a given company may also aim to 
maximise their wealth, the company is not part of this process and may harm their 
overall utility in other ways.   
 
Variations on condition L3 are common to all theories in the study, being the condition 
that allows companies to change the relevant characteristic to the theory over time.  Its 
absence would prevent the theory from functioning; a company that takes steps to 
improve how it is perceived has wasted time and effort if perception cannot be changed.  
However, where most other theories follow this with another condition about the 
characteristic only being observable in the second period, a comparable condition is not 
needed here.  The characteristic in question is the public’s current perception of the 
company rather than a more concrete but immediately unknowable characteristic like its 
quality.   
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4.5: Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) Agency Theory is an important theory within the 
discipline of finance.  The theory explains the workings of the firm, which at the time 
they state was often considered a “black box”.  They see a company as a nexus of 
contracts between individuals, many of whom have conflicting goals.  Where papers of 
the time were beginning to argue that wealth maximisation alone cannot explain 
company actions, Agency Theory suggests otherwise.  The difference is that where 
others looked at the company as a unified entity, Agency Theory considers wealth 
maximisation at an individual level. 
 
The theory relies on an agency relationship.  This is a contract in which a principal (the 
company’s owners) contract an agent (the company’s managers) to act on their behalf, 
which requires the agents to have some power to make decisions.  If both parties are 
assumed to be rational utility maximisers, the agent may not always act in the best 
interests of the principal as the agent’s interests may diverge from those of the principal. 
 
The divergence of interests can be limited through various methods, which Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) split into two broad categories.  Monitoring techniques involve 
observing the agent in order to limit their capacity to behave in a way that does not 
benefit the principal.  The other category, called bonding, are methods in which the 
agent is authorised to expend resources in ways that guarantee the agent will either not 
take actions that run counter to the principal’s interests or will compensate the 
principals in such cases.  While seemingly counter to the agent’s interests, successful 
bonding methods are carefully designed to increase their wealth.  An example is later 
given in which a manager with some ownership interest is obtaining detailed financial 
information for decision-making purposes.  If the other owners/debtholders decide it 
would be useful to publish similar information, it is likely that the owner-manager can 
provide much of the information at a lower cost than any other party.  The cheapest 
course of action would be for the company to have this information checked by an 
external auditor.  For the owner-manager, wealth is maximised by agreeing to pay the 
auditor’s fees as the alternative, having another party gather data from the beginning, 
would reduce the company’s wealth and therefore the fraction that flows to the owner-
manager. 
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Monitoring and bonding methods both carry costs and may still not result in the agent 
acting perfectly in the principal’s interests.  There is therefore an indirect cost to the 
principal in undertaking either method, which is named as the residual loss.  Further, the 
direct costs can eventually reach a point where the cost of bringing the agent’s actions 
into alignment with the principal’s interests is higher than the wealth generated for the 
principal, making the costs inefficient for the principal to undertake and therefore 
another source of residual loss.  Agency costs are overall defined as the three costs 
combined: monitoring costs plus bonding costs plus residual loss. 
 
Debt finance receives special consideration in the paper.  After some discussion of the 
three agency costs and modelling of where each is optimal, it is stated that few firms are 
financed almost entirely by debt.  This is due to an entrepreneur with low investment 
relative to the debt total being incentivised to undertake high-risk high-reward strategies 
since the entrepreneur will receive the benefits of high rewards while personally 
suffering only a fraction of the costs of unsuccessful projects.   
 
4.5.1: Agency in disclosure 
The application of Agency Theory to disclosure relies on the types of cost.  While 
residual losses are unavoidable, disclosure of information can act as either a monitoring 
or bonding technique. 
 
Disclosure as monitoring is the easier of the two to explain, and it works in three 
different ways.  The first part of this is that information becomes harder to hide within 
the company.  An inefficient use of resources should become more apparent to the 
owners if more detail of the company’s overall actions formally reaches them.  Healy 
and Palepu (2001) suggest that the existence of contracts to reduce agency problems 
frequently result in the disclosure of information by managers required to demonstrate 
that they are acting in shareholders’ interests. 
 
Related to this, the second aspect is that managers may become more careful about their 
actions if they are aware they are being observed, stopping some agency costs just by 
the existence of monitoring methods such as disclosure.  Third, published information 
can reach many.  In this sense, by disclosing information the company makes the 
monitoring more effective by allowing more people to act as monitors.   
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The bonding aspect of disclosure is less direct.  Some of the ideas above are applicable 
in that providing more information will make it harder for managers to act in their own 
interests without being observed (Raffournier, 1995).  By agreeing to provide more 
information on their actions, the managers are effectively bonding themselves.   
 
4.5.2: Research Evidence 
Agency Theory has received some research attention in the context of disclosure.  The 
use of corporate governance variables as a possible explanation of disclosure is often 
linked to this theory.  Evidence from research has been mixed. 
 
Watson et al (2002) find evidence broadly consistent with Agency Theory explaining 
the disclosure of accounting ratios.  Even within the paper, there is some doubt.  One of 
the expectations is that the more regulated industries in the sample would tend to 
disclose more as a means to reduce agency costs, but this particular hypothesis was not 
supported.  An earlier paper, Meek et al (1995), demonstrates evidence that contradicts 
the theory.  A measure of leverage is included and found to be significant, but with the 
wrong sign.  Where the theory predicts highly leveraged firms disclosing more to limit 
possible agency problems, the finding in the paper is more disclosure from less 
leveraged companies.  By contrast, Ahmed and Courtis’ (1999) meta-analysis finds a 
broad association between high debt finance and disclosure, supporting the theory.  
Similarly, Abraham and Cox (2007) find evidence supporting Agency Theory.  The 
difference may be explained by the more specific nature of this paper, however.  Rather 
than a general measure of disclosure, the paper examines risk information disclosure 
only.   
 
Outside of the Anglo-American accounting context, evidence tends not to support the 
theory.  Depoers (2000) makes frequent reference to the theory but rejects it as an 
explanation of disclosure in France.  Similarly, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) use the 
theory but, finding few of the Agency-derived variables to be significant, cannot 
support the theory as an explanation of disclosure.  However, Patelli and Prencipe 
(2007) find evidence supporting the theory in an Italian context, albeit limited only to 
cases where there is a single dominant shareholder. 
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4.5.3: Variables Relevant to Agency Theory 
To simplify, companies can reduce agency costs by disclosure.  This suggests that the 
signs supporting the theory would be firms likely to experience agency problems 
tending to disclose more. 
 
Debt finance is the primary indication of agency problems.  The existence of both 
equity and debt ownership means there are two classes of owner with different 
priorities, meaning a manager will inevitably generate some agency costs by serving the 
needs of one but not the other.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) include a lengthy and 
complex discussion of how debt may lead to agency costs; while it assumes managers to 
be dishonest, it gives an example of how debt can add to agency problems in a firm.  
Despite this, a clear direction of effect is not apparent.  The theory applied to disclosure 
suggests that debt finance creates agency problems and should lead to disclosure.  
However, lenders tend to be large institutions capable of acquiring information 
privately.  The result is a reduced need for disclosure as a portion of the company’s 
owners has no need for this type of information release.  Debt is expected to affect 
disclosure, but a strong effect of either positive or negative nature can be argued to be 
consistent with Agency Theory. 
 
The size of the firm is expected to have a positive effect on disclosure under this theory.  
A larger company offers more opportunities for a manager to act in their own interests.  
The sheer volume of information the company generates means more information is 
summarised rather than discussed in detail, potentially glossing over a manager’s self-
interested actions.  Similarly, multiple listing generally means international operations, 
which means less oversight from the headquarters and has the potential to create 
language barriers that make information harder to interpret.  Again, a positive effect on 
disclosure is expected as more information is produced to limit these effects. 
 
Clear effects from other variables are not expected.  Neither volatility nor sensitive 
industry membership have large agency cost implications.  It is not clear whether 
Agency Theory predicts a positive or negative effect on disclosure from financial 
performance.  No effects from any of these variables are included in Agency Theory 
models in this study. 
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4.5.4: Conditions for Agency Theory 
Morris (1987) lists the following as the complete set of sufficient conditions for Agency 
Theory (p50): 
 
A1: All market participants are rational wealth maximisers. 
A2: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect firms’ expected values and variances in the 
second period. 
A3: Firms have external equity and debt financing. 
A4: There is separation of equity and debt finance suppliers and managerial control in 
the firm. 
A5: Each manager owns a fraction of the firm’s outstanding equity. 
A6: Each manager is remunerated by salary, perquisite consumption, and returns on 
their equity in the firm. 
A7: Monitoring and bonding are available at a cost proportional to the value of the firm; 
and they reduce activities dysfunctional to capital suppliers at a reducing rate. 
 
Conditions A1 and A4 are stated to be collectively necessary.  Taken together, they 
imply that managers and capital suppliers are separate groups but both try to maximise 
their own wealth.  This allows the existence of the agency costs on which the theory 
relies.  A6 does not imply Agency without A1 and A4, but its direct mention of 
perquisites explains some of the sources of agency costs.  A5, managers owning part of 
the company, is a common means of performance-related pay used to align managers 
and owners.  A3, a mix of debt and equity capital, reflects the importance Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) placed on companies mixing the two sources.  As in other theories, 
condition A2 allows changes over time.  Finally, condition A7 explains how agency 
costs can be directly reduced, but as with others its presence does not predict the theory 
without further conditions. 
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4.6: Political Costs Hypothesis 
The last theory tested in this thesis is part of Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978) Positive 
Accounting Theory (PAT).  This, the authors’ first paper on PAT, argued for the idea of 
approaching accounting research from a positivist viewpoint.  The focus of the theory is 
what position a given company will take when lobbying with regard to proposed new 
rules and regulations, which is argued to be the result of the managers’ attitudes.   
 
Political costs are loosely defined as wealth transfers caused as a result of politics.  
Various examples are given, ranging from the nationalisation of a company to the 
regulation of an industry.  One of the major causes of political costs is explained to be 
the reported profits of a company, caused by an association the public makes between 
larger companies and monopolistic behaviour, in turn leading to increased demands for 
some manner of regulation on the company in question.   
 
The same authors provided a review of Positive Accounting after some time had passed 
and others had worked with the ideas (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  Three commonly 
used hypotheses are detailed in this paper, one of which is named as the Political Costs 
Hypothesis.  The hypothesis holds that larger companies will generally lobby in favour 
of proposals that would reduce their reported profits.  While counterintuitive given the 
normal assumption that high profits are desirable to both current and potential investors, 
the reduced profit lowers the amount of attention the company receives from the public 
and in turn the amount of political pressure directed at it. 
 
Note that the hypothesis above is based on reported profit causing political costs, where 
this is a measure of size rather than financial performance.  Further, a more general 
version of the hypothesis is that various characteristics make a company more visible to 
the general public, which increases the chance of the firm suffering political costs.  This 
visibility is referred to as “negative attention” below. 
 
4.6.1: Political Costs in disclosure 
In terms of disclosure behaviour, the Political Costs Hypothesis may act in two different 
ways. 
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The more direct of the two ways is that disclosure can add more detail to the 
information available and reduce the negative attention received.  Managers in a large 
company may be able to disclose some additional information that makes the position 
appear less powerful, such as reporting difficulties faced by the company in the period.  
Alternatively, engaging in and reporting on programmes that benefit people outside of 
the company (e.g. environmental initiatives) may reduce negative attention by 
demonstrating that the company is not solely focused on its position in the market. 
 
The alternative is for managers to accept that negative attention will occur and attempt 
to limit the resulting regulation.  In this approach, the managers observe the calls for 
regulation that will affect the company and produce relevant information before 
anything is made mandatory.  For example, if the political process seems to be moving 
towards requiring environmental information, managers may reveal some of this before 
any rules come into force.  The intention is to satisfy some of the demand for 
information of the type, reducing the political pressure and the likelihood of onerous 
regulation being placed on the company. 
 
4.6.2: Research Evidence 
Despite its status as a hypothesis rather than a theory, political costs have received much 
research attention in disclosure.  Overall, the evidence supports the idea. 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) discuss the theory in various parts of their literature review.  
While no conclusion is drawn, the evidence presented generally does not support the 
theory, finding little to no effect on various measures when political concerns are 
involved in a study.  One part of the paper suggests that size is not a suitable proxy for 
political costs as it captures many other factors, making any effects observed difficult to 
definitively explain as the result of political cost concerns.  Raffournier (1995), 
however, states the exact opposite; while size may be correlated with other variables, its 
effects on disclosure should be attributed to political costs.  With this, Raffournier’s 
paper supports the Political Costs Hypothesis in disclosure as size is very powerful and 
significant.  Ahmed and Courtis (1999) similarly use size as evidence for a political 
costs interpretation of disclosure.   
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Whether size is an appropriate measure of political costs or not is vital to the theory; if 
size does indicate political costs, then many other papers support the PCH as an 
explanation of disclosure.  If not, then many papers have shown that size is significant 
and provided little or no information on the PCH. 
 
Meek et al (1995) do not state a conclusion regarding the theory, but many of the 
variables they argue may signify Political Cost effects are significant in the final 
analysis, lending some support to the idea. 
 
Watson et al (2002) offer some additional criticisms of the PCH.  In addition to 
questions over whether size is an appropriate measure, one footnote suggests that the 
exact opposite of the theory may be true.  As written, the theory holds that companies 
with the potential for political costs should disclose.  This paper instead suggests that a 
company with likely political costs would be better off remaining silent in order to 
avoid any attention that may lead to costs. 
 
Finally, Milne (2002) argues against the entire concept.  While much evidence exists 
and is consistent with the PCH, Milne questions it.  Many papers have used such a 
broad definition of the term “political costs” that alternative explanations may be valid 
with the same results.  Without a firmer definition of political costs, there is little to 
support the theory directly. 
 
4.6.3: Variables Relevant to the Political Costs Hypothesis 
The PCH is similar in many ways to Legitimacy Theory in many ways.  While it is 
based on negative attention rather than controversy directly, the two concepts overlap 
heavily. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) explained when political costs would be most likely to 
emerge as they introduced the idea and later (1990) clarified it to explain the Hypothesis 
as larger firms being more likely to experience political costs, making this an important 
variable for the PCH.  As with Legitimacy, multiple listing is included although mostly 
as a control variable due to its links to size.  Further, the Hypothesis is based on possible 
calls for regulation due to the company attracting negative attention, making the 
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sensitive industry variable a likely cause of disclosure as it covers some of the 
companies often named as environmental problems. 
 
As in Legitimacy Theory, volatility and debt finance are not significant causes of 
controversy and not included in the theory. 
 
4.6.3: Conditions for the Political Costs Hypothesis 
The collective sufficient conditions for the PCH are as follows: 
 
P1: Market participants are rational wealth maximisers.  This is not necessarily true for 
other types of stakeholders in a given firm, who are not market participants with regard 
to the company in question. 
P2: Companies with a negative public perception will experience various negative 
outcomes. 
P3: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect the company’s public perception in the second. 
 
P2 is the only necessary condition.  Without the concept of negative attention, the 
hypothesis collapses as there is no need to reduce attention to avoid the undesirable 
regulation that would result.  Market participant wealth maximisation (P1) in included 
because there is an implicit assumption in the PCH that regulation limits the company’s 
ability to profit, but as in other theories it does not predict the PCH alone.   
 
Condition P3 enables managers to change the perception of their company over time, 
again important to the PCH but not enough to predict it.  As in Legitimacy Theory, the 
PCH concerns the immediate perception of the company rather than a reliably 
measurable but currently unknown characteristic and no condition about observing it 
only in the second period is included.  Condition P1, again similar to Legitimacy, means 
a company’s managers and owners each aim to maximise its profit.  Those who are not 
involved in a company through the market (i.e. most stakeholders) do not gain wealth 
from the company’s actions.   
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4.7: Comparison of theories 
The list of variables relevant to the PCH in section 4.6.3 is nearly identical to those in 
section 4.4.3, the variables relevant to Legitimacy Theory.  The only differences in the 
two are some of the justifications for a given variable; the actual list of variables and the 
effects expected of them is identical.  There is clearly some overlap between Legitimacy 
Theory and the Political Costs Hypothesis that makes the two impossible to distinguish 
from the list of variables examined here.  However, much of the overlap in relevant 
variables results from the two explanations having similar underlying assumptions.  
Each is based on companies attracting unwelcome attention.  A difference occurs only 
at this point; the PCH assumes regulation will be demanded and the company’s 
managers will take actions to limit its effects, while Legitimacy Theory has managers 
communicating with stakeholders over their concerns about the company’s problematic 
aspects. 
 
The similarity is enough that the two may be identical for practical purposes.  While 
differences exist in the two as explanations, they describe largely the same series of 
events in disclosure terms, differing mainly in the intentions of the company managers.  
Lemons and Signalling theories are in a similar position, each explaining why firms 
with better results and/or managers may publicise more information.   
 
In addition to the possibility that some theories are the same in disclosure terms, the 
research performed aims to determine which theory or theories best explain observed 
disclosure activity.  It is possible that several have explanatory power and as such a 
formal means of comparing the theories before analysis is needed to ensure that the 
results are reasonable, such as not supporting two contradictory theories. 
 
Table 4.1 below repeats the conditions for each theory for reference purposes.   
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Table 4.1: Conditions by theory 
Lemons Theory conditions 
L1: All market participants are rational wealth maximisers.   
L2: The quality of firms competing for equity and debt funds in the capital markets 
varies. 
L3: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect the quality of firms in the second period. 
L4: The actual quality of firms is observable in period 2 only. 
L5: In period 1, information asymmetry exists between the manager of each firm and 
capital suppliers.  The manager’s information about the firm is superior to that of 
capital suppliers. 
Signalling Theory conditions 
S1: All market participants are rational wealth maximisers. 
S2: The quality of firms competing for equity and debt funds in the capital markets 
varies. 
S3: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect the quality of firms in the second period. 
S4: The actual quality of firms is observable in period 2 only. 
S5: In period 1, information asymmetry exists between the manager of each firm and 
capital suppliers.  The manager’s information about the firm is superior to that of 
capital suppliers. 
S6: Signalling costs are inversely related to firm quality. 
Agency Theory conditions 
A1: All market participants are rational wealth maximisers. 
A2: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect firms’ expected values and variances in the 
second period. 
A3: Firms have external equity and debt financing. 
A4: There is separation of equity and debt finance suppliers and managerial control in 
the firm. 
A5: Each manager owns a fraction of the firm’s outstanding equity. 
A6: Each manager is remunerated by salary, perquisite consumption, and returns on 
their equity in the firm. 
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A7: Monitoring and bonding are available at a cost proportional to the value of the 
firm; and they reduce activities dysfunctional to capital suppliers at a reducing rate. 
Legitimacy Theory conditions 
L1: Market participants are rational wealth maximisers.  This is not necessarily true for 
other types of stakeholders in a given firm, who are not market participants with regard 
to the company in question. 
L2: Companies must produce something of value to remain relevant and must distribute 
rewards to those who granted it power or lose support. 
L3: All companies operate in two time periods.  Managers make investment and 
production decisions in the first period which affect the public’s perception of the 
company in the second period. 
Political Costs Hypothesis conditions 
P1: Market participants are rational wealth maximisers.  This is not necessarily true for 
other types of stakeholders in a given firm, who are not market participants with regard 
to the company in question. 
P2: Companies with a negative public perception will experience various negative 
outcomes. 
P3: All firms operate in two periods.  Managers make production and investment 
decisions in the first period which affect the company’s public perception in the second 
period. 
 
4.7.1: Comparison 1: Lemons and Signalling 
The descriptions above for Lemons Theory and Signalling Theory suggest some 
similarity in the two.  A comparison of conditions suggests a stronger connection. 
 
The necessary conditions are L5 and S5 in table 4.1, which in each case is the existence 
of information asymmetry in which company managers have superior information to 
potential investors.  Aside from the final condition S6, the two sets are identical.  Under 
Morris’ (1987) technique, this makes the theories identical. 
 
Each covers a situation where information asymmetry exists regarding the quality of an 
investment and the potential investors set all prices on the assumption that any 
opportunity may be a poor one.  The primary difference in them is what is suggested to 
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occur after this point.  Lemons, as written, has the better investments leave the market 
and reduce the overall quality.  Signalling, by contrast, has the better investments find 
ways to make their superiority clear to the market.  In effect, Lemons describes what 
would happen if signals could not be sent.  Unable to distinguish themselves from 
inferior investments, the better options cannot obtain a fair price and leave the market. 
 
In practical terms, sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.4 detail the observable effects of these two 
theories among the variables tested here.  Each relies on companies highlighting good 
performance and, as such, the two would be impossible to differentiate in this particular 
study.   They are treated as the same theory for the remainder of the thesis.  Future 
references will name only Signalling as it is more often mentioned in other disclosure 
literature. 
 
4.7.2: Comparison 2: Legitimacy and Political Costs 
The descriptions above highlight similarities in Legitimacy Theory and the Political 
Costs Hypothesis.  Both relate to the perceptions of companies leading to negative 
outcomes and the managers attempting to reduce the problems by actions that affect the 
perception of the firm. 
 
There are clear similarities in the sets of conditions given in table 4.1.  The second 
condition, the necessary one in each, is different.  However, while the wording differs, 
the two conditions describe very similar situations.  In terms of explaining disclosure, 
the two theories are almost identical.  They differ in broader terms, but in disclosure 
terms they overlap. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the two are considered identical.  In each, companies 
likely to come under question are expected to disclose more information.  While it is 
questionable whether the two theories are the same as explanations of disclosure, they 
are impossible to distinguish using the variables employed here.  The two are hereafter 
referred to collectively as Legitimacy, using the name of the Theory rather than the 
Hypothesis.  Either may be the underlying explanation of any evidence that supports the 
two, however. 
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4.7.3: Comparison 3: Signalling and Agency 
The comparison of Signalling and Agency Theories is performed in Morris (1987) as an 
example of the method. 
 
Morris argues that condition S5 is necessary for Signalling, while A1 and A4 are 
necessary in Agency.  That is, in order, information asymmetry, wealth maximisation, 
and separation of ownership and control.  Information asymmetry and separation of 
ownership and control complement each other since the controlling managers will tend 
to have more information about their company than any other party.  However, 
Signalling Theory does not have wealth maximisation as a necessary condition, 
indicating that the two theories are not identical and do not share an implicative 
relationship.  Further, at no point do the conditions conflict.  They are therefore 
concluded to be consistent theories in that neither provides information about the other 
and each may be true or false independently.  Both may therefore have some 
explanatory power over disclosure in practice. 
 
4.7.4: Comparison 4: Signalling and Legitimacy 
Earlier discussion suggests that Signalling and Legitimacy have little in common.  
Nonetheless, a formal comparison is carried out. 
 
There is no overlap in the necessary conditions of these two theories.  The necessary 
conditions are S3 and L2, respectively the existence of information asymmetry and 
companies potentially losing support if acting inappropriately.  Neither implies the 
other, and neither conflicts with the other.  In the sufficient conditions, only wealth 
maximisation is common and there is no evidence of conflict among the rest.  These 
theories are therefore consistent; Signalling and Legitimacy Theories may both have 
some explanatory power over disclosure independently of each other. 
 
4.7.5: Comparison 5: Legitimacy and Agency 
As in section 4.1 above, there is little in earlier discussion to suggest Legitimacy and 
Agency theories share either conditions or predictions. 
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There is little evidence these theories interact at all.  The necessary conditions are L2, 
A1, and A4; companies must act appropriately or lose support, market participants 
maximise their wealth, and the separation of ownership and control.  There is some 
overlap in these conditions.  Separate ownership and control could potentially lead to 
the firm not rewarding owners in the event of serious agency problems.  However, 
wealth maximisation is only necessary in Agency Theory and not Legitimacy, where it 
is a (jointly) sufficient but not necessary condition, so the two are neither identical nor 
implicative.  Examination of the remaining conditions shows no overlap at all, 
suggesting that these two are consistent theories that may both explain disclosure 
independently. 
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4.8: Conclusion 
Five theories of disclosure have been selected for study.  These are Lemons Theory 
(Akerlof, 1970), Signalling Theory (Spence, 1973), Legitimacy Theory (Shocker and 
Sethi, 1973), Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the Political Costs 
Hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978 and 1990).  Each has been explained both in 
general and as a theory of disclosure. 
 
In comparing theories, Lemons and Signalling are identified as being identical.  While 
there are differences between the two, as explanations of disclosure they are identical.  
In Lemons Theory, companies are priced as if there is some risk every company is an 
unknown lemon.  Managers can counteract the potential lemon assumption by providing 
more information about the company.  This is almost exactly what Signalling Theory 
describes; better investment opportunities make their superiority clear in order to obtain 
the higher valuations that they deserve.  The two are collectively referred to as 
Signalling Theory in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
In addition, Legitimacy Theory and the PCH are considered identical.  This is less clear 
than the above example and is more a practical than a theoretical effect.  Both theories 
have managers in companies that attract the wrong kind of attention provide more 
information in order to reduce the suspicion surrounding the company.  The signs of 
each theory are therefore similar enough that, while the theories are not identical, they 
would be impossible to distinguish in the study performed.  The two are collectively 
referred to as Legitimacy Theory in the remainder of the thesis, but the PCH 
explanation is an equally valid one for any supporting evidence despite this name. 
 
Finally, Signalling, Legitimacy and Agency are all compared against each other.  Morris 
(1987) performed the comparison of Signalling and Agency and found no evidence that 
the two were at all linked.  The same is found for the other comparisons performed.  
These three theories are all possible explanations of disclosure independently of each 
other and some combination of them may explain disclosure behaviour among company 
managers.  The next phase is testing these ideas, which requires data. 
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Chapter 5: Data and methods 
This chapter covers the origins and usage of the sample used in the study and the 
variables used in later modelling.  The chapter explains where the raw data originated 
and explains which companies make up the sample.   The basis of the sample is a pre-
made list of companies, so part of this section will explain what this list contains and 
explains the reasoning for removing some entries before analysis. 
 
The data for this study was mostly gathered within DataStream, primarily using the 
program for access to the Worldscope database.  One of the pre-existing lists of 
companies in DataStream was identified as a useful starting point, consisting of 1660 
FTSE-listed companies at 31/7/2013.  However, as in many papers using a broad list, 
not all were suitable for entry into the sample.  The list’s constituents are not removed 
immediately should they de-list for any reason, commonly one of choosing to become 
private entities, cessation of business activity due to bankruptcy, or merging with 
another company.  Instead, they remain part of the list for some time after their de-
listing from the FTSE with a note about why there is no additional data available.  The 
lack of further data makes these ‘dead’ firms (to use the program’s term) unusable.   
 
In addition, some entries were missing important data.  The majority of these are 
investment funds run by companies rather than shares in the companies directly.  This 
would not be a problem in itself, but they generally lack at least one piece of data and 
are unsuitable for comparison with others.  This is likely a result of their nature as 
investment funds as some of the information is not necessary or useful to these different 
types of investment.  In addition, there are some cases where a company lacks some 
piece of information.   
 
Between dead firms and missing data, the final usable sample contains 1436 companies.  
No further restrictions are placed on the sample (e.g. industry sector), leaving this as the 
final sample size. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  Section 5.1 discusses the the 
choice of sample, the possibility of outliers, and the transformations applied to the data 
set before use in some later models.  Section 5.2 details the variables used in the study, 
the individual characteristics of the companies included in the sample that are used in 
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the models performed in the next two chapters.  Section 5.3 investigates the variables 
before modelling is performed, examining the descriptive variables and performing 
some correlation analysis to inform later modelling. 
 
Finally, section 5.4 details the modelling methods used in the next chapter.  The section 
primarily focuses on the structural equation modelling aspect.  While regression 
methods are used and are important to the study, they are also far more commonly used 
in disclosure literature and familiar to researchers in the area. 
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5.1: General Discussion of Data 
This section provides a discussion of the reasoning behind the choice of sample. 
 
A large data set is useful in any quantitative test.  A sample should be representative of 
the wider population in terms of the various characteristics the population may have. 
The larger a sample becomes, the more likely this is to be true. A small sample is more 
likely to not include a member of the population that represents a particular 
characteristic. For example, if only 5% of companies have no debt in their capital 
structure, a small sample may fail to include a single company of this type. 
Alternatively, a small sample may include proportionately too many of these companies 
and create the impression that a larger percentage act this way. The larger the sample 
becomes, the more likely it is to accurately reflect the population’s characteristics. 
 
However, feasibility of using larger data sets can become an issue. The larger the 
sample becomes, the more observations there are and the more unwieldy the data set 
will be. The same occurs when more variables are used as this increases the data 
required of each case studied. Whether through more cases or more variables, a large 
data set means more time is required to both gather the data and manipulate it for study. 
The data collection technique is especially influential in this regard as slower 
approaches will be particularly hard to use with a larger sample, but may provide better 
information on a single case. 
 
The researcher needs to therefore balance the two concerns of practical data sets and 
representing the population accurately. In this thesis, there is an opportunity to study a 
population instead of a sample. The data is mostly obtained through Datastream (DS), 
an online database of company information. This allows large quantities of information 
to be obtained very quickly, being limited more by internet connection speeds than the 
need to gather data directly from the source companies. It is therefore possible to gather 
information on all companies that DS covers very quickly, making the entire population 
of UK listed companies a feasible data set to examine. 
 
The purpose of the research is primarily to investigate whether SEM is a possible means 
to handle the rarely-discussed endogeneity present in the data used in disclosure studies.  
Many potential samples are available for this idea.  The sample selected consists of all 
94 
 
UK listed companies as of July 2013. There are four characteristics contained in this 
description, and the reasons for each are discussed below. 
 
Listed companies are chosen due to a practical data availability matter.  Listed 
companies are required to produce and make easily available detailed financial 
information annually along with smaller interim releases and occasionally immediate 
releases of important new information.  Acquiring data on listed companies is 
accordingly straightforward. 
 
Unlisted companies, by contrast, need only to provide information to existing 
shareholders, although they may provide information on request. This in itself creates a 
possible source of problems as the two types are subject to very different requirements.  
Further, if unlisted companies are used, there is a clear potential response bias problem 
in that not all companies will respond to requests.  If there is any consistency in those 
that provide information then there is a bias in the sample.  It may be the case that this 
bias actually provides information about one or more of the theories of disclosure, e.g. 
unlisted companies with high financial performance responding to requests for 
information would be evidence consistent with Signalling Theory.  However, without 
information on the non-responsive companies, it would be difficult if not impossible to 
determine whether the responding companies are any different to the rest.  In addition to 
possible bias, the process of gathering information on unlisted companies is 
comparatively slow as unlisted companies do not appear in the Datastream database in 
any significant number. Between possible response bias and slower information 
gathering combined with the intention to use a large data set, unlisted companies are 
excluded.  This is consistent with comparable studies, which rarely use unlisted 
companies in their samples. 
 
Disclosure studies have historically tended to use samples from shareholder-focused 
Anglo-American accounting system countries.  The reason for this is simple: private 
shareholders should be the primary beneficiary of disclosure.  A larger institutional 
shareholder is likely to have the power to pressure managers into releasing information 
privately, or otherwise have the power and ability to learn fine details about the 
company.  A smaller shareholder, by contrast, is not able to pressure the company in the 
same way and may miss out on details not provided in some kind of disclosure.  It is 
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likely that shareholder-focused annual reports result in greater overall disclosure than 
those in countries where annual reports are intended for lenders.  As the intention 
behind this thesis is to create a thesis comparable to past disclosure studies, an Anglo-
American system country is the clear choice.  While this narrows down the possible 
countries to use, there are still several options.  A UK sample is chosen primarily due to 
researcher familiarity with the sample.   
 
Early in the research, exploration of the information contained within DS revealed that 
the program contains a sample data set containing all UK-listed companies.  This 
provided a sample that was large but not unmanageable.  Further, as discussed above, 
there are advantages in being able to use the entire population instead of a sample drawn 
from it, making this a useful starting point for forming the final sample.  The DS sample  
contains a number of entities that do not provide all of the information required.  In 
addition, this sample is updated as new companies are listed and existing ones de-list, 
but there is a delay.  The effect of this is that there were a number of companies 
described as ‘dead’ in the list that needed to be removed.  This term refers to any 
company for which information is no longer available.  Common reasons for this lack of 
current information include cessation of business activity, de-listing, or a change of 
name (in this case, the old name entry will often refer users to the new one).  Mergers 
and acquisitions may create one or more of these situations among the companies 
involved and are another common cause of ‘dead’ companies in the DS sample.  The 
exact effects depend on the structure of the company after the merger or acquisition is 
complete.  Commonly, one of the companies involved increases in size as the final 
business entity keeps the name of one and combines the assets of both, while the other 
is considered ‘dead’ as its name is either no longer in use or does not refer to an 
independent listed company.   
 
The final aspect of the sample is the timing.  Data was gathered in mid-2013 and the 
decision was made to use up-to-date information at the time.  In Datastream, the request 
was made for the most recent information at the date of 31/7/2013, resulting in 
information dated from the most recent report before that date, i.e. anywhere from 
August 2012 to July 2013 depending on the financial year end.  This date provides data 
that is recent in comparison to most disclosure studies and is well after the stock market 
crash of 2008.  The crash represents a potentially interesting period in which to study 
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disclosure behaviour to determine whether companies behaved differently due to the 
sudden downturn.  However, the intention in this thesis is to create a study comparable 
to the main body of disclosure studies, the majority of which were tested on recent data 
at the time of publication. 
 
There is an additional practical reason to use data from this time period.  The DS sample 
is updated regularly and its constituents are always currently UK-listed companies.  The 
actual date at which the list was used determines its members, not the time for which 
data is requested.  For clarity, using this list at July 2013 will return data on the 
companies listed at that point regardless of what historical data is requested.  Using this 
list to investigate 1993 would cause problems due to many of the constituents being 
unlisted or yet to form in 1993, while many 1993-listed companies would not be 
included as they now count as ‘dead’ companies in Datastream.  This problem could be 
solved without much difficulty by making a custom list containing all listed companies 
that were active at the time for which data is required, however.  Using the DS sample is 
faster and easier without compromising on data other than requiring up-to-date 
information at the time of data gathering. 
 
‘Dead’ companies would create a potential survivorship bias in the DS sample in a 
study over time, but data in this thesis is gathered for a single point in time only and 
should contain a mix of long-established and stable companies, failing companies, and 
newly-formed or newly-listed entities.  The sample was investigated again at a later date 
due to some companies returning unlikely values for some of the collected data points.  
A few instances of negative shareholders’ equity are noted (as discussed in section 
5.3.7) and there are many cases where large reported losses lead to negative 
performance ratio values.  When the same DS list was retrieved at a later date, many of 
the companies showing these traits were ‘dead’ companies.   
 
5.2: Variables 
This section discusses the many variables used within the study.  All variables are 
classed into one of seven groups.  The reason for this is explained in more detail in 
section 5.4 below.  To summarise, SEM can make use of latent variables, a type of 
variable that is not observed directly but instead indicated by several others that are 
observed.  Variables are classed here under headings based on which latent variable 
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they indicate, meaning that all variables under one heading are alternative means of 
measuring the same concept. 
 
5.2.1: Size 
A company’s size is thought to lead to greater disclosure.  This may occur as a larger 
company will generally have more to report, leading to an economy of scale effect 
(Singhvi and Desai 1971, Raffournier 1995).  As the quantity of data about the firm 
rises with size, senior managers are likely to receive summaries of important 
information.  The kind of data often disclosed is therefore already collected and collated 
within the firm’s ordinary operations and the only additional costs are in adapting it for 
external use and publication.  Further, there is some suggestion that managers may 
avoid disclosure due to proprietary information that may threaten the company’s 
competitive position.  Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that this is less common with a 
larger company as its overall position is harder to threaten. 
 
The vast majority of literature examined includes a size variable.  Almost all of those 
that use the variable find it has a significant and positive effect on disclosure (e.g. 
Buzby 1975, Adams et al 1998, Linsley et al 2006, Dobler et al 2011), and no negative 
results have been identified.  In general, insignificant results occur when the sample is 
restricted to specific types of company.  For example, Ali et al (2007) and Chen et al 
(2008) both find no size effect when examining family-owned companies.  Malone et al 
(1993) find no effect when examining only oil and gas companies, although Patten 
(1992) does observe a size effect in a similar sample.  Gelb and Strawser (2001) provide 
an anomalous result, with size being insignificant despite a seemingly typical sample.  
The only limits placed on the sample were that firms had to have made available social 
and environmental information as early as 1989, possibly meaning that the sample is 
mostly larger companies that had experimented with such reporting early.  In a case 
highly relevant to this study, Grüning (2007) does not find size to be directly significant 
in a structural equation model of disclosure causes, but nor does he allow it to be a 
direct cause – the model does not link size directly to disclosure at any point. 
 
The above gives evidence that size is positively linked to disclosure.  Many of the 
reasons given contain some implicit theories about disclosure, e.g. a theory that 
economies of scale occur.  In addition, there are some possible effects from the studied 
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theories.  The PCH explicitly mentions that larger companies are more likely to receive 
negative attention.  There is a possible Agency Theory explanation as it becomes harder 
to closely observe all managers as the scale of the firm rises, making agency problems 
more likely and disclosure a potential means to limit them. 
 
The measurements of size are mostly drawn from related literature.  Measures of a 
company’s book value of assets are very common (e.g. Singhvi and Desai 1971, Cooke 
1989, Raffournier 1995, Taylor et al 2010), although in many cases a logarithmic 
transformation is used.  Few give any explanation for using this particular size measure; 
Malone et al (1993), focusing on oil and gas firms, state that it is one of the few 
measures available that is not affected by the fluctuations in oil prices.  In DataStream, 
this is Total Assets (code wc02999). 
 
A smaller number of papers use the companies’ market capitalisation (e.g. Gelb and 
Strawser 2001, Ali et al 2007).  This is a more accurate measure for companies that rely 
on intangible assets that cannot be recorded on the balance sheet, but is more subject to 
fluctuations in commodity prices than the more consistent book value.  The gathered 
data is titled in DataStream as market Capitalisation (code wc08001). 
 
The company’s turnover is a common measure of size (e.g. Patten 1992, Lopes and 
Rodrigues 2007).  Meek et al (1995) justify its use over other measures in an 
international study, arguing that it is less subject to variations in local GAAP than 
others.  Additionally, it is another measure useful when the company relies on 
intangibles and would appear smaller under its book value.  Revenue information is 
gathered using the data point titled Net Sales or Revenues in DataStream (code 
wc01001).   
 
One paper using shareholders’ equity has been identified (Grüning, 2007), although no 
justification for this measure is given.  In practice, it offers the benefits of market value 
without being as subject to market fluctuations, although it does not measure size as 
directly.   It is gathered in DataStream as Common Shareholders’ Equity (code 
wc03501). 
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Cooke (1992) uses several size measures, including both some of those listed above and 
a number of alternative measures less common in the literature, arguing that each 
variable some unique information on company size that the others do not.  Potential 
multicollinearity problems are prevented by merging these variables into a single size 
variable through factor analysis.  This is conceptually similar to the use of latent 
variables in this thesis, using multiple measures to form a construct and using that to 
test models.  
 
A measure of the company’s total income is employed, using the datatype Operating 
Income (code wc01250).  In addition, a measure of total profit was gathered, using 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (code wc18191).   
 
5.2.2: Multiple Listing 
Multiple listing status is widely thought to lead to greater disclosure.  The common 
reasoning is that different countries have their own listing requirements that will not 
always overlap.  For ease and cost reasons, multiple listed companies are likely to 
produce only one report that serves all requirements.  This creates an unintentional 
voluntary disclosure; in each listing location, there is some information not required by 
the regulator as the company is working to another regulator’s rules on what 
information must be provided.  Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) study the decisions 
managers make about where to list when looking outside of their home location, 
arguing and finding supporting evidence that they tend to select areas that add the least 
to their existing disclosure requirements.  If true, the effects of multiple listing on 
disclosure may be weaker than expected. 
 
Some of the arguments are similar to those presented for size in section 5.2.1.  A 
company listing in multiple locations often physically operates in each of them, 
meaning there are operations geographically removed from the headquarters.  These 
will often be reported in a summarised report that is relatively easy to turn into an 
external publication.  In addition, the facilities distant from the headquarters may have 
lower oversight and possible language barriers that combine to make information more 
easily hidden, creating a source of agency problems and making the theory applicable.  
Cooke (1989) states that multiple listing is a means of reducing cost of capital, as it 
allows shares to be issued in the markets of lowest cost. 
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If multiple listing is found to have effects on disclosure, this may be explained by 
Signalling Theory.  Operating in geographically diverse areas may act as a form of 
diversification, making the firm more stable and therefore a better investment than 
comparable companies that are not as physically widespread.   
 
In practice, literature has found multiple listing to have broadly positive effects on 
disclosure (e.g. Cooke 1989, Meek et al 1995, Robb et al 2001, Archambault and 
Archambault 2003, Abraham and Cox 2007, Grüning 2007, Lopes and Rodrigues 
2007).  Taylor et al (2010) offer a notable exception in which a negative effect is found.   
 
Two measures are taken for multiple listing.  Generally, researchers use a dummy 
variable for multiple listing status, equal to 1 if a company is listed in more than one 
country and 0 otherwise (e.g. Cooke 1989, Robb et al 2001).  Abraham and Cox (2007) 
use a variation more relevant to this thesis: for their UK-based sample, multiple listing 
is only considered where the company is additionally listed in the USA, considered 
likely to increase disclosure due to increasingly strict rules being placed on USA listed 
companies.  A US-listing dummy is adopted here. 
 
The other measure is more wide-ranging and based on Saudagaran and Biddle’s work 
(1995).  As stated above, multiple listing should subject a company to further sets of 
rules and, as a result, lead to greater disclosure.  To cover this effect, a measure of the 
total number of listings is used, counting the number of countries in which a company is 
listed other than the UK. 
 
Neither measure was found as a coded variable within DataStream.  They are instead 
obtained from company summaries within the program. 
 
5.2.3: Financial performance 
Recent financial performance is included as a variable.  Arguments regarding its effect 
on disclosure work in both directions, however.  One argument holds that low 
performance increases disclosure because managers need to show how they plan to 
resolve the situation (Armitage and Marston, 2008).  The alternative is that managers 
become more open with good results as this means they can show their talents, while 
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poor results lead to a comparative silence to prevent blame being placed on specific 
individuals (Singhvi and Desai 1971, Raffournier 1995). 
 
Under some circumstances, it is possible that a low return may be a side effect of low 
disclosure.  Underperformance in one division of the company can be obscured by 
pooling its returns with others when calculating this type of ratio.  This means lowering 
disclosure as divisional information is not revealed, and has the effect of lowering the 
company’s overall performance ratio. 
 
Signalling Theory offers a very clear expected result for performance.  Strong 
performance is a clear sign of good news that the company can and should highlight in 
order to stand out.   
 
The literature examined has not produced a clear effect, supporting both of the opposing 
predictions above.  While papers generally include positive predictions, the single most 
likely outcome is an insignificant effect on disclosure (e.g. Meek et al 1995, Watson et 
al 2002, Linsley et al 2006), with no clear uniting factor in the papers obtaining this 
result.  Negative effects show some consistency, with two (Baginski et al 2002 and 
Chen et al 2002) using samples from the early- to mid-1990s, and the other two 
examples (Ali et al 2007, Chen et al 2008) each focusing on family-owned companies.  
The expected positive effects are the rarest of the three outcomes observed here, 
although negative results are only marginally more common (Singhvi and Desai 1971, 
Clarkson et al 1999, Field et al 2003).  The total of positive and negative results is very 
close to the number of insignificant results for this variable. 
 
Three measures of performance are used.  The first is the return on assets (ROA), 
defined as Income/Book value of assets.  This is a measure Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
used, and it has continued to be employed since (e.g. Taylor et al 2010).  However, as 
stated under section 5.1.1, book value may not be the most reliable measure of size for 
all companies and therefore not the ideal means of scaling profits by size.  Accordingly, 
additional measures are employed.  Singhvi and Desai (1971) also used the earnings 
margin (EM), defined as Profit/Revenue, arguing that it better reflects the ability to 
absorb rising costs (the measure is used in some later papers, such as Meek et al 1995).  
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In addition, a third measure is used, that of Profit/Size, size measured as book value of 
assets, although there is little literature using this measure in disclosure. 
 
None of these are obtained using DataStream directly, but each is calculated from two 
measures found in the program.  Book value of assets, the denominator in ROA and 
Profit/Size, is as listed under 5.1.1 above, Total Assets (code wc02999).  Income, used 
in ROA, is Operating Income (code wc01250).  Profit, as used in EM and Profit/Size, is 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (code wc18191). 
 
5.2.4: Debt finance 
As the level of debt in a firm’s capital structure increases, lenders become more 
important to the firm relative to shareholders.  This has a possible effect on disclosure.  
Lenders, generally being large institutional investors, can often access information by 
pressuring managers.  Shareholders, more likely to be individuals, lack the same ease of 
access and are more reliant on published information.  With high levels of debt, 
disclosure becomes less important to the company as shareholders are relatively less 
important as a source of finance. 
 
However, Agency Theory predicts that companies more likely to have agency problems 
would disclose more as a means of monitoring.  Shareholders, being less powerful on an 
individual basis, are less important to the company than the lending institutions and the 
firm may start to operate for their benefit over the shareholders.  This is an agency 
problem as some owners are not being served by the managers, so should lead to greater 
disclosure. 
 
Perhaps reflective of the two strong yet contradictory lines of reasoning, the literature 
finds a mix of results on the matter.  As in the financial performance case in section 
5.1.3 above, the most likely result is an insignificant effect (e.g. Raffournier 1995, 
Watson et al 2002, Dobler et al 2010).  Positive and negative effects are almost equal in 
number (and, combined, equal to insignificant results).  There is little to link the 
positive results together (Malone et al 1993, Frankel et al 1995, Ahmed and Courtis 
1999), and similarly little evidence to connect the negatives (Meek et al 1995, Zarzeski 
1996, Brown and Hillegeist 2007, Taylor et al 2010). 
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Three measures are taken.  Debt/Assets and Debt/Equity are both common measures 
used by many researchers (e.g. Meek et al 1995 and Ali et al 2007, respectively).  
Again, total assets may not reflect a given company’s size well and debt/assets may not 
best reflect its proportion of debt, leading to the use of the second measure of 
debt/equity. 
 
In addition, the total value of debt, unscaled by size, is collected and used as a measure 
of debt finance.  However, it is questionable as a measure of the firm’s capital structure.  
As shown below in tables 5.2 and 5.3, this measure correlates far more powerfully with 
size than other debt measures.  This is not surprising; debt value is not scaled by size at 
all, yet a larger company may have obtained its size in part by including some debt in its 
financing to become larger than would be possible if relying on equity alone. 
 
Like the performance measures, the two ratios are calculated using data from 
DataStream.  Debt is measured using Total Debt (code wc03255) and divided by Total 
Assets (code wc02999, as above) for Debt/Assets and Common Shareholders’ Equity 
(code wc03501) for Debt/Equity. 
 
5.2.5: Sensitive industry 
Many papers have included an industry membership variable as a determinant of 
disclosure.  The reasons vary with the exact classifications used.  There is reason to 
believe each industry forms its own disclosure practices that may vary from others (e.g. 
Botosan and Harris, 2000, and Patten, 1992).  Some businesses will generate more 
information, for example, while follow-the-leader effects may result in comparable 
companies reaching similar practices.  Legitimacy Theory holds that, as disclosure is a 
possible means to communicate, it is more important to some industries than others.   
 
No consistently used industry classification variable is apparent in the literature.  
Researchers use different means of splitting their data depending on their exact research 
question and the sample used.  Generally, any industries that are expected to disclose 
more on average are found to do so.  Industry classifications found to disclose above 
average include resource extraction (Meek et al, 1995), chemicals (Robb et al, 2001), 
financial services (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007), and retailers (Field et al, 2003).   
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Adams et al (1998) use four industry classes chosen due to their different 
characteristics.  Two of these are found to disclose more than average.  The first is oil, 
chemicals, metal, and power; a group of companies that exploit natural resources and 
process raw materials.  The second is services, food, and retail; the group of companies 
that directly face the final consumer.  This is broadly consistent with the industry 
classification findings of other papers and forms the basis for the industry variable 
employed for this thesis. 
 
The industry variable used in this thesis is a dummy variable equal to 1 for ‘sensitive’ 
firms and 0 otherwise.  Following the Legitimacy argument, and the example of Adams 
et al (1998), two kinds of firms are considered sensitive.  The first are those that extract 
resources, included because they have clear environmental impacts that may harm the 
local area and its inhabitants and, in keeping with the theory, may suffer a loss of 
support from local stakeholders that leads to actions against the company.  The other 
type is those which deal with the public directly.  If a firm that deals with the general 
public attracts negative attention, the public can penalise it relatively easily by turning 
to competitors.  A company further from the public in the supply chain is harder to 
influence in this way.   
 
This variable is not gathered from DataStream and instead uses the FTSE website’s 
industry classifications to define each company.  Companies classed as some form of 
resource extraction, e.g. oil and gas, are considered sensitive, as are those with classes 
such as restaurants or retailers that deal with the general public.  In practice, the industry 
classes considered sensitive are: Oil and gas production (0001 range); Chemicals (1300 
range); Consumer goods (the entire broad 3000 range); Pharmaceuticals (4577); 
Consumer Services (5000 range, but excluding the narrow media agencies category 
5555); Telecommunications services (6000 range); Utility providers (7000 range); 
Banks (8300 range); Forestry and paper (1730 range); Property and casualty insurance 
(8536); Life insurance (8570); Financial services (8770).  Any classification not 
included in this list is considered non-sensitive. 
 
The split of companies into expected high and low disclosure groups along these lines is 
broadly consistent with findings in the literature to date.  The industries that have been 
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observed to disclose more than most are those for which Legitimacy Theory provides an 
explanation for higher disclosure.   
 
5.2.6: Return Volatility 
The return volatility of a firm over time is included for several reasons.  Arguments are 
mixed for this variable.  One holds that the market rewards stability, which Signalling 
Theory predicts would lead to greater disclosure.  The other is that volatile companies 
need to say more to the market since previous prices have lower predictive power. 
 
Research is mixed on this variable.  Insignificant effects (Gelb and Strawser 2001, Chen 
et al 2008) are rare, with a clear effect generally being visible when return volatility is 
used.  However, the direction of effect varies, with some finding positive effects (e.g. 
Clarkson et al 1994, Abraham and Cox 2007) and others negative (e.g. Field et al 2003, 
Brown and Hillegeist 2007) with no clear pattern.  This likely reflects the literature on 
volatility as a disclosure determinant, as competing explanations are given.  It is 
possible that managers act in different ways depending on the company’s 
circumstances. 
 
The concept of volatility takes several forms as a company may vary in many ways 
from one period to the next.  The major two are price-based volatility, i.e. changes to the 
share price, and returns volatility, i.e. changes in the level of profitability.  Examination 
of the literature surrounding disclosure shows that papers making use of volatility tend 
towards return volatility, so the same is used here. 
 
Only one variable is used for volatility.  Return on equity values are collected over the 
past five years for each company.  Where a company’s data does no go back this far due 
to first listing at some point in the period (or first entering the database for any other 
reason), the data is used as far back as it exists.  The standard deviation of the 
fluctuating return on equity is used as the actual variable (following the example of 
Field et al, 2002, and Chen et al, 2002).  Data for this variable was readily obtained in 
DataStream using the return on equity datatype (code wc08301). 
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5.2.7: Disclosure 
The measurement of disclosure in empirical studies of the concept is a challenge.  
Before a measurement can be selected, the researcher must first determine whether they 
will use disclosure quality or quantity.  Two papers, Botosan (2004) and Beattie et al 
(2004), argue that disclosure quantity measures are not disclosure quality measures.  
While this seems simple, both papers point to others that have stated an intention to 
measure quality while using quantity measurements.  In practice, few measurements 
will cover only one of these aspects exclusively, but in general quantity is far easier to 
measure and tends to dominate the research.  Further, there is not a clear means of 
measuring disclosure quality.  Regardless of whether quality or quantity is involved, 
papers tend to use one of three forms of measurement, discussed below. 
 
The first method is to form an index of items of information expected and analyse a 
company’s documents for them, scoring based on whether a company discloses the item 
or not.  Singhvi and Desai (1971), one of the early papers in the area of disclosure 
studies, used this approach to measuring disclosure.  The principle was soon discussed 
in more detail with Buzby (1974) discussing in detail which items should be included in 
such an index.  The idea has since become a popular method of measuring disclosure, 
having been used consistently over time (e.g. Cooke 1989a, Robb et al 2001, Dobler et 
al 2011), although Rowley and Berman (2000) warn that an index approach may miss 
some details of interest to the researcher where a company scores well overall but is 
lacking disclosures in some areas. 
 
There are a number of further negative points to this approach.  The coding is subjective 
to some extent.  While in many cases the presence or absence of an item will be 
apparent, there will be examples in which the wording of part of the document will 
make it unclear whether an item is covered or not.  Further, something appearing in an 
unexpected location may be missed by the reader.  This can be resolved to some degree 
by using multiple scorers, allowing two or more people to independently rate companies 
and comparing the results.  Second, the use of a simple present/absent classification 
fails to capture the difference between those companies that give an item a passing 
mention and those that give it detailed analysis.  Beattie et al (2004) suggest a solution 
to this latter problem with a more complex coding system (e.g. 1 point for mentioning 
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an item and 2 for discussing it in depth), which adds complexity to the system and 
worsens the subjectivity problem. 
 
The main concern for this project, however, is the intention to use a large sample size.  
For a smaller study, the detailed examination of documents for each company is 
practical.  In this case, the sample is too large for this to be done in a practical 
timeframe.   
 
The second measurement approach is to use an existing score.  Various organisations 
rate company disclosures and provide lists of scores.  The FAF/AIMR reports are a 
good example of this, having been used in various papers over time (e.g. Gelb and 
Strawser 2001, Welker 1995).  The organisation behind these reports had groups of 
analysts specialised in various industry sectors examine company reports in great detail, 
checking for the presence of items of information that they would find useful to their 
own analysis, and formed a rating for each company from the combined score of each 
analyst who examined the company.  In effect, this approach creates a formalised 
version of the disclosure scoring approach above, using very similar methodology with 
groups of expert analysts.  It is therefore prone to the same problems of subjectivity and 
simple scoring as discussed above, although the use of multiple analysts to form a score 
ensures that the final ratings are a consensus.  However, the researcher does not need to 
perform the scoring, eliminating the time-consuming part of the process. 
 
The main problem with this approach is one of access to the resulting ratings.  The 
FAF/AIMR reports were once commonly used but have not been made public since 
1997.  Further, using pre-existing scores limits the possible sample of companies to 
those included in the original scoring system.  Continuing the FAF/AIMR report 
example, these reports only covered US-listed companies, preventing their use in any 
other national context. 
 
The third approach is to find an indirect proxy measurement for disclosure.  The two 
approaches above are also proxy measurements, but are based on disclosure activity 
directly; an indirect proxy, by contrast, uses the observation of a related matter to 
determine a company’s disclosure.  This is the method selected here as it has neither the 
time requirements of studying documents for the entire sample nor the access problems 
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inherent to finding a pre-made disclosure score.  The problem with this approach is that 
there is never a perfect proxy, regardless of the situation, as the proxy is not identical to 
the underlying measurement of interest. 
 
Research using the proxy approach to disclosure measurement often uses properties of 
analyst forecasts, commonly one or more of the total analyst following (e.g. Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996), the forecast dispersion (e.g. Irani and Karamanou 2003), and less 
often the accuracy of forecasts (e.g. Francis et al 2006) or the scale of revisions made to 
forecasts (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  The use of any proxy based on analyst 
forecasts relies on an understanding of the role analysts play in the market, which must 
be discussed first.  The question is whether analysts act as information intermediaries or 
information sources regarding the companies they analyse.  In the former case, the 
analyst benefits from corporate disclosures and the number of analysts following the 
company should rise with disclosure.  In the latter case, analysts compete with the 
information a company releases and greater disclosure is expected to lead to a smaller 
analyst following.   
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) performed an analysis primarily concerned with this matter.  
Their paper explains what observations would indicate analysts acting as sources or 
intermediaries and finds far more support for the information intermediary explanation.  
The finding is based on how analysts react to company-provided disclosures.  Other 
information sources would compete with the company’s own disclosures while 
intermediaries benefit from them.  The analysts’ role is therefore observable from their 
response to company-provided disclosure.  If they are intermediaries then they will tend 
to analyse companies with strong disclosure policies, leading to more analysts following 
the company.  If analysts instead act as information sources then they will compete with 
the company’s disclosures, resulting in lower analyst followings where disclosure is 
stronger.  Lang and Lundholm’s (1996b) finding is the former; analyst following tends 
to be larger where the company discloses more.  The paper discusses the possibility that 
the cause and effect is reversed, that the company’s analyst following being large means 
there is more pressure on the company to release more information, but this 
interpretation does not change the overall finding that analysts act as information 
intermediaries; they are still demonstrating a preference for more disclosure provided by 
the company. 
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Broader evidence suggests that analysts take a more complicated role.  Holland (1998) 
examines the results of disclosing information privately to selected analysts, observing 
that this practice helps to limit market responses, preventing extreme reactions to news.  
This suggests that analysts have a role in the market other than acting as an intermediary 
under these circumstances, likely acting as an information source in this case as they use 
information that is not otherwise available.  Taken from the perspective of market 
participants without this privileged access to information, the analyst is acting as a 
source of information as it has not been revealed by the company directly.  However, 
this practice is far less common now than it was at the time of publication due to the 
passing of Regulation Fair Disclosure in the USA and its influence on legislation 
elsewhere in the world and disclosure practices among companies.  More recently, and 
not affected by this change, Ryan and Taffler (2004) observe evidence that analysts 
sometimes cause price movements, indicating that they are information sources to some 
extent.  Ascioglu et al (2005) offer no analysis of the matter but assume analysts act as 
information sources; analyst following is used as a measurement of disclosure about a 
company that is not provided by the company in question.  The evidence overall 
suggests that analysts have a complex role in the market.  They act primarily as 
information intermediaries, but can act as information sources where circumstances 
permit. 
 
There are a number of papers that use either analyst following or some aspect of their 
forecasts as a proxy measure of disclosure, usually taking (if not stating) analysts to act 
as intermediaries and benefit from the presence of company-provided information.  Four 
measures based on analysts are common: the revisions made to analyst forecasts before 
results are published, the dispersion of analyst forecasts, the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts, and the total number of analysts following a company, each discussed below.   
 
Revisions-based measures are uncommon in research.  Lang and Lundholm (1993) find 
that revisions become less numerous and are of a smaller magnitude when the 
company’s disclosure rating is higher.  However, the expected effects on this variable 
are not entirely clear a priori as revisions to forecasts suggest analysts are surprised by 
new information.  Such surprise could be the result of them learning of something not 
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disclosed by the company, but equally could be the result of the company releasing 
information as soon as its employees are aware. 
 
The accuracy of analyst forecasts compared to the actual result is often used to examine 
the effects of Regulation FD on financial analysts (e.g. Francis et al 2006, Heflin et al 
2003).  In this context, the variable is not directly a proxy for disclosure.  However, 
Regulation FD represents a change in disclosure environment, intended to increase the 
overall information availability surrounding each company by preventing private 
disclosures.  As a proxy for disclosure, it is expected that greater accuracy results from 
greater disclosure (as observed in Baik et al 2008).   However, the result of using this 
measurement is dependent on the timing of forecasts relative to the publication of 
results.  A forecast made (or revised) closer to the publication date is more likely to 
include all relevant information than one made far from publication.   
 
Forecast dispersion is used with the assumption that detailed disclosure means all 
analysts tend towards the same conclusions (Lang and Lundholm 1996b, Irani and 
Karamanou 2003, Ali et al 2007).  Different personal information acquisition levels, 
different analysis techniques, and differing capabilities among analysts all mean that 
analysts will draw non-uniform conclusions, but greater information availability results 
in a similarity in the core analysis.  Dispersion is therefore a measure of analyst 
disagreement and is expected to fall with disclosure. 
 
The final measure, analyst following, is more common in practice.  Bhushan (1989) and 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that analyst following should increase with a 
company’s disclosure rating.  Evidence generally supports this interpretation as analyst 
following rises with disclosure (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1996b, Botosan 1997, Botosan 
and Harris 2000, Lang et al 2003, Ali et al 2007, Bozzolan et al 2009, Lang et al 2012).  
Healy et al (1999) examine the changes surrounding companies in periods in which 
their disclosure ratings improve.  One of the observed effects is that analyst following 
rises after disclosure ratings rise, suggesting that analysts are inclined to follow 
companies with better disclosure ratings.  A correlation between disclosure and analyst 
following exists. 
 
111 
 
Any combination of these four measurements can be used and a pilot study performed 
in the course of this thesis used all four.  However, for the final study only analyst 
following was used.  The reasons for the removal of the other three variables are largely 
due to differences in the two samples and the learning process from the pilot study.  In 
the pilot study sample of the FTSE 350, most companies are followed by multiple 
analysts.  The further the sample is expanded beyond this group, the more companies 
have a following of only a single analyst or none at all.  In either case, analyst 
dispersion becomes meaningless; there is zero dispersion regardless of the company’s 
disclosure policy.  The number of forecast revisions is similarly problematic in cases 
with zero following as there can be no revisions by default.  This measure has further 
problems with low total followings as the total number of revisions is limited by the 
total number of estimates.  Similarly, with no analysts there is no potential to identify 
the accuracy of forecasts, and small followings lead to a few estimates dominating the 
calculated accuracy value.  Total analyst following is not subject to these problems as a 
low following simply means a low value is recorded for that company and there are no 
issues with the measurement. 
 
Bhushan (1989) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) each explain in part how and why 
analyst following responds to disclosure.  Each analyst or organisation employing them 
is a business and, for the purposes of this argument, they are considered to be rational 
wealth maximisers, in keeping with the conditions of the theories laid out in section 4.7, 
so analysts are driven by profit.   
 
The business process for analysts as information intermediaries is to acquire 
information, process it in some way (likely drawing conclusions about the company’s 
prospects), and sell the resulting package of information that includes both the 
company’s own release and the analyst’s additions.  Information economics mean the 
costs of production scale little with the number of sales; once the analysis process is 
complete, the results can be sold to multiple parties with only minimal further 
production costs (for example, printing the information).  Bhushan (1989) mentions that 
this may also work against the analyst as a buyer may be able to resell the information. 
 
As in most business models, one of the approaches available to analysts to maximise 
profit is by lowering costs.  The very low per-unit costs mean that the primary source of 
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cost reduction is in the information gathering and processing stages.  The cheapest 
companies to follow, then, are those for which information is plentiful and easily 
processed.  This trait depends largely on the company’s own information releases, i.e. 
its disclosure policy.  Detailed disclosures make information cheap for analysts to 
acquire, although the potential to obscure details in a mass of information means it is 
not necessarily cheap to process.  High-quality disclosure should solve this problem by 
releasing relevant information and making for ease of processing.  For the analyst, the 
ideal is a company that releases both detailed and high-quality information as this is 
cheap to both acquire and analyse. 
 
The result of this discussion is that analysts are more likely to follow those companies 
that produce detailed or high quality disclosures, and much more likely to follow those 
that produce both. 
 
For the research performed here, the analyst following proxy was obtained from 
DataStream.  The number of EPS estimates for the next financial year (coded as F1NE) 
was used.  Although this is not necessarily the actual number of analysts taking an 
interest in the company, it shows the number following closely enough to be confident 
in making a prediction of results in the near future. 
 
The use of analyst following has another benefit.  As discussed above, the alternative 
approaches are to use an existing disclosure score or form an index.  Existing scores are 
often formed with reference to analysts, making the resulting ratings indicative of what 
analysts want to see in a company’s disclosures.  Similarly, when making an index the 
researcher needs to select items to include and this often involves seeking analysts’ 
views on what makes a useful disclosure.  Analyst following is therefore related to these 
alternative approaches as by its nature it captures analyst preferences for what is 
disclosed. 
 
There is a notable and important disadvantage to analyst following as a measure of 
disclosure, however.  As mentioned in section 2.2, compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements will vary among companies as some managers will comply 
with the letter of the rules and others the spirit.  Analyst following is argued here to 
respond to the overall disclosure quality or quantity, regardless of whether the 
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disclosures in question are required or voluntarily provided.  While the measure can be 
reasonably expected to primarily reflect voluntary disclosure, it does not do so 
exclusively and some amount of variation within mandatory disclosure will be 
contained within this proxy. 
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5.3: Data properties 
This section covers the results of descriptive analysis performed on each variable along 
with correlation analysis on all of them, collectively.  Tables of overall descriptive 
statistics and correlations are presented first, then discussed in detail in the same order 
as in Section 5.2.  Discussion here focuses mainly on the basic untransformed data set 
with all observations included.  Generally, each transformation results in stronger 
correlations than the basic data, but very rarely shows a significant relationship where 
the basic data did not already identify one. 
 
Table 5.1 below presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables.  This covers 
the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for all of the 
non-binary variables. 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are each tables of correlations among the variables used in models 
later in the thesis.  Table 5.2 covers the Pearson correlation, the common interpretation 
of correlation that tests for a linear relationship between two variables.  Table 5.3 
instead uses the Spearman correlation, a non-parametric (and less commonly used) 
measurement of correlation.  The Spearman correlation uses the rankings of 
observations rather than their actual values to obtain a correlation value, recording high 
values if the relationship between two variables is monotonic but not necessarily linear.  
A curvilinear relationship that is perfectly monotonic would have a Spearman 
correlation of 1 but a lower Pearson correlation due to the nonlinear link between 
variables.  While useful for identifying that a relationship exists, the Spearman 
correlation is poor for defining a meaningful strength.  Cooke (1998) uses a good 
example to explain the problem.  A Spearman correlation of 0.7 indicates that an 
increase of 1 to one variable is expected to increase the other by 0.7.  However, both 
variables are ranks and therefore take integer values; a change of 0.7 is not possible.  
Interpretation of any values other than 1, 0, or -1 has the same problem.  The strength of 
a relationship can be stated relative to other Spearman correlation values (e.g. 0.5 
indicating a stronger link than 0.3), but the use of ranks means the power cannot be 
interpreted in terms of the units of the variables in question. 
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The use of both correlations gives a better overall understanding of how the variables 
are related since it is easily possible for two variables to share a very strong relationship 
but have a low correlation value using only one technique.   
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Size measures       
Book Value 
(£000) 0.02 1,651,255.32 7,570.21 78,504.64 16.44 295.30 
Market Cap 
(£000) 0.00 1,518,667.85 2,925.92 41,914.74 33.37 1195.72 
Profit 
(£000) -2,356.00 344,600.00 538.05 10,453.39 29.06 893.71 
Revenue 
(£000) -9.45 425,090.30 1,925.46 16,168.71 19.33 433.67 
Income 
(£000) -5,096.00 177,180.45 297.62 4,825.10 34.58 1261.59 
Equity 
(£000) -286.50 629,538.65 1,416.20 17,800.60 31.22 1084.78 
Foreign listing measure 
      
Foreign listing 
(# of countries) 0.00 6.00 0.81 0.78 .84 1.50 
Debt finance measures 
      
Debt 
(£000) 0.00 439,559.00 1,319.48 16,154.41 21.14 497.18 
Debt/ Equity 
(£000) -64.68 171.40 0.38 5.49 19.12 677.70 
Debt/ Assets (£000) 
0.00 32.42 0.20 1.02 26.30 768.14 
Performance measures 
      
Profit/Size 
-31.70 144.43 0.01 4.09 31.03 1095.28 
Earnings Margin 
-314,179.00 312,499.00 -458.22 13,346.52 -2.59 453.64 
Return on Assets 
-11.06 3.02 -0.08 0.63 -9.07 121.24 
Volatility measure 
      
Volatility 
0.00 3383.29 41.10 165.08 13.99 238.59 
Disclosure measure 
      
Following 
(# analyst estimates) 0.00 32.00 4.35 6.67 1.97 3.14 
 
Overall, table 5.1 indicates that most of the variables display high kurtosis.  While less 
obviously problematic, skewness is also high on most variables.  The one variable that 
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comes closest to the desired normal distribution according to the table is multiple 
listing, an unexpected result for a variable that can take a range of values limited to 
whole numbers between 0 and 6. 
 
At a glance, the financial performance measures appear incorrect.  Each is based on the 
overall profitability measure scaled by some other measurement.  Profit/Size, Earnings 
Margin and Return on Assets each take a mean value that appears unreasonably low.  
However, examining the data, these values are expected.  Profit values in the sample are 
often low, with 575 companies reporting a loss at the time of data collection.  
Profit/Size has a low mean of 0.01 due to the effects of so many negative profit reports.  
The negative mean observed for Earnings Margin is due to a stronger version of the 
same effect.  147 companies reported zero or negative revenue values (which likely 
explains to the negative profit reported in all such cases).  Attempting to use these 
values in the Profit/Revenue formula of EM would create further problems.  Where 
revenue is reported as 0, the formula would divide by zero and create invalid results.  In 
the few cases where the reported revenue is negative, there is a larger problem.  In all of 
these, the profit value is (as should be expected) also negative.  The formula would then 
divide a negative by a negative.  While mathematically possible, the result would be a 
positive EM in cases where the company’s performance is very poor, and possibly even 
a large EM where the profit is orders of magnitude lower than the revenue.  To 
minimise the effects of both the negative and zero revenues, the EM formula is altered 
to instead divide by 1, leading to results equal to the reported profit.  The Return on 
Assets values have a similar cause, although less pronounced as total reported income 
tends to be less extreme than reported profit whether a profit or loss is reported.   
 
In addition, a brief examination of the companies reporting negative performance ratios 
was carried out using data from later years.  Most of the companies in this situation 
either improved their performance rapidly or were de-listed within two years.   
 
The remaining parts of section 5.3 discuss tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.  Each variable is 
discussed in terms of the observed correlations with others and expectations are formed 
for the upcoming analysis in chapters 6 and 7.  However, as these correlation analyses 
are univariate tests and the models are multivariate, some differences between 
expectations and observations are likely. 
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Table 5.2: Pearson Correlations 
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*: Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**: Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.3: Spearman Nonparametric Correlations 
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5.3.1: Size 
The collected size variables – profit, book value of assets, market capitalisation, 
revenue, income, and equity – are all considered collectively due to (expected) 
similarities in correlations.  As shown in table 5.1 above, these all display a high degree 
of non-normality, having very high kurtosis and large positive skewness.  The skewness 
is to be expected by the nature of the variables, which for the most part have a lower 
bound of 0 and no practical upper bound.   
 
Plotting the variables explains much of the kurtosis.  Each variable displays at least one 
very large outlier and a number of others that, although smaller, are still above the 
typical range for the variable. 
 
The size measures display a high degree of Pearson correlation with each other, as 
expected of alternative measurements of the same underlying concept.  Among these 
six, book value and income are the least correlated, with only 0.175.  Of the six, these 
two generally demonstrate the lowest correlations with others in the group; the highest 
correlation profit has is with income, while book value’s maximum is 
=with equity.  By contrast, the lowest correlation among the remaining four size 
measures is =0.783 between market cap and revenue.  Market cap, income, and equity 
all share strong correlations with each other, ranging from =0.965 to =0.989.   
 
If Spearman’s nonparametric correlation values are used instead of the Pearson 
correlations discussed above, the values of the correlations change.  The results still 
show strong correlations within the group, but income and book value integrate better 
and are not noticeably less correlated than others.  This suggests these two do not scale 
linearly with other size measures. 
 
The size measures generally demonstrate correlations with three variables outside of the 
group.  A correlation is observed between size measures and total foreign listing in all 
cases except for profit.  The remaining five size measures all display a significant 
correlation with foreign listing, although not a large one (maximum is =0.175 with 
book value).  The same observation is made with size measures and US listing status, 
although in each case the correlation is lower.  These relationships were expected; a 
company that has operations in multiple countries has more potential for growth than 
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one restricted to a single area.  Spearman correlations show stronger connections 
between these variables and the size measures but otherwise the observations are 
unchanged other than the profit and total listing correlation being significant, though 
small (=0.069). 
 
Pearson correlations suggest that there is no link between size and performance, with no 
significant correlations identified between any performance and any size variable.  
Spearman correlations in all cases are significant and positive, and of moderate to 
powerful strength (=0.422 at the lowest, between equity and profit/size, and =0.798 
between profit and profit/size).  This suggests that there is a notable monotonic 
correlation between size and performance, but not a linear one.   
 
All size measures demonstrate some correlation with the total value of debt in the 
company, suggesting that debt is a more reliable measure of size than debt finance.  
While these correlations are generally low, the company’s book value demonstrates a 
very high correlation with debt at =0.898.  This may be evidence that debt finance is 
used in addition to equity finance rather than acting as a substitute as it suggests that 
companies using debt are able to purchase more assets than those that do not use this 
alternative source of finance. 
 
If size and debt ratios are correlated using Spearman’s method then, like with 
performance, a new interpretation results.  All debt measures demonstrate a significant 
positive correlation with size using this technique.  However, the two debt ratio 
measures are never strongly correlated with size, at most reaching =0.493 (debt/equity 
and revenue).  The debt value measure obtains higher correlations but remains 
correlated with size measures.  As with performance, this all suggests the relationship 
between size and debt finance is somewhat monotonic but not linear. 
 
Earnings volatility is comparable to the performance measures in that it is not correlated 
with any size measure using Pearson correlations but has moderate Spearman 
correlations (ranging from =-0.213 to =-0.305).  Again, the relationship is not linear. 
 
Book value and revenue each show very low correlations with sensitive industry 
membership (=0.078 and 0.065 respectively).  It is not clear why these two variables 
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should be connected to the industry type, although the low correlation values suggest it 
may be a property of the sample and not a general observation to expect in other cases.  
Spearman correlations do not change much with regard to sensitivity as, although the 
details differ, the result is still low correlations with some but not all size measures.   
 
Finally, the size measures are all correlated with analyst following.  The correlations 
range from =0.118 (profit) to 0.282 (revenue).  This provides some evidence that the 
sample used here demonstrates the commonly-observed link between company size and 
disclosure practices.  The Spearman correlations are higher (reaching a maximum of 
=0.739) but otherwise the overall observation of a link between size and analyst 
following holds.  Once again, the relationship here appears to be largely monotonic but 
non-linear. 
 
5.3.2: Multiple Listing 
The measure for total foreign listing has a mean of 0.81, indicating a tendency towards 
few listings outside of the UK.  When multiple listing is measured only by reference to 
US listing, little changes in the analysis.  This measure does not appear in table 5.1 
above as it is a binary variable and most of the measures taken there would not apply; 
the details are presented below in table 5.4.  Approximately one fifth of the sample is 
listed in the USA. 
 
Table 5.4: US listing 
  Frequency Percent 
Not US 
listed 
1161 80.8 
US listed 275 19.2 
 
The total foreign listing variable displays a high degree of normality compared to others 
in the sample, having low kurtosis and skewness values as seen in table 5.1.  However, 
as a finite and countable variable taking only a very small range of values, the normal 
distribution is not strictly appropriate to the variable. 
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The two listing variables, foreign and US listing, display a correlation of =0.636 
(Spearman =0.670).  Total foreign listing includes US listing, which explains much of 
this correlation.  As mentioned above, both variables have low but significant 
correlations with the size measures. 
 
Both listing variables display a very low, significant negative Pearson correlation with 
earnings margin (=-0.067 with total listing, -0.070 with US listing) but no significant 
correlations with other financial performance measurements.  Total foreign listing 
displays a similar correlation (=-0.055) with the volatility of recent earnings.  
Spearman correlations between listing and performance are uniformly insignificant, in 
keeping with the very low Pearson correlations. 
 
Listing has significant Pearson correlations with only one of the debt finance variables, 
the actual value of debt.  Spearman correlations change little, creating one additional 
significant correlation between debt/equity and foreign listing, but the value of this is 
very low (=0.067). 
 
Both variables display a significant correlation with sensitive industry membership.  
While the value of this correlation is low for US listing (=0.095), the value for total 
listing (=0.234) cannot be dismissed.  Spearman correlation values are barely different. 
 
Finally, both variables show a correlation with analyst following, taking values of 
=0.403 for total listing and =0.189 for US listing, and again the Spearman correlation 
values are similar.  This supports the idea that listing in multiple countries will lead 
companies to disclose more information due to differing listing requirements in each 
regulatory jurisdiction.  Note that the =0.403 correlation with total listing is the highest 
Pearson correlation involving analyst following. 
 
5.3.3: Financial Performance 
All of the performance measures display high positive kurtosis, suggesting that a normal 
distribution cannot be applied.  Unlike others in the sample, two of the performance 
variables have negative skewness (ROA and earnings margin).  All three of the 
performance measures are constructed as a ratio of two of the size variables, a 
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numerator related to the throughput and a denominator related to the recorded value of 
the firm, and the properties of these ratios are therefore likely to be influenced heavily 
by at least one of the variables involved.  If plotted, these tend to have potential outliers 
at both ends of the scale due to a few companies recording high profits while others 
experience high losses.  Visually, profit/size and earnings margin each display one very 
large outlier at the upper end (although not the same company in each case) and have a 
few outliers at the lower end of varying scale.  ROA behaves differently, having a 
varied range of low outliers and a few smaller outliers above its typical range. 
 
The three performance measures are not strongly correlated with each other.  ROA and 
profit/size are correlated with =0.376, while earnings margin is not correlated with 
others in the group.  As seen in chapter 7, models that initially used all three invariably 
removed earnings margin as insignificant, suggesting that it is not compatible with the 
others.  Spearman correlations show a different relationship, however, with all three 
having strong positive correlations (minimum =0.744). 
 
In addition to the correlations between performance measures and listing discussed in 
the relevant sections, there are a few other significant correlations.  First, profit/size and 
ROA are each correlated with the debt/assets measure, taking values of =-0.109 and 
=-0.328 respectively.  This suggests that companies have better performance when 
debt finance levels are low in relation to the recorded asset value.  However, all three of 
these variables involve the use of book value of assets as a denominator, and the link 
may be related more to this than any accounting-based explanation.  The Spearman 
correlations show a very different relationship between performance and debt finance, 
with low but uniformly positive correlations between any pair of measures. 
 
Pearson correlations suggest no relationship between performance and earnings 
volatility.  Spearman correlations suggest otherwise, having moderate correlations 
between performance measures and volatility (profit/size =-0.262, earnings margin =-
0.255, and ROA =-0.272). 
 
Further evidence that earnings margin acts differently to the other performance 
measures is observed in its significant correlation with sensitive industry membership of 
=-0.083.  Spearman correlations, however, increase the magnitude of this relationship 
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to =-0.136, but significant negative correlations with the other two performance 
variables mean this is comparable to others. 
 
In addition, profit/size and ROA (but not the earnings margin) each show correlations 
with the analyst following.  The profit/size correlation is very low at =0.069, while the 
ROA correlation is higher at =0.162.  Spearman correlations instead show a link of 
approximately =0.400 with all three performance measures. 
 
5.3.4: Debt Finance 
The debt finance measurements each display similarly high positive skewness and 
kurtosis.  The value of debt in the firm appears visually similar to a size variable, having 
a large number of outliers of varying sizes, while the two ratio measurements have a 
small number of large positive outliers. 
 
There are very few correlations involving the measures of debt.  The three measures in 
the group are barely correlated, with only debt and debt/equity showing anything 
significant, but the value is a very low =0.075.  Spearman correlations show a different 
relationship with all three having strong correlations (minimum =0.763), suggesting a 
non-linear relationship between these variables. 
 
As mentioned above, the size measures correlate with the total (i.e. unscaled) value of 
debt and listing status, much like the size variables under Pearson values while all three 
debt finance measures correlate to some extent under Spearman values.  Listing status 
correlates only to debt value and Spearman correlations do not change much in this 
category.  As discussed earlier, the performance measures correlate only when using 
Spearman’s methods. 
 
Earnings volatility has no significant Pearson correlation with any debt finance 
measure, but significant positive Spearman correlations occur.  The debt value has 
=0.350, comparable to size measures, while the two debt ratios have =0.283 for 
debt/equity and =0.201 for debt/assets, suggesting once again that there is a non-linear 
relationship between volatility and debt finance usage. 
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There is a very small correlation between debt value and sensitive industry membership 
(=0.076), again comparable to some size measures.  This does not change if Spearman 
correlations are used, with the debt and sensitivity correlation actually lower under this 
version of correlation (=0.058). 
  
The value of debt displays a significant correlation with analyst following in line with 
the size measurements (=0.239), while the two measures of debt scaled by company 
size do not show significant correlations.  This suggests that debt finance level is 
unlikely to have an effect on analyst following in later models and further supports that 
total debt is more indicative of firm size than the use of debt finance.  Spearman 
correlations are similar to Pearson in this case, with the debt value correlation being =-
0.133 and no significant correlations with the other two. 
 
5.3.5: Sensitive industry 
As a binary measure, the sensitive industry variable is not described in table 5.1 above.  
Its frequencies are in table 5.5 below.  As it shows, there is an almost even split between 
sensitive and non-sensitive industries in the sample. 
 
Table 5.5: Sensitive Industry 
  Frequency Percent 
Non-sensitive 
industry 
771 53.7 
Sensitive 
industry 
665 46.3 
 
Most correlations involving sensitive industry membership are mentioned in one of the 
sections above.  It is significantly (Pearson) correlated with some size measures, listing 
status, and the value of debt to low extents and has a low negative correlation with 
earnings margin but no other performance measure.  Spearman correlations are not very 
different for the most part other than being low and negative with all three performance 
measures. 
 
126 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that that sensitivity is correlated with analyst following.  At 
=0.169, its value is comparable to the correlations between following and size.  This 
relationship is weaker (=0.120) but still exists according to the Spearman correlation. 
 
5.3.6: Return Volatility 
The non-normality of the volatility measure is comparable to that of most of the size 
variables, showing similar skewness and kurtosis to many of them.  When plotted, this 
variable is visually similar to most of the size measures as there are a few large outliers 
and a larger number of smaller ones. 
 
There are only two significant Pearson correlations involving earnings volatility, the 
low (=-0.086) correlation with debt/equity and a marginally higher (=-0.103) 
correlation with return on assets.  The variable is otherwise unrelated to any other under 
the Pearson method of correlation. 
 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation creates a very different image.  Under this 
method, significant correlations are present with a range of other variables.  The lack of 
significant Pearson correlations combined with the number of significant Spearman 
correlations indicates that volatility has strong but highly non-linear relationships with 
other variables. 
 
 The six size measures each display a significant correlation ranging from =-0.213 
(market cap) to =-0.305 (profit), suggesting that larger companies have more stable 
returns.  Correlations of similar scale exist with the three performance measurements, 
suggesting that higher income tends to be linked with stable returns.  The value of debt, 
which has been previously indicated to act more like a size measure than a debt finance 
measure, displays a lower correlation (=-0.133).   
 
In addition, a significant correlation of =-0.213 exists with the disclosure measure, 
indicating a small tendency for companies with more stable returns to provide more 
information.  This may be a case of the two variables having a common cause rather 
than a causal link; larger companies have more to disclose and are more stable, as 
indicated by correlations between size and both disclosure and volatility.   
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Unusually, there is not a significant Spearman correlation with the debt/equity measure 
despite there being a significant Pearson correlation between this and volatility. 
 
5.3.7 Outliers 
Outliers, observations that take unusually extreme values, are a possible problem with 
any data set.  Regression analysis relies on a line of best fit, one that minimises the total 
distance between itself and all observations, as discussed in section 5.4.1. In OLS 
regression, all observations are equally weighted; the distance between the line and any 
one observation is as important to minimise as the distance to any other.  This creates a 
clear problem if outliers are involved in the data set.  A clear pattern may exist in most 
of the observations, but an outlier will tend to pull the line of best fit away from this 
pattern as it is considered equally important. 
 
Other regression approaches may apply unequal weights to observations.  This makes it 
more important to minimise the distance to some observations than others as the highly-
weighted cases will contribute larger amounts to any distance measurement.  Unequal 
weighting can reduce the problems caused by outliers by making their distances less 
important to the overall function, but it cannot completely eliminate the problems.  It is 
also possible for an unequal weighting system to assign high weight to an outlier and 
further move the final line of best fit away from a pattern apparent in other variables. 
 
The handling of outliers creates an issue for quantitative research.  Including an outlier 
in the sample means the problems described above may occur.  Removing them from 
the sample eliminates these problems, but means relevant data is unused.  Outliers may 
be due to errors made in the process of data entry, e.g. typing an extra digit and 
increasing a value by an order of magnitude.  Cases like this are safe to remove from a 
data set as they are incorrect and their effects on patterns are not reliable.  Other cases 
are genuinely unusual observations that behave differently from others in the sample.  
Observations of this type may be included or removed from the sample.  Their inclusion 
may make a pattern or relationship that exists elsewhere in the sample less clear.  
However, their removal means not including true and valid observations.  It is also often 
difficult to determine which outliers are errors and which are genuine but unusual 
observations. 
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The data used in this thesis come from Datastream outputs, which rely on data entered 
into Datastream, which in turn are provided by the company. This means errors may 
occur at the company level, at the Datastream level, or at the researcher level.  Outliers 
are checked against the company’s published reports where possible, which eliminates 
Datastream and researcher-caused error.  Company-level errors are still possible, 
although for listed companies the information should have been entered carefully due to 
possible legal action and audited before publication, largely eliminating material errors.  
It is therefore unlikely that outliers in the data set are due to error and most are accurate 
but extreme values. 
 
Outliers in this thesis are investigated using the Mahalanobis Distance method.  This 
approach helps to identify multivariate outliers, observations that are unusually large or 
small in multiple variables once correlations in the sample are taken into account.  The 
test converts the Mahalanobis distance into a p-value, then searches for cases where 
p<0.001.  Any observation with a p-value in this range has a highly significant distance 
and is very likely to be an outlier.  When this test is applied to the sample used in this 
thesis, 46 outliers are identified.  Most of these companies have a clearly identifiable 
reason to be considered an outlier, such as a recorded loss meaning the performance 
ratios take extreme negative values, or cases where the company uses such extreme 
levels of debt in its capital structure that the debt-to-equity ratio takes a large value.  A 
few companies record negative equity or a book value that exceeds the market value of 
the company.  In the time since data was gathered, most of these companies have either 
changed their situation or ceased to exist as independent and active business entities. 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation tables for the outlier-free sample are presented 
below.  Removing outliers reduces skewness and kurtosis and tends to strengthen 
correlations. 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics with Outliers Removed 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Size measures 
      
Book Value 
(£000) 
53 167011000 1671947.84 9590167.861 11.998 169.274 
Market Cap 
(£000) 
0 68453931 985894.51 5004660.135 10.144 116.658 
Profit 
(£000) 
-9452 41591430 781990.33 2953969.631 6.886 59.744 
Revenue 
(£000) 
-853320 12284123 101703.16 579678.432 12.266 193.608 
Income 
(£000) 
-286500 28821975 421588.21 1743881.674 9.261 108.047 
Equity 
(£000)       
Foreign listing measure 
      
Foreign listing 
(# of countries) 0.00 6.00 0.81 0.78 .84 1.50 
Debt finance measures 
      
Debt 
(£000) 
0 29776000 302653.75 1522151.213 10.326 143.129 
Debt/ Equity 
(£000) 
-10.158 16.674 .401 1.436 2.587 40.567 
Debt/ Assets  
(£000) 
0.000 2.106 .156 .223 3.153 16.518 
Performance measures 
      
Profit/Size 
-2.874 .862 -.055 .323 -3.551 18.946 
Earnings Margin 
-33614.000 9697.000 -338.843 2077.269 -9.372 115.665 
Return on Assets 
-1.962 1.241 -.029 .263 -2.846 12.912 
Volatility measure 
      
Volatility 
0.000 637.435 28.278 55.361 5.477 40.198 
Disclosure measure 
      
Following 
(# analyst estimates) 0.00 32.00 4.35 6.67 1.97 3.14 
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Table 5.7: Pearson Correlations with Outliers Removed 
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Table 5.8: Spearman Nonparametric Correlations with Outliers Removed 
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5.3.8 Normality and Transformations 
Examination of skewness and kurtosis values for most variables indicates that few if 
any of the variables follow a Normal distribution (table 5.1).  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and Shapiro-Wilk normality tests confirm this idea.  For both tests, every variable tested 
has a significant deviation from a Normal distribution.  While removing outliers tends 
to reduce the skewness and kurtosis the values are still very large (table 5.6) and this is 
reflected in the two tests still showing no Normally-distributed variables.  
 
In order to limit the effects on non-normality on the testing, two transformations of the 
data are examined.  Logarithmic transformation is used with the aim of reducing the 
non-normality of the sample while retaining potential relationships between variables.  
Where a variable can take a non-positive value, a constant is added before 
transformation to make even the lowest observed value positive so that logarithmic 
transformation is possible.  When the transformed data are subjected to Normality tests, 
they are found to still be non-Normal.  Visual inspection of plots of the variables reveals 
the problem to have two sources. Some variables are naturally skewed by having a 
minimum value of zero, such as the three measures of debt finance.  Rather than a 
smooth bell-curve, such variables tend to demonstrate a high peak at zero due to many 
companies recording no debt. Logarithmic transformation of these zero values (after 
adding a constant of 1 to make the procedure possible) still leaves a large peak.  
 
The other cause is in the addition of constants before transformation.  Some of the 
constants are large enough that they dominate the new value that is then subjected to 
logarithmic transformation, leading all transformed values to be heavily influenced by 
the added constant.  For example, if the smallest recorded profit is -£1m then the same 
amount is added to make all values positive.  A profit (or loss) of lower (absolute) value 
than this has had a constant that may be several orders of magnitude larger than the 
original value added to it, meaning the £1m addition is more important in determining 
the logarithmically transformed value than the original observation.  Transformed 
values therefore cluster around the logarithm of the added constant. 
 
Overall, logarithmic transformation is of limited value for the data collected for this 
thesis.  If variables were limited to positive values only then the addition of a constant 
would be unnecessary, reducing the problems this transformation causes.  However, the 
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use of potentially negative values in this sample (e.g. profit/loss values) means the 
choice is between leaving some non-normal variables untransformed or having the 
problems described above. Tables 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 show details of the 
transformation.  This transformation is applied to the full data set with outliers as the 
transformation should naturally result in more normally distributed variables. 
 
Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics with Logarithmic Data 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Size measures 
      
Book Value 
(Log) 
2.996 21.225 11.256 2.655 0.465 0.534 
Market Cap 
(Log) 
0.000 21.141 10.725 3.073 -0.778 2.770 
Profit 
(Log) 
6.306 19.868 11.253 2.093 1.084 0.625 
Revenue 
(Log) 
10.692 19.665 14.728 0.288 5.719 137.662 
Income 
(Log) 
0.000 18.997 13.725 0.615 -14.283 351.050 
Equity 
(Log) 
0.001 20.261 13.014 0.938 0.785 35.525 
Foreign listing measure 
      
Foreign listing 
(# of countries) 0.00 6.00 0.81 0.78 .84 1.50 
Debt finance measures 
      
Debt 
(Log) 
0.000 19.901 6.879 5.120 -0.128 -1.189 
Debt/ Equity 
(Log) 
-11.148 5.144 -0.981 1.744 -1.765 4.391 
Debt/ Assets  
(Log) 
-11.614 3.479 -1.594 1.762 -1.555 3.223 
Performance measures 
      
Profit/Size 
(Log) 
4.361 5.006 4.700 0.013 -3.685 482.945 
Earnings Margin 
(Log) 
0.000 13.348 12.647 0.336 -37.292 1405.151 
Return on Assets 
(Log) 
3.256 3.689 3.609 0.019 -10.290 149.731 
Volatility measure 
      
Volatility 
(Log) 
-4.472 10.317 2.982 1.863 -0.335 0.423 
Disclosure measure 
      
Following 
(# analyst estimates) 0.00 32.00 4.35 6.67 1.97 3.14 
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Table 5.10: Pearson Correlations with Logarithmic Data 
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Table 5.11: Spearman Nonparametric Correlations with Logarithmic Data 
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The other transformation tested is a Normal Score approach, as Cooke (1992) describes.  
The Normal score approach forces all variables to take a Normal distribution, but it 
eliminates the details of possible relationships among variables in the process.  The first 
stage of this transformation requires observations to be ranked, removing the ability to 
examine how far two variables tend to move together and reducing possible 
relationships only to whether both increase in rank together or if one increases while the 
other decreases.  The method then converts the ranks into values that force the variable 
to take a Normal distribution. 
 
The Normal Score transformation data are not subjected to Normality testing.  This data 
should generate a Normal distribution and testing was performed only in order to check 
the method had been performed correctly.  For some variables the tests indicate non-
Normality.  On further inspection, the cause is equal values before transformation.  
Where two or more observations are equal they are each assigned the mean rank for all 
observations sharing the same value when the transformation ranks observations.  In 
some cases, there are enough observations of a given value to distort the final Normal 
Scores.  For example, a number of companies record zero debt in their capital structure, 
meaning that all of them share a rank for their debt, debt/assets, and debt/equity values. 
 
One more transformation was investigated but not used, that of converting observations 
to their ranks.  This was found to have the same problem discussed above with the 
Normal Score approach, eliminating information about the scale of relationships 
between variables as the only information retained by the transformation is the rankings 
and not the actual differences in size between any two observations.  Further, this 
approach gives variables a new distribution that is effectively a discrete variation on the 
Uniform distribution, which does not help with later tests that assume a Normal 
distribution of variables.  Finally, this approach tends to result in the same conclusions 
as the Normal Score method as both rely on ranking observations to some degree.  
 
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for data 
after normal score transformation.  The normal score transformation requires 
observations be ranked, so the resulting Pearson and Spearman correlations are nearly 
identical and only Pearson correlations are presented.  This transformation is performed 
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on the full data set for the same reason; the ranking stage of the transformation 
eliminates outliers by its nature, preventing them from causing problems. 
 
Table 5.12: Descriptive Statistics with Normal Score Data 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std.  Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Size measures       
Book Value 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Market Cap 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Profit 
(Normal Score) 
-2.180 3.391 0.003 0.992 0.059 -0.173 
Revenue 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.009 0.979 0.121 -0.200 
Income 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Equity 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Foreign listing measure 
      
Foreign listing 
(# of countries) 0.00 6.00 0.81 0.78 .84 1.50 
Debt finance measures 
      
Debt 
(Normal Score) 
-1.065 3.391 0.035 0.920 0.452 -0.471 
Debt/ Equity 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.016 0.967 0.113 0.088 
Debt/ Assets  
(Normal Score) 
-1.065 3.391 0.035 0.920 0.452 -0.471 
Performance measures       
Profit/Size 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Earnings Margin 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Return on Assets 
(Normal Score) 
-3.391 3.391 0.000 1.000 0.000 -0.016 
Volatility measure       
Volatility 
(Normal Score) 
-2.009 3.391 0.004 0.988 0.086 -0.224 
Disclosure measure 
      
Following 
(# analyst estimates) 0.00 32.00 4.35 6.67 1.97 3.14 
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Table 5.13: Pearson Correlations with Normal Score Data 
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5.4: Methods 
Studies of the determinants of disclosure among companies tend to use regression 
analysis as the primary means of statistical analysis.  The discussion above in section 
5.2 suggests this may not be the most appropriate method. 
 
5.4.1 Regression and SEM Discussion 
OLS regression is the technique commonly taught to students as the basic method of 
regression.  
 
The method is easily explained using a case of simple regression where a dependent 
variable is explained in terms of a single explanatory variable.  In such cases, plotting 
the regression on a 2-dimensional plane is possible and serves to clarify the process.  In 
this case, the researcher may plot each observation to visually show the relationship 
between the two variables.  Once each point is in place, a line of best fit is commonly 
drawn.  However, it is very difficult to find this line precisely.   
 
The regression process tests possible lines of best fit by identifying the distance between 
each point and the line being tested.  In OLS, these distances are squared and summed.  
The line with the lowest total sum of squares is the final line of best fit.  The squaring 
occurs in part to ensure that all values are positive before the summation, as using the 
original measured values would lead to a combination of positive and negative that 
would make most total distances near to zero regardless of whether the line passes 
perfectly through all points or is equally far above some points as it is below others.  In 
addition, squaring values means that points far from the line contribute 
disproportionately highly to the total distance figure.  The algorithm therefore favours 
lines that come close to all points over those that pass near-perfectly through most but 
far from a few.   
 
While useful for ensuring that all observations are accounted for when minimising the 
error distance, this property can cause problems when a potential outlier is included in 
the sample.  The line of best fit will be weighted towards this single point due to its 
large distance from any line that passes through all others.  When squared, this distance 
becomes a very large discrepancy that the process needs to minimise. 
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The same approach is applicable to multivariate regression (i.e. multiple explanatory 
variables), albeit harder to visualise.  The process effectively works the same way, 
however.  A now hypothetical line is drawn between all observed points, as plotted in n-
dimensional space, and the distance between the predicted point (the line) and the 
observed point (the plotted point) is calculated for each observation.  These distances 
are squared and the reported regression equation is the one that describes the line with 
the lowest sum of squares. 
 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 show correlations between size and multiple listing (Pearson =0.175 
with book value of assets), and between sensitive industries and multiple listing 
(Pearson =0.234 with total foreign listing).  While neither is particularly strong, there 
is an assumption in regression that all explanatory variables are completely independent 
of each other.  The size-listing correlation is particularly important given the frequency 
with which these two variables are used together in regressions explaining disclosure.  
As Haavelmo (1943) argues, variables are often endogenous but researchers rarely 
consider the implications of this.  As a consequence of the independence assumption, 
regression cannot easily be used on models in which explanatory variables have causal 
effects on each other (Iacobucci, 2009).    
 
Violation of the independence assumption leads to some degree of inaccuracy in 
regression.  Regression identifies the effect that each explanatory variable has on the 
dependent.  If two explanatory variables have effects on each other, the relationship of 
each with the dependent is not clear.  To use one of the examples above, assume the 
correlation between size and listing is because a large company has the resources to 
expand into foreign markets; size causes multiple listing.  If both of these variables have 
effects on disclosure, as the literature suggests, then size has an indirect effect not 
accounted for in regression as it influences disclosure through its effect on multiple 
listing.  Further, the multiple listing coefficient captures some of the effect of size.  The 
coefficients contain some degree of inaccuracy, and there is a higher possibility of 
drawing erroneous conclusions as a result. 
 
To get around the potential problems of correlated explanatory variables, alternative 
methods can be employed.  Structural equations modelling (SEM) has been selected.  
141 
 
SEM is a generalised case of regression, using many of the same ideas to identify how a 
number of explanatory variables determine the values of other, dependent variables.   
 
A single starting point for SEM is difficult to identify as it developed over time across 
multiple areas of research.  Wright (1921) is one of the earliest known papers to focus 
on ideas that would later inform SEM.  Essentially, Wright notes that there are cases 
where explanatory variables are statistically related to one another and may even have 
causal relationships.  One of the examples used is a model predicting the weight of a 
guinea pig approximately one month after birth, in which many of the relevant variables 
are themselves influenced by the condition of the mother.  A method is discussed 
involving correlations being recognised in the form of paths between variables, and is 
later applied to an example.  The method bears similarity to the calculations performed 
in SEM and the same principles are in use, but the full methodology is yet to be 
developed at this stage.  While potentially useful, the method described is 
computationally intensive.  This was likely the reason for the paper’s initially low 
impact; Wright’s paper was published in 1921, decades before technological 
developments would result in practical computers.  Despite this, Wright was able to 
make estimates in this and later papers. 
 
Goldberger (1972) offers a useful overview of the development of SEM.  Essentially, 
SEM has two models, one a structural model and the other a measurement model.  
These concepts were developed independently and brought together to form the method 
as it is now understood.  Wright’s (1921) path analysis concept provides the structural 
aspect, linking variables with expected causal links.  At approximately the same time, 
psychologists began working with the method of Factor Analysis due to the recognition 
of unobservable variables underlying observed results.  As a simple example, a 
subject’s score on a series of tests may be explained by some unobservable mental 
talents, while a given disorder may be difficult to measure directly but easily observed 
through behaviours. 
 
One of the largest steps in SEM was not the method itself being defined, but a computer 
program being developed for it.  Joreskog created LISREL – short for LInear Structural 
RELations – during the 1970s.  With this software, the computation-heavy nature of 
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SEM became less of a barrier to many researchers and the development of the method 
beyond its basic ideas received a major boost.   
 
Despite overall enthusiasm, there are those who argue for simpler methods.  Klein 
(1960) is a good example of this.  The paper advises using simpler methods where 
possible and not becoming caught in the overenthusiasm that has allegedly followed 
since Haavelmo’s (1943) work was published.  In many cases, Klein argues, a more 
basic method will perform adequately without adding unnecessary complexity.  More 
important, however, is to not regard complexity as a solution to all problems, which 
many were apparently doing at the time.   
 
There are two primary benefits to SEM.  First, unlike regression, there can be more than 
one dependent variable, and it is possible for any given variable to be both explanatory 
and dependent, being determined in part by other variables in the model (i.e. 
endogenous) while in turn serving as a determinant of others.  Correlation of 
explanatory variables is therefore allowable and non-problematic in SEM.  In addition 
to this, SEM can make use of latent variables.  These are variables that cannot be 
observed directly, often due to a conceptual nature, but can be seen indirectly through a 
number of indicator variables.  As an example, company size could be considered a 
latent variable.  A company reliant on employee talent over equipment will have a 
comparatively small book value due to few recordable assets despite a large volume of 
trade and resulting high income and profit, likely leading to a large market 
capitalisation.  At the other extreme, a heavily automated manufacturer will have a large 
total book value that largely defines the total market capitalisation, while the other 
common measures may be lower in comparison.  More generally, various authors argue 
that multiple-indicator latent constructs are useful because individual measures will 
have some amount of bias or inaccuracy, but using several together should reduce the 
effect of any individual indicator’s problems (Aaker and Bagozzi 1979, 
Diamantopolous 1994, Steenkamp and Baumgartner 2000).  Cooke (1992) explains the 
use of multiple measurements for a concept in the disclosure context: 
 
“There is no overwhelming theoretical reason to prefer one size variable to another. 
However, each variable may contain an interesting and possibly unique aspect of size, 
despite any multi-collinearity between the size variables.” 
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Cooke, 1992, p232 
 
Cooke (1992) uses factor analysis to resolve this problem, condensing several measures 
of company size into a single factor.   
 
Similar cases can be handled in SEM by treating the various measures as indicators of a 
latent variable for the underlying concept.  Using the same example, by taking a range 
of indicators, a more rounded view of the size of a given company can be obtained.  The 
same holds for other variables commonly used in disclosure studies.  For this reason, 
latent variables are used where possible for any variable where multiple measures were 
taken, although in many cases they proved unhelpful or problematic and are removed 
before the final model.   
 
Figure 5.1 below shows a latent variable as it would appear in a SEM diagram.  Arrows 
point from the indicator variables to the latent variable because the latent concept causes 
the values of its indicators.  Further, the shapes given to the variables vary.  Clarity in 
diagrams requires that latent variables be visually distinct from indicator variables.  
Established convention in SEM is for unobserved (i.e. latent) variables to take an oval 
shape while observed variables are rectangular. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Latent variable example 
 
 
By definition all indicators of a single latent variable should be correlated.  This gives 
another means of including correlated variables in SEM, in addition to the ability to 
connect (latent) variables. 
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A second type of latent variable may also be used (Bollen and Lennox 1991, Jarvis et al 
2003, Mackenzie et al 2005).  The type above is known as a reflective latent variable as 
the indicators reflect the underlying concept.  The other type is known as a formative 
latent as the indicators collectively define the underlying concept.  The two types have 
very different properties and interpretations.  None of the concepts used here were 
found to be better represented as a formative variable as all were either single-indicator 
variables (i.e. not latent variables) or underlying concepts better modelled with 
reflective latent variables.  Appendix A discusses formative latent variables in more 
detail, along with additional SEM capabilities that were not considered necessary for 
this thesis. 
 
Ultimately, the SEM process fits two models to the data.  One examines how well the 
latent variables are measured by their indicators, known in some cases as the 
measurement model, and applies some confirmatory factor analysis to determine how 
strongly each indicator loads on the latent construct.  Following this, the other tests the 
relationships between the latent constructs, known as the path model, which involves 
regression-like relationship tests (Aaker and Bagozzi 1979, Anderson and Gerbing 
1982, Iacobucci 2009).  As a result, the source of poor fit becomes comparatively easy 
to identify.  While regression has the convenient measurement R
2
 to indicate fit (see 
below), all sources of poor fit are encapsulated within 1-R
2
.  In SEM, the two model 
approach makes clear whether poor fit is due to inaccurate measurement of constructs or 
inaccurate paths between constructs (Iacobucci, 2009). 
 
Figure 5.2 below presents an example of a structural equation model. 
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Figure 5.2: Example SEM 
 
This diagram shows a number of conventions of SEM.  As described above, observed 
variables (the indicators) are represented with angular boxes, while latent variables are 
elliptical.  Arrows represent causal links, so in this case Latent A is thought to influence 
both Latent B and the dependent variable.  There is no requirement that only latent 
variables be used; if one of the latent variables can be adequately represented with a 
single indicator then it can be replaced with that indicator.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that this diagram (like all the model diagrams in this thesis) 
is, strictly, incomplete.  Any endogenous variable, defined as one caused to any extent 
by another variable present in the model, should have another causal variable added to 
it.  This represents an error term, i.e. the part of its value that is not explained by causes 
present in the model.  In Figure 5.2, only Latent A would not have such a variable 
attached as it is the only exogenous variable in this model; the other two latent variables 
and all of the indicators would have an error.  These error terms are usually represented 
with a circular shape to distinguish them from other types of variable.  Throughout the 
thesis, these error terms are left out of model diagrams as an aid to clarity.  They were 
included during the analysis of each model. 
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There are some disadvantages to SEM, however.  First, it is complicated; regression is 
simpler and may be a better option despite its problems if they are known and worked 
around.  In cases where the regression assumptions are minimally violated, regression is 
a less complicated method that gives reliable results.  It is possible that the regression 
models are accurate enough that the effort necessary for SEM is unnecessary. 
 
Second, there is not a single convenient measure of model fit in SEM, unlike regression 
which has R
2
 as a clear indicator of fit.  Instead, the normal recommendation is to use a 
series of fit measures for a comprehensive overview of overall fit.  In addition to this, 
the chi-square test – one of the more useful fit measures – is sensitive to sample size.  
With larger samples it becomes more likely to indicate a poor model fit despite large 
samples being otherwise preferable in statistical studies. 
 
Due to the question of the appropriateness of SEM and the need to compare it to 
existing techniques, it is not the only modelling process used in this thesis.  As seen in 
Chapter 6, regression models of the type commonly seen in disclosure literature are 
tested first as a basis for comparison.  Chapter 7 covers most of the results of SEM 
approaches to modelling and contains a comparison of the results of the two methods, 
although there are a few exploratory structural equation models in chapter 6. 
 
The methods used, both SEM and OLS, are forms of estimation.  That is, they attempt 
to find a value for some unobserved parameters based on the observed data.  In each 
case, the main items estimated are the extent to which some variables influence the 
value of others. 
 
In regressions, the only estimation required is the coefficient attached to each of the 
explanatory variables, the various i in the regression equations.  For SEM, estimation 
is more complex.  All arrows in a path diagram, both straight causal links and curved 
covariances, are estimated.   
 
A straight connection between two non-indicator variables is conceptually similar to a 
i coefficient in a regression in that it estimates the extent to which the value of one 
variable influences the value of another.  Straight arrows between a latent variable and 
its indicators are again similar as they estimate the extent to which the latent variable’s 
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unknown value influences that of the indicators.  However, for each latent variable, the 
estimated weight of one indicator will be constrained to be exactly 1 in order to provide 
a scale for other weights.  This does mean weights are defined in relation to each other 
rather than on a more absolute scale and the values will change if a different indicator is 
used for scaling. 
 
Curved covariance arrows are conceptually different to the straight arrows more 
commonly seen in structural equation models.  Where a curved arrow is not present 
between two variables, the researcher is assuming zero covariance.  The existence of an 
arrow relaxes this assumption, but it is possible for the calculated covariance to be close 
to zero or statistically insignificant. 
 
SEM estimation is a more sophisticated and data-intensive method than regression 
analysis.  At its core, the method relies on covariance matrices.  Parameter values for 
the model are estimated using the covariance matrix  containing implied values of 
covariance obtained from the starting values for required parameters (themselves 
obtained by differential calculus).  This matrix is compared against the covariance 
matrix S, which contains the observed values.  A maximum likelihood approach is then 
employed to find a sufficiently probable  given the observed S, which is then used to 
determine the parameters required to generate the final matrix . 
 
The actual maximum likelihood fitting function is: 
FML = log|| + tr(S
-1
) – log|S| - (p + q)      (1) 
Where tr indicates the trace of the matrix S-1 and (p + q) is the total number of 
variables in the model.  The maximum likelihood is obtained where this function is 
minimised.  Bollen (1989) explains the derivation of this equation. 
 
For OLS regression, the estimation process follows a simple formula.  The error term i 
in the regression equation should be minimised for all i.  By rearranging the regression 
formula for i, the estimation minimises: 
 
i = Y –  – 1x1 –  2x2 – … – nxn (2)       
 
 
148 
 
A number of estimation techniques are possible in SEM.  The chosen method here is 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  This approach to estimation uses the observed 
data to find the most likely (i.e. highest probability) values for statistical parameters that 
describe the observed sample’s distribution.   
 
5.4.2 Possible Alternative Methods 
The main reason for the use of an alternative modelling technique is a perceived 
endogeneity problem in the data commonly used in regression studies that explain 
disclosure activity.  The chosen SEM approach is but one of many possible techniques 
that allows for some degree of endogeneity in models. 
 
One of the most obvious alternatives is an instrumental variables (IV) regression 
approach (and the related 2-stage least squares method). IV regression includes at least 
one instrumental variable in analysis.  In a simple regression of the form Y = 
iXi) + , an instrument for X would be independent of Y but not X.  The value of 
the instrument does not influence Y directly, but it does influence X which in turn 
affects Y.  If X can be held constant while changing the instrument’s value, Y should 
also remain constant.  An instrument for explanatory variable X can be loosely defined 
as one which influences the dependent Y only through effects it has on X. 
 
IV analysis is useful in cases where the value of an explanatory variable X is correlated 
with the error term .  This often means there is some correlation among explanatory 
variables. While this describes the situation with the explanatory variables commonly 
seen in disclosure studies, IV analysis is not used here.  To some extent this is simply 
because of the benefits of SEM discussed above (mostly in latent variables).  Beyond 
this, using IV analysis requires being able to find an instrument, which may be a 
challenge.  The properties required of an instrument are such that it can be very difficult 
to find a suitable variable to fill this role.  While it may be possible to find a variable 
that would serve as an instrument for company size, this would not be easy and would 
not enable the use of latent variables. 
 
In terms of the underlying mathematics, the models that rebuild regressions in SEM are 
applying regression techniques.  The SEM process fits two models sequentially.  One, 
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the measurement model, tests the latent variables to determine how well they are 
described by their indicator variables.  The second model, the structural model, then 
tests relationships between non-indicator variables using regression techniques.  These 
can involve latent variables only, latent and observed (non-indicator) variables, or 
observed variables only.  In the case of a model with only observed variables, there is 
no measurement model to test and the process moves straight to the structural model.  
 
The structural model phase is capable of handling a range of complex relationships 
between variables.  However, in the case of the remade regression models in this thesis, 
there are no complex relationships.  Six observed variables are assigned as causes of a 
single observed dependent and nothing else is included in the model.  All that needs to 
be calculated is the extent to which each variable explains the dependent, exactly as in a 
simple OLS regression.  Differences in values between one regression and its SEM 
remake are generally small and likely explained by rounding errors somewhere in the 
process as the two programs may use a slightly different algorithm or work to more 
significant figures in the process even if they display to the same number. 
 
In addition to different methods, different estimators could be used with SEM such as 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).  This covers a family of estimators with the 
benefit that some estimator can be found within the GMM framework that should 
provide a good estimation for any data set.  
 
MLE, the default in many programs that cover such techniques, is an efficient and 
unbiased estimator as long as the data meets certain requirements, primarily in terms of 
meeting assumptions about an underlying normal distribution.  Where the data does not 
meet these requirements, GMM techniques will provide a better estimator. MLE is also 
computationally less complex and therefore faster to calculate, which was more 
advantageous before computing power became widespread and easily accessible.  Both 
of the SEM programs used (Stata 14 and AMOS 22) include the option to use 
asymptotic distribution-free (ADF) estimators, which are part of the GMM category.   
 
Investigation of the dependent variable above shows that it does not deviate far from a 
normal distribution.  In the regression models in chapter 6, its errors (residuals) are 
demonstrated to similarly not deviate far from a normal distribution.  MLE is known to 
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be highly efficient under these circumstances and is therefore the preferred form of 
estimation throughout. 
 
A latent variable in SEM is used where there is a hypothetical variable that cannot be 
measured directly but would be useful for the model under consideration.  A latent 
variable is formed by identifying a number of indicators, measurable variables that will 
have their values influenced by the unseen value of the latent variable.  In practice, this 
means that a number of observable variables are condensed into a single unobserved 
one in the structural model phase.  There is a clear comparison to be made with factor 
analysis. 
 
Factor analysis is normally used to identify whether a group of variables can be reduced 
to a smaller number of unobserved variables that each represent the commonalities 
between subsets of the observed variables.  Its purpose is to reduce a large, complicated 
set of variables down to a smaller, more manageable number.  There is also a variation 
on the technique known as confirmatory factor analysis.  This is used where a 
researcher has a pre-existing construct from theory or prior examination and wishes to 
test that their expected measurement variables are the correct set (e.g. identifying 
whether measures should be added or removed).  A SEM latent variable can be 
examined in this way; the researcher will usually have pre-existing ideas about where a 
latent variable exists and can use CFA to test these ideas.  This process is performed as 
part of the measurement model stage of SEM. 
 
As an additional test here, an exploratory factor analysis was performed.  All of the 
observed variables were used in a single test to investigate whether the expected latent 
variables emerge from this method.  Overall, the EFA is consistent with the a priori 
expected latent variables.  The factors that emerge generally match the expected latent 
variables in terms of the measures that show large loadings.  The main difference is that 
there is some evidence that book value of assets and total debt together load to some 
extent on a previously unexpected factor.  It is not immediately clear what this factor 
represents other than some aspect of company size.  While this potential factor is not 
used in later modelling, the size latent variable often has relatively low loading from 
book value compared to other size measures, and the debt capital latent is usually well-
represented by the debt/assets and debt/equity measures alone.  
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5.5: Conclusion 
Data has been gathered for a range of variables.  Examination of the data in section 5.3 
shows some potential problems, although all are to be expected from the data.  The 
variables are tested for correlations, which show some apparent links between variables 
in some cases.  In general, high correlations occur within the variable groups defined by 
the headings above, indicating that different measurements of the same concept tend to 
be correlated as expected.  Measurements of different concepts rarely have high 
correlations, suggesting few cases of one variable potentially acting on both.  
Importantly, many of the variables are correlated significantly (if not always highly) 
with the dependent variable, suggesting that most may have an effect on disclosure 
practices. 
 
However, these are conclusions drawn from correlation analysis alone.  The next 
chapter covers the results of regression techniques involving the data, while chapter 7 
covers SEM approaches. 
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Chapter 6: Regression Modelling 
The layout of this chapter is explained here.  Section 6.1 discusses the regression 
process and models used, and the major assumptions made in this form of testing.  
Section 6.2 demonstrates and discusses the results of the regression analyses performed 
on the data.  Sections 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 repeat this process for the outlier-removed data, 
the logarithmic data, and the normal score data respectively.  Section 6.6 discusses the 
overall findings taking all four sets of models into account. 
 
Section 6.7 shows the initial results of SEM methods and includes rebuilding the 
regressions as simple structural equation models, then goes into detail on various steps 
taken with the structural models and discusses a single one in depth as an example.  
This process always results in near-identical coefficients as the OLS regressions.  The 
results of this process are reported only for the basic data models as this is sufficient to 
illustrate the comparability. 
 
As a general rule, statistical significance is accepted here at the 5% level.  However, 
variables significant at 10% are kept in the model when insignificant items are deleted.  
This is essentially to allow for the possibility that further changes to the model may yet 
show significance to the item in question.  No conclusions are drawn that assume such 
items are supported by the analysis, however.  A few references to a “grey area” of 
significance are made, which means 0.05<p-value<0.10. 
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6.1: Regressions Basics and Assumptions 
Research in this field frequently uses regression analysis to determine what combination 
of characteristics make a company likely to disclose information.  A similar analysis is 
carried out here as a baseline for comparisons and to forge expectations for later 
models.  In keeping with past research, all regressions performed are basic OLS 
regressions.  Other techniques are available but rarely used in the area, with the 
exception of logit methods where the dependent is a binary variable and Tobit methods 
where there is some censoring of the dependent. 
 
Various pieces of research use different variables to measure the same concept.  In some 
cases, these alternatives are effectively mutually exclusive due to regression methods 
encountering distorted results where two or more included variables are strongly related 
to one another.  Using company size as an example, some papers use the book value of 
assets as a measure of size (e.g. Singhvi and Desai 1971) while others recommend a 
measure based on the company’s revenue (e.g. Adams et al 1998).  Both are valid 
measures of size despite giving different information about the company and it is not a 
simple matter to identify a superior one.  Each is ultimately a proxy measure and will 
therefore estimate the size of some companies more accurately than others.   
 
As an example, companies are generally unable to value human capital on the balance 
sheet.  In a company reliant on employee abilities as a major source of income, the book 
value of assets will be small relative to the revenue of the firm.  On the opposite side, a 
heavily automated manufacturing company will have a high asset value simply because 
its primary ‘workforce’ consists of machines that can and should be considered assets, 
making the assets high relative to the revenue. 
 
In order to deal with the fact that various measures are suggested for several variables, a 
number of regressions have been performed.  This additionally serves as a robustness 
test, ensuring that observed effects are explained by what the variables represent instead 
of some statistical quirk of the data, for example showing that size is the cause instead 
of revenue specifically.  There are three regression models in total, each using a 
different rule for variable selection where there are options.  Regression 1 uses the most 
commonly employed measure of each variable, i.e. the measurement seen in the largest 
number of prior papers examined.  Regression 2 uses the second most common measure 
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in each case.  Regression 3 deviates from the pattern.  Where a third variable is 
available, this is used; otherwise, the first choice is re-used.   
 
All regressions take the same basic form: 
 
DISC = 1SIZE 2LIST3PERF  4DF 5SENS 6VOL   
 
Where: 
DISC, the dependent variable, is the measure of disclosure.  This is the analyst 
following measure described in chapter 5 
SIZE is a measurement of the company’s scale.  The three measures used are book 
value of assets, market cap, and revenue.    
LIST is a variable for the company’s multinational listing status.  There are two 
measures here.  The first is a count of the total number of countries in which the 
company is listed.  The other is a dummy variable for whether the firm is listed in the 
USA.   
PERF is a performance ratio for the company.  Three are employed: the profit/size ratio; 
return on assets; and the earnings margin.   
DF measures the level of debt involved in the company’s capital structure.  Three 
measures are used: the Debt/Assets ratio, Debt/Equity ratio, and the monetary value of 
debt in the company. 
SENS is a dummy variable set to 1 if a company is in a publically sensitive industry 
sector, as explained in chapter 5.  This measure never varies between models as there is 
only one measurement of sensitivity. 
VOL measures the company’s earnings volatility.  This is calculated as the standard 
deviation of return on equity over a five-year period (or less where data is unavailable 
for the full period, as explained in chapter 5).  This measurement is unchanged between 
regressions. 
The Greek letters are all standard regression notation.  The  represents a constant of 
unknown value before analysis, the various i (i=1,2,…,6) are coefficients of unknown 
value before analysis, and the  is an error term with a Normal(0,) distribution ( 
being an unknown standard deviation) that reflects some random variation around the 
model’s predictions. 
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In addition to the analysis detailed below, all models were checked for multicollinearity 
of variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF) measure.  In all cases, the VIFs are 
below 2.   Even the strictest of tests using this variable suggest it should not exceed 5.  
As a result, no further mention is made as all regression models are assumed to not have 
any problems with correlated variables. 
 
Further, three major assumptions made in regression analysis are tested and discussed 
below.  The first assumption is that variables are measured on a continuous scale.  This 
is true for only a few variables in this study, with the only unambiguously continuous 
variables being those that are formed by calculation, such as the debt and performance 
ratio measures.  US listing is the most notable violation of this assumption as it is a 
dummy variable taking values of 0 or 1.  Models that do not use this variable instead 
include the total number of foreign listings, which takes discrete values ranging from 0 
to 6.  Analyst following takes a wider range, but still by its nature must take discrete 
values.  Any variable that represents a currency quantity, e.g. any of the size measures, 
presents a less severe violation.  These variables are generally measured in units of £1m 
and are rounded, meaning they are discretely measured.  However, these variables take 
values in a wide enough range that they can be practically considered continuous. 
 
The second assumption tested is that there is a linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and each dependent variable.  While this can be investigated by plotting the 
two, this is rarely helpful in this thesis.  When most variables are plotted against analyst 
following, the resulting diagram does not provide much information on the relationship.  
Many companies have a low following, so regardless of the other variable’s value there 
is a general tendency for the plots to be largely flat. 
 
Correlation analysis proves more helpful in this regard.  Comparing tables 5.2 and 5.3 
shows that, for most variables, the Spearman correlation with analyst following is much 
stronger than the same variable pair’s Pearson correlation.  This suggests that nonlinear 
relationships are generally far stronger than linear relationships.  While linear 
relationships cannot be ruled out, it is likely that they generally do not accurately 
describe the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
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Logarithmic transformation does not change this result much, reducing the scale of the 
difference between Pearson and Spearman correlations while still showing stronger 
Spearman correlations.  Normal scoring makes the differences much smaller, but still 
favours the Spearman correlations.  The two should actually be identical, but the 
differences are minor and likely caused by the Spearman correlation algorithm handling 
identical values differently to the ranking that occurs in the Normal Score 
transformation. 
  
The third assumption tested is that the residuals produced from the regressions follow a 
Normal distribution.  This is quickly proven false by examination of a histogram of the 
residuals of each regression, as presented directly beneath each regression below.  For 
the basic, untransformed data including possible outliers, the residuals consistently 
display a slight positive skewness and very definite leptokurtosis in each case.  The 
skewness indicates a likely violation of another assumption, that of no significant 
outliers after the regression (i.e. no large deviations from the regression line).  The 
higher than expected number of large (positive) residuals that the skewness indicates 
implies that some residual values may be far higher than expected and qualify as 
outliers. 
 
Removing outliers from the sample reduces the kurtosis, but both it and the skewness 
are still clear after regression.  Logarithmic transformation produces inconsistent results 
in this regard.  The residuals of regression 1 are slightly leptokurtic but otherwise close 
to Normal.  Regression 2 displays some skew and very clear leptokurtosis, while 
regression 3 is between the other two in that it shows minor skew and moderate 
leptokurtosis.  The rank and normal scores transformations both have similar results in 
all models.  These transformations result in minor positive skew and slight 
leptokurtosis. 
 
The final assumption discussed is that variables are measured without error.  This is not 
strictly a regression assumption as most statistical methods will benefit from reliable 
measurement.  As discussed in section 5.3.7 when addressing outliers in the sample, the 
data here should be considered measured without error.  The sample consists of listed 
companies and most observations are values that were recorded in the companies’ 
annual reports.  The reliability assumption emerges from the audit process that occurs 
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before the annual reports are published.  Auditors cannot prevent all errors; even 
excluding cases where fraudulent reporting has been able to occur for several years, the 
auditors cannot reasonably examine all figures in great detail, and some published 
figures rely on a degree of judgement from within the company (provisions for bad 
debts are a clear example of this; although not part of this study, the value of such 
provisions may influence other recorded values).  However, the auditors’ role is to 
prevent material misstatements.  Values in annual reports may be in error to some 
extent, but should be free of errors of any notable scale. 
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6.2: Regressions on Base Data 
6.2.1: Regression 1 
The first regression model tested as an explanation of disclosure activity is: 
 
DISC = 1(Book value of assets) 2(Total foreign listing)3(Return on assets)  
4(Debt/Assets) 5(Sensitive industry) 6(Volatility)     
 
The results of this regression are given in the table below.  The R
2
 fit indication is 
0.230.  Similar research tends to obtain values around 0.3-0.4 range (e.g. 0.306 for 
Raffournier (1995) and Jiang et al’s (2011) 0.370).  The obtained 0.230 is rather low in 
absolute terms, but only slightly lower than comparable research. 
 
Table 6.1: Results of Regression 1 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
72.335 0.000   0.233 0.230 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  1.442 0.255 5.606 0.000 
Book 
Value 
0.204 1.74E-08 0 8.677 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.343 2.934 0.207 14.144 0.000 
Sensitive 0.077 1.023 0.319 3.205 0.001 
Return on 
Assets 
0.161 1.700 0.261 6.523 0.000 
Debt/ 
Assets 
0.064 0.416 0.16 2.596 0.010 
Volatility -0.012 0.000 0.001 -0.513 0.608 
 
The only coefficient to fail the significance test at the 5% level is that of volatility, 
which is consistent with its very small standardised coefficient of -0.012. 
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The coefficient of Book Value is similarly small, but this is an effect from the scale of 
the variable.  In this case, the standardised coefficient provides more information; 
removing the effect of variable size demonstrates that this is actually one of the more 
powerful coefficients with a value of 0.204, beaten only by Foreign Listing’s 
standardised coefficient of 0.343. 
 
The remaining coefficients do not need much comment.  Sensitive industry membership 
adds one analyst above the average for a company with similar characteristics in an 
insensitive line of business.  The ROA coefficient appears large, indicating some 
analyst interest from performance.  Finally, the use of debt generates analyst interest, 
but at a lower rate than other potential sources.   
 
However, upon further analysis, it becomes clear – as mentioned earlier – that the 
regression is not working properly.  The diagram below shows a histogram of the 
residual values. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Residual Histogram of Regression 1 
 
The line represents what a Normal distribution of the same mean and standard deviation 
as the residuals would look like.  The histogram clearly deviates heavily from this.  The 
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peak is off-centre, indicating a nonzero skewness.  In addition, the peak is obviously far 
higher than it should be.  Combined with the long right-hand tail, this suggests some 
degree of leptokurtosis.  This is not entirely unexpected; analysis of the variables 
individually generally resulted in high kurtosis and skewness. 
 
6.2.2: Regression 2 
This model uses less commonly used variables.  The resulting equation is: 
 
DISC = 1(Revenue) 2US Listing)3(Earnings Margin)  4(Debt/Equity) 
5(Sensitive industry) 6(Volatility)        
 
The regression results are displayed below.  R
2
 this time is 0.122, a clear indication of a 
poorly-fitting model.   
 
Table 6.2: Results of Regression 2 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
34.220 0.000   0.126 0.122 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  2.874 .238 12.068 .000 
Revenue .256 1.06E-7 .000 10.275 .000 
US listing .148 2.513 .424 5.922 .000 
Sensitive .140 1.867 .334 5.584 .000 
Earnings 
Margin 
.010 4.97E-6 .000 .407 .684 
Debt/ 
Equity 
.001 0.001 .030 .043 .966 
Volatility -.042 -0.002 .001 -1.672 .095 
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This arrangement of variables changes things compared to regression 1.  Volatility 
remains insignificant (albeit in the ‘grey area’ where 0.05<p-value<0.10) but is joined 
by the debt finance and performance measures (debt/equity and earnings margin, 
respectively).  The significant determinants of disclosure under this model are sensitive 
industry membership, US listing, and size as measured by reference to revenue.   
 
However, residual analysis suggests severe problems as seen in Figure 6.2 below: 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Residual Histogram of Regression 2 
 
Compared to regression 1, these residuals are similarly skewed and much more 
leptokurtic.  All evidence indicates that regression 1 is superior. 
 
6.2.3: Regression 3 
This third model continues the pattern set by the second, using the third most common 
measurement of a given variable where such could be found.  The model is: 
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DISC = 1(Market Cap) 2(Total foreign listing)3(Profit/Size)  4(Debt) 
5(Sensitive industry) 6(Volatility)        
 
The listing measurement has been set as the total number of listings again, as in 
regression 1, because there was no third option.  The debt finance variable this time is 
the monetary amount of debt in the firm.  This variable is questionable; while it gives a 
clear indication of the amount of debt, it does not scale to the firm’s size.  Further, in 
testing correlations among variables, it became clear that this correlates more strongly 
with size measures than other debt finance indications.  This gives some cause for 
concern about co-linearity problems, although no such problem emerged as the VIFs 
remained below 2. 
 
The fit for this version of the model is an R
2
 of 0.211, putting it in the middle of the 
three regression models. 
 
Table 6.3: Results of Regression 3 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
64.859 0.000   0.214 0.211 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  1.405 .255 5.506 .000 
Market 
Cap 
.092 1.46E-8 .000 3.853 .000 
Foreign 
listing 
.350 2.997 .209 14.315 .000 
Sensitive .075 1.000 .323 3.093 .002 
Profit/Size .066 0.299 .106 2.810 .005 
Debt .168 6.94E-8 .000 7.010 .000 
Volatility -.028 -0.001 .001 -1.204 .229 
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As is becoming consistent, volatility is not significant at the 5% level.  All other 
variables are.  Market cap and debt both have very small coefficients, but again as 
monetary amounts they are measured on such scales that the net effect of multiplying 
the coefficients by the variable values will in many cases mean a small but noticeable 
effect.  Otherwise, there is little to add that has not been applicable to other models so 
far. 
 
As with the previous two models, analysis of residuals indicates some troubles with the 
regression method used here: 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Residual Histogram of Regression 3 
 
Once again, there is a clear positive skew and very definite leptokurtosis.  The residuals 
appear similar to those of Regression 1 in Figure 6.1 above. 
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6.3: Regressions with Outliers Removed 
6.3.1: Regression 1 
Table 6.4: Results of Regression 1 with Outliers Removed 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
88.617 0.000   0.281 0.277 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  1.378 0.263 5.243 0.000 
Book 
Value 
0.246 0.000 0.000 10.400 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.289 2.390 0.199 12.002 0.000 
Sensitive 0.068 0.866 0.300 2.892 0.004 
Return on 
Assets 
0.255 6.110 0.576 10.610 0.000 
Debt/ 
Assets 
0.099 2.807 0.660 4.253 0.000 
Volatility -0.012 -0.001 0.003 -0.495 0.621 
 
Retesting regression model 1 after removing the outliers from the sample improves the 
model fit by a small amount (R
2
 0.277).  In terms of the important variables, foreign 
listing still has the largest standardised coefficient, but not by as large a margin.  In 
addition, return on assets has become more powerful than the company’s book value.  
Overall, this model most supports a Signalling explanation of disclosure due to the 
importance it places on the financial performance variable, ROA.  It does not reject 
either of the other theories, however. 
 
Inspection of residuals below shows that, while this change to the data improves the 
resulting normality, it does not resolve the problems.  The diagram shows the residuals 
to be less skewed and less leptokurtic than in the original version of regression 1, but 
still showing both of these traits. 
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Figure 6.4: Residual Histogram of Regression 1 with Outliers Removed 
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6.3.2: Regression 2 
Retesting regression model 2 with outliers removed shows some very different 
outcomes compared to the first version. 
Table 6.5: Results of Regression 2 with Outliers Removed 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
111.217 0.000   0.329 0.326 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  2.649 0.213 12.412 0.000 
Revenue 0.522 0.000 0.000 23.022 0.000 
US listing 0.114 1.848 0.365 5.057 0.000 
Sensitive 0.061 0.776 0.288 2.695 0.007 
Earnings 
Margin 
0.014 0.000 0.000 0.618 0.536 
Debt/ 
Equity 
0.080 0.352 0.099 3.551 0.000 
Volatility -0.057 -0.007 0.003 -2.537 0.011 
 
This model has the highest fit of those tested so far, with an R
2
 of 0.326.  Earnings 
margin, a performance measure, is insignificant, although volatility (unusually) is 
significant.  Like the first version of regression 2, this one shows size to be the most 
important variable by a large margin, in this case by an even larger margin.  Only it and 
US listing show non-negligible standardised coefficients.  Looking to residuals shows 
clear problems, however; the pattern appears largely unchanged from the original 
regression 2. 
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Figure 6.5: Residual Histogram of Regression 2 with Outliers Removed 
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6.3.3: Regression 3 
Regression 3 retested without outliers produces results unlike the original version. 
Table 6.6: Results of Regression 3 with Outliers Removed 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
121.599 0.000   0.349 0.346 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  1.863 0.233 7.996 0.000 
Market 
Cap 
0.296 0.000 0.000 9.429 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.269 2.223 0.189 11.767 0.000 
Sensitive 0.044 0.554 0.286 1.938 0.053 
Profit/Size 0.215 4.205 0.447 9.398 0.000 
Debt 0.124 0.000 0.000 3.956 0.000 
Volatility -0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.129 0.898 
 
The R
2
 here of 0.346 is even higher than the no-outlier regression 2 above.  Where the 
original version of this model showed listing to be very important, it now has the second 
largest standardised coefficient behind market cap.  Debt was formerly third, but now 
comes behind profit/size.  Unusually, the sensitivity variable is narrowly insignificant 
here. 
 
Residual plotting shows improvement over the initial version of this model, but does not 
indicate that non-normality of residuals has been eliminated by removing outliers. 
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Figure 6.6: Residual Histogram for Regression 3 with Outliers Removed 
 
 
Across the three models in this section, little information on disclosure theory emerges.  
Model 3 has the best fit and an insignificant sensitivity variable, showing little support 
for Legitimacy explanations.  Model 2 has a slightly lower fit and an insignificant 
performance variable, not supporting a Signalling explanation.  This would suggest 
Agency Theory is the best explanation by default. 
 
However, while their R
2
 values are much larger than that of model 1 above, model 1 has 
the most normal residuals.  It explains less of the variance in the disclosure measure, but 
better follows regression assumptions.  These three models are therefore considered 
weak evidence for Agency Theory. 
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6.4: Logarithmic data regressions 
Logarithmic data transformations improve the R
2
 and residual normality of all models 
tested. 
 
6.4.1: Regression 1 
Table 6.7: Results of Regression 1 with Logarithmic Data 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
319.144 0.000   0.573 0.571 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  93.744 23.555 3.980 0.000 
Book 
Value 
0.728 1.830 0.052 35.490 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.103 0.885 0.166 5.316 0.000 
Sensitive 0.038 0.512 0.239 2.141 0.032 
Return on 
Assets 
-0.086 -30.652 6.575 -4.662 0.000 
Debt/ 
Assets 
0.035 0.131 0.067 1.947 0.052 
Volatility -0.015 -0.051 0.058 -0.875 0.382 
 
 
Regression 1 shows R
2
 of 0.571 when logarithmic data is used.  Book value, the size 
measure, is the most important variably by a large margin.  Volatility is firmly 
insignificant, while debt/assets is marginally insignificant.  This model suggests a 
rejection of Agency explanations as a result, but the low standardised coefficients on 
both the sensitive and performance measures suggest little support for either.  Residuals 
from the model are marginally skewed and noticeably leptokurtic, although not to the 
extent of models examined so far. 
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Figure 6.7: Residual Histogram for Regression 1 with Logarithmic Data 
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6.4.2: Regression 2 
Table 6.8: Results of Regression 2 with logarithmic data 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
400.543 0.000   0.627 0.626 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  -22.239 4.106 -5.417 0.000 
Revenue 0.767 2.444 0.053 46.465 0.000 
US listing 0.062 1.055 0.279 3.784 0.000 
Sensitive 0.084 1.121 0.219 5.121 0.000 
Earnings 
Margin 
-0.007 -0.131 0.322 -0.406 0.685 
Debt/ 
Equity 
0.002 0.009 0.062 0.152 0.879 
Volatility 0.004 0.014 0.055 0.264 0.792 
 
Regression 2 with logarithmic data has the single highest R
2
 in the thesis, with a value 
more than double those found when using untransformed data (0.626).  Revenue, the 
size measure, is the most powerful variable by a large margin, and of the three the 
indicate theories only sensitivity is significant.  This suggests support only for a 
Legitimacy explanation of disclosure. 
 
However, while the R
2
 is high, the residual plot below shows clear skew and kurtosis.  
As in the outlier-free data, the best fit is not necessarily indicative of best meeting 
regression assumptions. 
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Figure 6.8: Residual Histogram for Regression 2 with Logarithmic Data 
 
  
174 
 
6.4.3: Regression 3 
Table 6.9: Results of Regression 3 with logarithmic data 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
266.874 0.000   0.528 0.526 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  10.935 42.868 0.255 0.799 
Market 
Cap 
0.461 1.001 0.046 21.578 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.173 1.485 0.171 8.704 0.000 
Sensitive 0.071 0.955 0.250 3.817 0.000 
Profit/ 
Size 
-0.009 -4.501 9.132 -0.493 0.622 
Debt 0.279 0.363 0.026 13.754 0.000 
Volatility -0.039 -0.133 0.061 -2.166 0.030 
 
Logarithmic regression 3 shows the lowest R
2
 of the logarithmic models, although still 
higher than the untransformed or outlier-free models at 0.526.  The size variable is still 
the most important, although by a smaller margin than in the other log models.  Only 
profit/size is insignificant, rejecting a Signalling explanation while supporting both 
others.  The high standardised coefficient of debt suggests this model provides more 
support for Agency Theory than Legitimacy.   
 
Residual analysis shows more normality than those of regression 2, but less than 
regression 1. 
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 Figure 6.9: Residual Histogram for Regression 3 with Logarithmic Data 
 
The logarithmic data does not present a theory as the best supported.  Regression 1 
rejects Agency due to the insignificant debt finance variable, but shows little support for 
either alternative due to the low standardised coefficients.  Regression 2 only supports 
Legitimacy Theory, while regression 3 rejects Signalling while providing some support 
for the others.  This overall suggests limited support for Legitimacy as the best 
explanation of disclosure as it is consistently not rejected. 
 
  
176 
 
6.5: Normal Score Regressions 
The use of normal score transformations greatly improves the normality of residuals.  
Logarithmic data is better for R
2
 values, but normal scores still provide a large 
improvement. 
 
6.5.1: Regression 1 
Table 6.1: Results of Regression 1 with Normal Score Data 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
262.098 0.000   0.524 0.522 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  2.883 0.209 13.762 0.000 
Book 
Value 
0.591 3.942 0.163 24.160 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.152 1.304 0.177 7.352 0.000 
Sensitive 0.066 0.884 0.254 3.479 0.001 
Return on 
Assets 
0.085 0.564 0.144 3.925 0.000 
Debt/ 
Assets 
0.019 0.140 0.139 1.002 0.316 
Volatility 0.000 0.001 0.128 0.011 0.991 
 
This model’s R2 of 0.522 is among the higher in this thesis, but lower than those of 
models using logarithmic data.  Company size (book value) is by a large margin the 
most important variable.  Like in log regression 1, the debt finance measure is 
insignificant, rejecting Agency Theory, and the standardised coefficients of the 
sensitivity and performance measures are low enough to provide little support for their 
respective theories.  
 
While still slightly skewed and leptokurtic, the residuals of this model are among the 
best in the thesis. 
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 Figure 6.10: Residual Histogram for Regression 1 with Normal Score Data 
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6.5.2: Regression 2 
Table 6.11: Results of Regression 2 with Normal Score Data 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
258.137 0.000   0.520 0.518 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  3.023 0.175 17.253 0.000 
Revenue 0.709 4.832 0.160 30.255 0.000 
US listing 0.089 1.503 0.316 4.762 0.000 
Sensitive 0.162 2.167 0.250 8.675 0.000 
Earnings 
Margin 
-0.009 -0.061 0.142 -0.427 0.669 
Debt/ 
Equity 
-0.045 -0.311 0.144 -2.157 0.031 
Volatility 0.038 0.038 0.130 0.293 0.769 
 
At 0.518, this model has the lowest fit of the three normal scores models, which is 
unusual for regression 2.  Standardised coefficients demonstrate revenue (size) to be the 
most important variable by a large margin, followed by sensitivity, best supporting 
Legitimacy Theory.  The low (absolute) value of the debt finance variable’s 
standardised coefficient suggests neither support nor rejection of Agency Theory.  
Earnings margin is insignificant, rejecting a Signalling explanation.   
 
The residuals of this model are not as Normal as those of Normal Score Regression 1, 
but better than most in the thesis.  Skewness is more apparent in this diagram than that 
of Regression 1 above. 
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Figure 6.11: Residual Histogram for Regression 2 with Normal Score Data 
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6.5.3: Regression 3 
Table 6.12: Results of Regression 3 with Normal Score data 
Model 
Data F-stat 
Model 
Sig.   R-square 
Adj. R-
square 
 
344.346 0.000   0.591 0.589 
Variable 
Data Std. Coeff. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error t-stat Sig. 
Constant  2.862 0.191 15.019 0.000 
Market 
Cap 
0.454 3.056 0.154 19.792 0.000 
Foreign 
listing 
0.141 1.204 0.162 7.415 0.000 
Sensitive 0.070 0.941 0.234 4.012 0.000 
Profit/Size 0.080 0.531 0.127 4.192 0.000 
Debt 0.285 2.064 0.149 13.878 0.000 
Volatility -0.016 -0.110 0.118 -0.933 0.351 
 
At 0.589, Regression 3 is the best of the Normal Scores model.  As with the logarithmic 
data, the market cap is by far the most important variable, albeit to a lesser extent than 
size measures have been in other models.  Standardised coefficients show importance of 
the debt finance variable, supporting Agency Theory above other theories. 
 
Residuals of this model are comparable to those of Normal Score Regression 2, being 
good but less so than those of Regression 1 with the same data. 
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Figure 6.12: Residual Histogram for Regression 3 with Normal Score Data 
 
A clear best supported theory emerges from regressions performed using Normal Score 
data.  Legitimacy Theory is supported by models 1 and 2, while model 3 does not reject 
it.   
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6.6: Overall Regression Discussion 
Table 6.13 shows the adjusted R
2
 of all models and the standardised estimates of each 
variable.  Estimates of NS indicate that the value was not significant at the 5% level. 
 
 Table 6.13: Fit and estimates for all regression models 
   Fit Standardised Estimates 
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Base Data Models 
Reg 1 0.233 0.230 0.204 0.343 0.077 0.161 0.064 NS 
Reg 2 0.126 0.122 0.256 0.148 0.140 NS NS NS 
Reg 3 0.214 0.211 0.092 0.350 0.075 0.066 0.168 NS 
Outlier-free Models  
Reg 1 0.281 0.277 0.246 0.289 0.068 0.255 0.099 NS 
Reg 2 0.329 0.326 0.522 0.114 0.061 NS 0.08 -0.057 
Reg 3 0.349 0.346 0.296 0.269 NS 0.215 0.124 NS 
Logarithmic Models  
Reg 1 0.573 0.571 0.728 0.103 0.038 -0.086 NS NS 
Reg 2 0.627 0.626 0.767 0.062 0.084 NS NS NS 
Reg 3 0.528 0.526 0.461 0.173 0.071 NS 0.279 -0.039 
Normal Score Models  
Reg 1 0.524 0.522 0.591 0.152 0.066 0.085 NS NS 
Reg 2 0.520 0.518 0.709 0.089 0.162 NS -0.045 NS 
Reg 3 0.591 0.589 0.454 0.141 0.070 0.080 0.285 NS 
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Taken collectively, the regression models of all types and using all data most support 
Legitimacy Theory as an explanation of disclosure.  Models using the unaltered, 
logarithmic, and normal score data all support this theory above any other.  The models 
using the untransformed data with outliers removed generally support Agency Theory.  
However, these are merely the most consistently supported theories among the 
regressions using that form of data.  The other theories may be rejected by some 
models, but are generally supported to a smaller extent.  Signalling Theory and Agency 
Theory are less consistently supported or less powerful across all models, but each 
demonstrate some cases where they best explain disclosure as seen among the sample.   
 
Size, by all measures used in the regressions above, has a uniformly positive effect on 
disclosure.  Such a result is to be expected based on the literature to date.  Size was one 
of the first variables identified as a potential explanation.  It had a positive effect when 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) used it, and the paper heavily criticising their work argues 
that size should be even more important (Buzby, 1975).  The vast majority of papers 
examined include size and find it to be a positive determinant of disclosure.  The 
identified exceptions invariably find an insignificant result and never negative 
outcomes.  Most of the exceptions are studying something more specific than the 
generalised studies that find positive results.  For example, Malone et al (1993) offer an 
early insignificant size finding in a sample consisting only of firms in the oil and gas 
sector.  Frankel et al (1994) uses a more general sample, but the dependent variable is 
the existence of a voluntary manager-provided forecast of results instead of a more 
general measurement of disclosure.  More recently, Ali et al (2007) and Chen et al 
(2008) have had insignificant size results when examining family-owned companies in 
the USA. 
 
Listing status, measured above as multiple listing, is invariably positive in the 
regressions above.  This too is in keeping with literature to date.  Multiple listing does 
not have the same frequency of occurrence in literature as size, but is positive in a 
majority of cases.  Taylor et al (2010) find a rare negative result, but believe this 
apparent oddity is considered a unique result of their combined sample and disclosure 
measure.  Raffournier (1995) and Robb et al (2001) both find insignificant multiple 
listing, neither of which are easily explained.   
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Sensitive industry membership has a near-uniform effect, being insignificant in one 
model (logarithmic 2) but otherwise positive.  The effects of various industry 
classifications have been tested in the literature and tend to have any effects that the 
researcher predicted in advance.  Adams et al (1998) have industry effects comparable 
to those seen here; their sample is split into categories that are expected to face different 
levels of public scrutiny, finding that those expected to be more sensitive to public 
opinion tend to disclose more than others.   
 
The various measures of financial performance have a more mixed set of results.  The 
obtained coefficient is significant and positive in seven models, but the standardised 
coefficients suggest a weak overall effect in many cases.  Regression 3 has particularly 
mixed results here, having a weak performance effect with the base and normal data, a 
stronger effect with outliers removed, and an insignificant effect with logarithmic data.  
In wider literature, performance measures have had an inconsistent effect on disclosure, 
being positive about as often as negative and insignificant in about as many cases as 
significant.  There is little pattern to the wider results in literature, with all three 
possibilities occurring in various contexts and time periods.   
 
Debt financing measures have very mixed results.  Regression 1 uses Debt/Assets, 
finding a positive but weak result with the base and outlier-free data, but insignificant 
results with the two transformed data types.  Regression 2, using Debt/Equity, has an 
insignificant coefficient with the basic and logarithmic data, a weak positive with the 
outlier-free data, and a weak negative with normal score data.  Regression 3 has a clear 
positive result in most cases, but the debt measurement in this case is simply the value 
of debt in the firm, not scaled by size.  This was demonstrated in Chapter 5 to be 
strongly correlated with size, so it is likely that this measure is actually indicative of 
size, despite finding a low VIF in testing.   Like performance, the effects observed from 
debt finance have varied greatly in the literature and has a similar set of results – 
positive as often as negative, significant as often as not.  There is, however, a small 
pattern within the findings on this variable.  The positive results identified have 
clustered towards earlier papers (Malone et al, 1993, Frankel et al, 1995, and Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999) and cease appearing by 2000.  However, with only three positive 
results identified, this may not be a meaningful pattern and further evidence would be 
needed to reach a firmer conclusion.   
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Volatility is here found to be insignificant overall, being firmly insignificant in all but 
two models.  Findings in literature are quite evenly split between positive, negative, and 
insignificant effects on disclosure, and like performance there is little apparent pattern.  
There are some signs of negative results being a more recent event as the first identified 
paper with such is from 2003 (Field et al), but as with debt this is a conclusion drawn 
from a few observations and more are necessary to confirm the effect. 
 
On the whole, the results obtained here are in line with past research.  Size and listing 
are both consistently positive, as found here.  Industry effects are commonly significant, 
albeit not in any one form, consistent with the result here.  Recent performance and debt 
finance are unclear, having mixed results with a tendency towards weak positives here, 
and do not have any consistent effects in literature.  Finally, volatility is not significant, 
which is overall in keeping with the literature’s even mix of results. 
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6.7: Structural Models of Regression 
This section covers the results of fitting structural models that match the three 
regressions above.  This is done to test for comparability of the methods.   
 
Such simple models do not take full advantage of the power of SEM.   By their nature 
as regressions, none of these models contain multi-indicator latent variables, instead 
having only single indicators.  This removes the measurement model aspect in favour of 
the assumption that everything is measured appropriately and gives no means of 
checking that this is correct.  In addition, the validity and reliability tests for SEM rely 
upon the existence of latent variables, meaning this step has to be skipped for these 
models.  Further, these models follow the regression assumption of independence 
among explanatory variables, eliminating another potential advantage of SEM. 
 
The results demonstrate that the two methods are comparable in terms of the findings.  
In all cases, regardless of data type, the resulting SEM are nearly identical to the 
original regressions.  Only the models using the base, unaltered data are reported here in 
order to illustrate the comparability without repeatedly reporting a model that has 
effectively been tested earlier in the chapter. 
 
Visually, these models are all similar to: 
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Figure 6.13: Example of Regression as SEM 
 
 
This diagram represents Regression 1.  The only changes any other Regression-type 
models make are alternative variables, as discussed throughout section 6.2.  Each table 
of results shows six items, each of which is a single variable with an arrow pointing 
towards analyst following. 
 
For each model, a table of fit values is produced.  SEM lacks a single convenient 
measure of fit like R
2
 and a range of measures are used instead for a rounded view of 
how each model fits.  Each model’s fit table, tables 6.14, 6.16, and 6.18, contain the 
measurements discussed below. 
 
Chi-square is the value of the chi-square statistic obtained for the model.  It is not 
especially useful in itself and is included for completeness of information rather than its 
value as an indicator of fit.  Good fit is indicated by a low value relative to the next 
measurement. 
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DF is the degrees of freedom in the model, and again is included for information rather 
than any particular testing value.  Degrees of freedom in SEM are based on the number 
of parameters in the model and not the sample size.  The calculation involves the 
number of covariances between parameters, which for p parameters is (p(p+1))/2.  The 
number of covariances that are given a fixed value in the model is then subtracted from 
this value.  In the regression models in this section the calculation is consistent. Each 
model has seven total variables for a total of (7*8)/2 = 21 total possible covariances.  
However, the assumption of variable independence means many of these are assigned a 
value of 0 rather than being estimated.  Ultimately, only six are estimated, being the 
covariances between the independent variable and each of the six explanatory variables, 
so the DF value for each model is 21 – 6 = 15.  AMOS (one of the software packages 
used) explains the calculation a little differently.  It instead suggests there are 28 distinct 
sample moments, 21 covariances as above plus 7 means.  Of these, only the 6 
covariances not set to 0 and the 7 means are estimated, leading to 13 estimates and a DF 
calculation of 28 – 13 = 15. 
 
P-value is the probability of the obtained chi-square value occurring on the mentioned 
number of degrees of freedom.  Good fit is, unusually, indicated by a high p-value.  The 
test used has good model fit as its null hypothesis, so a significant result indicates a 
large deviation from an assumption of good fit.  Mathematically, the process checks 
whether a difference between model and observation is significant.  A high p-value 
therefore indicates an insignificant difference, meaning that in an unusual variation on 
normal testing, a significant result indicates poor fit.  All other references to 
significance in this document use the 5% level, so for consistency this will be applied 
here as well; a p-value of 0.05 or higher indicates good fit.  Further, this test has 
problems with large samples; if enough data points are tested, the cumulative total 
discrepancy becomes large enough to be significant and suggest a poor fit even if the 
individual differences are very small. 
 
CMIN/DF is the obtained chi-square value divided by the degrees of freedom.  This 
gives a quick but imprecise view of fit and serves as a useful rough measure.  For ideal 
fit, this ratio should be as low as possible.  In practice, values of 1 are excellent, 2 is 
good, and 3 indicates a mostly-fitting model with some problems.  This measure is 
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affected by the sample size issue of the chi-square test above as it serves as the 
numerator in the function. 
 
NFI, and TLI are fit indices.  In each case, the measures take values in the range [0, 1], 
where 1 indicates perfect fit and 0 means the model explains nothing (both can 
mathematically go beyond the range, but this requires extremely good or bad fit to 
occur).  These measures fit relative to another, theoretical model which is not designed 
to fit well.  In all cases, values near 1 are ideal; as a general rule, values of 0.9 and 
above are definite indicators of good fit.   
 
PNFI is a parsimony-adjusted version of the NFI above.  This means that it penalises 
complexity in the model.  It is possible with SEM to make a model that has plenty of 
linkages and complicated relationships between variables and find that this fits well 
because it is mapping the sample near-perfectly, leading to a model that has severely 
limited generalizability.  Parsimony adjustment alters the formula for the index to 
include some aspect that reduces the value for everything added to the model, so 
inclusions will only be beneficial if their addition to fit outweighs the penalty term they 
apply.  Note that the parsimony adjustment is applied to all models, so even a simple 
one has a lower fit under this index than the unadjusted NFI.  Even a simple model will 
therefore have a lower fit under this measure than a non-adjusted index.   As a result, 
the judgements made on this index must be more lenient; a value above 0.9 is very hard 
to obtain.  0.7 is used instead as the cut-off of clear powerful fit. 
 
RMSEA is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, a complex but reliable 
measurement of model fit.  RMSEA below 0.08 is a definite indication of good fit, 
while 0.05 is excellent.   
 
The final column, B-S P-value, is the result of testing a Bollen-Stine bootstrap method 
on the model.  This is the probability AMOS (the SEM software used) has determined 
of the model being correct from using a bootstrapping approach.  This is essentially a 
significance test that works the same way as the other P-value column in that the null 
hypothesis is that the model is correct and an insignificant result is therefore indicative 
of good fit.  The reason for its inclusion is that the bootstrap method involved corrects 
for non-normality of the data, which is an important factor in the sample employed here. 
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6.2.1: Regression 1 
This model takes the basic regression equation described just under the Regression 1 
heading above and turns it into a structural model.  Everything that is listed on the right-
hand side is considered as a cause of the disclosure measure of analyst following, all 
independent of each other. 
 
Table 6.13: Regression 1 SEM estimates 
      Estimate 
Standard 
error 
C.R. 
P-
value 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Following <--- 
Book 
Value 
0.000 0.000 8.839 0.000 0.208 
Following <--- Foreign 2.934 0.198 14.817 0.000 0.349 
Following <--- Sensitive 1.023 0.309 3.309 0.000 0.078 
Following <--- 
Return on 
Assets 
1.700 0.244 6.967 0.000 0.164 
Following <--- 
Debt/ 
Assets 
0.416 0.151 2.756 0.006 0.065 
Following <--- Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.518 0.605 -0.012 
 
When compared to table 6.1, it becomes clear that the two methods do not differ greatly 
in results.  All estimates, both standardised and not, are nearly identical across the two. 
 
While these tables show some usefulness to the model, the overall fit is not acceptable 
in any regard and is poor by several measures.   
 
Table 6.14: Regression 1 SEM fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
318.392 15 0.000 21.226 0.544 0.374 0.389 0.119  0.139 
 
The RMSEA is too high for a definite good fit.  However, even the basic indices 
indicate poor fit here, which is unusual when compared against models later in the 
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thesis.  The parsimony-adjusted indices are actually higher than a few later models, 
which is likely a result of the extreme simplicity of these remade regressions. 
 
However, this is all consistent with the fit obtained earlier.  The model as a regression 
was found to have R
2
 of 0.230, a low figure that falls below even the usually low figures 
obtained in similar research.  A poor fit for this SEM is to be expected. 
 
6.2.2: Regression 2 
When analysed as SEM, the estimates for this models are very close to those of the 
regression version in section 6.2.2, including a number of insignificant items: 
Table 6.15: Regression 2 SEM estimates 
      Estimate 
Standard 
error 
C.R. 
P-
value 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Following <--- Revenue 0.000 0.000 10.376 0.000 0.258 
Following <--- US 2.513 0.418 6.008 0.000 0.150 
Following <--- Sensitive 1.867 0.330 5.656 0.000 0.141 
Following <--- 
Earnings 
Margin 
0.000 0.000 0.410 0.682 0.010 
Following <--- 
Debt/ 
Equity 
0.001 0.030 0.043 0.850 0.966 
Following <--- Volatility 0.000 0.000 -.312 0.755 -0.042 
 
This is the best-fitting of all the regression remakes, which goes against the very poor fit 
of 0.125 this model had as a regression.  Index-type fit measures are still too low to be 
clearly acceptable, but this model passes the RMSEA test with a value of 0.049. 
 
Deletion of the insignificant items was tested.  This improves the index measures, but 
increases the RMSEA to 0.085, just above the acceptable level.  The confidence interval 
of this estimate goes below the required level, giving some indication that it may be 
acceptable. 
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Table 6.16: Regression 2 SEM fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
67.262 15 0.000 4.484 0.741 0.694 0.529 0.049  0.070 
 
Despite the simplicity of this model, the PNFI is still low.  The B-S p-value is also very 
low, albeit not quite enough to reject the null hypothesis of this model being correct.  
This is consistent with the comparable regression having a notably lower fit than the 
others. 
 
6.2.3: Regression 3 
Like the previous two models, this SEM’s estimates largely match those of the relevant 
regression model: 
Table 6.17: Regression 3 SEM estimates 
      Estimate 
Standard 
error 
C.R. 
P-
value 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Following <--- 
Market 
Cap 
0.000 0.000 3.927 0.000 0.094 
Following <--- Foreign 2.997 0.200 14.952 0.000 0.358 
Following <--- Sensitive 1.000 0.313 3.194 0.001 0.076 
Following <--- Profit/Size 0.299 0.106 2.817 0.005 0.067 
Following <--- Debt 0.000 0.000 7.184 0.000 0.172 
Following <--- Volatility -0.001 0.001 -1.209 0.227 -.029 
 
The fit here is essentially not quite as good as regression 2 in any regard. 
 
Table 6.18: Regression 3 SEM fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
166.880 15 0.000 11.125 0.673 0.567 0.482 0.084  0.174 
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Despite being one of the best fitting when tested as a regression, the SEM version does 
not have an absolutely good fit.  There is little to recommend this model.  The closest it 
comes to good fit is that the RMSEA narrowly fails to reach the acceptable level, while 
even the basic indices are clearly too low. 
 
6.2.4: Additional Models 
Retesting regression models in SEM form produces near-identical coefficient estimates 
in all cases tested here and detailed discussion of most models is not provided.  Model 
fits are quite different, however.  Table 6.19 below presents the fit for all regression 
models retested as SEM. 
 
Models are named according to the data type used, with base referring to untransformed 
data, outlier to that with outliers removed, log to logarithmic data, and norm to normal 
score data.  The number in each name defines whether the model is regression 1, 2, or 3 
as above. 
Table 6.19: Fits for All Regression Structural Models 
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Base 1 318.392 15 0 21.226 0.544 0.374 0.389 0.119 0.139 
Base 2 67.262 15 0 4.484 0.741 0.694 0.529 0.049 0.070 
Base 3 166.880 15 0 11.125 0.673 0.567 0.482 0.084 0.174 
Outlier 1 292.420 15 0 19.495 0.607 0.462 0.433 0.116 0.005 
Outlier 2 148.120 15 0 9.875 0.786 0.723 0.562 0.081 0.005 
Outlier 3 1245.920 15 0 83.061 0.320 0.049 0.229 0.245 0.005 
Log 1 622.404 15 0 41.494 0.662 0.533 0.473 0.168 0.005 
Log 2 177.939 15 0 11.863 0.889 0.855 0.635 0.087 0.005 
Log 3 618.686 15 0 41.246 0.635 0.496 0.454 0.167 0.005 
Norm 1 1027.79 15 0 65.519 0.509 0.316 0.363 0.217 0.005 
Norm 2 909.836 15 0 60.656 0.537 0.355 0.383 0.204 0.005 
Norm 3 1244.42 15 0 82.961 0.508 0.313 0.363 0.239 0.005 
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In table 6.13 (in section 6.6), there is a clear trend in the R
2  
and adjusted R
2
 fit 
measures.  The base data tends to produce the lowest values and removing outliers 
improves things to some extent.  Normal score data provides a larger improvement and 
logarithmic data the greatest improvement, with many of the fit values for these models 
being very high.   
 
Table 6.19 above does not show the same clear changes in fit values when the data type 
is changed, however.  While the logarithmic data does tend to produce the best fits by 
the index measures (NFI, TLI, and PNFI), it is not as clear as the improvement to R
2
 for 
the same models.  The normal score data often shows worse fit than the base data in 
these models.  
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6.8: Conclusion 
There are two questions central to this chapter.  Are the methods comparable? What do 
the models imply? 
 
In answer to the first question, the methods obtain similar estimates.  Table 6.1 and 6.13 
show the estimated coefficients for each variable in regression 1 and the same model 
remade as a SEM, respectively.  Comparing the standardised estimates column in each 
table reveals only minor differences.  In most cases, the values differ only at the third 
decimal place, suggesting only minor differences.  As this is the final digit given in each 
table, this may be the result of a rounding process in the calculations rather than an 
actual difference.  Foreign listing is the exception, having a standardised estimate of 
0.343 under regression and 0.349 in SEM, a larger discrepancy but still a minor 
difference.  Comparison of p-values reveals similarly small differences between the 
methods.  The same pattern is apparent with the other two models and with the 
unreported structural models using the other data types.  Given the same model, the two 
approaches produce almost identical estimates and drawn the same conclusions about 
variable significance, supporting the idea that the two are comparable. 
 
One difference between methods is apparent, however.  Table 6.13 shows a large 
improvement in R
2
 when the logarithmic or normal score data is used in regressions.  
This is not the case for SEM, as shown in table 6.19 and discussed in section 6.2.4 
above.  In this regard, regression has an advantage over the more complex SEM. 
 
The implications of these models are largely discussed in section 6.6 above.  Size and 
multiple listing status each have positive effects on disclosure in all three models, as 
expected from the literature.  More useful is a comparison of the financial performance, 
debt finance, and sensitive industry membership variables, which are respectively the 
primary indicators of Signalling Theory, Agency Theory, and Legitimacy Theory.  
Performance and debt are each significant in regressions 1 and 3, indicating some 
support for Signalling and Agency explanations.  However, sensitivity is significant in 
all three cases, suggesting that Legitimacy is a more robust explanation as it applies in 
all three models.  All three explanations are supported to some extent, with Legitimacy 
having marginally more support than the others. 
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However, this is a conclusion drawn only by examining the implications of generalised 
models.  The next chapter covers the use of SEM to make models specifically to 
represent each theory, which may offer a different view on the theories studied. 
  
197 
 
Chapter 7: Theory Modelling 
This chapter covers the modelling of theories using a SEM approach.   The four sections 
to the chapter are described below. 
 
Section 7.1 is a raw table of results.  It is placed here for immediate reference. 
 
Section 7.2 explains the preparatory steps taken before modelling can begin.  To 
summarise, when using latent variables there is a requirement to test each to ensure they 
will work as intended.  This process is explained in the section, followed by a somewhat 
naïve model that includes all of the gathered variables as an exploration of what may 
and may not be useful in later models. 
 
Sections 7.3 through 7.5 are the most important, covering the results of building models 
for each theory and analysing these in SEM terms to determine which (if any) theories 
offer an explanation for disclosure among the companies that make up the sample.  
Section 7.3 shows the results of testing a model of Signalling Theory with all four data 
types, 7.4 does the same for Agency Theory, and 7.5 the same for Agency Theory. 
 
Section 7.6 concludes the chapter, examining both what implications these models have 
for the theories examined as explanations of disclosure and other interpretations that 
may exist. 
 
As in Chapter 6, significance is accepted at the 5% level.  In addition, the modelling 
takes an iterative approach in which the least significant items are deleted in order to 
better focus on what is found to be relevant.  Variables are only removed from models if 
they are insignificant at the 10% level, intended to leave room for further alterations. 
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7.1: Raw Results 
This section is a table of results only.  The various models are given more detailed 
treatment below.  This section exists purely to allow easy comparisons between them.  
Note that the three regression-equivalents from section 6.2 (titled Reg 1, 2, and 3 here) 
are included for further comparison.  The exploratory model rows represent the models 
in section 7.2 below, named such as these primarily exist to investigate the proposed 
latent variables for other models.  The final three are each named for the theory they 
represent. 
 
The various fit measures are as explained in section 6.7.  A summary of each is 
presented here. 
 
Chi-square is the value of the chi-square statistic obtained for the model.  It is not 
directly useful as a measure of fit.  
 
DF is the degrees of freedom in the model, and again is included for information rather 
than any particular testing value.  
 
P-value is the probability of the obtained chi-square value occurring on the mentioned 
number of degrees of freedom.  Good fit is indicated by a high p-value as the null 
hypothesis in this test is that the model fits the data well. 
 
CMIN/DF is the obtained chi-square value divided by the degrees of freedom.  This 
gives a quick but imprecise view of fit and serves as a useful rough measure.  For ideal 
fit, this ratio should be as low as possible, with values below 3 being ideal. 
 
NFI, TLI, and PNFI are fit indices.  In each case, the measures take values in the range 
[0, 1], where 1 indicates perfect fit and 0 means the model explains nothing (both can 
mathematically go beyond the range, but this requires extremely good or bad fit to 
occur).  These measures fit relative to another, theoretical model which is not designed 
to fit well.  PNFI is the same as NFI but adds a penalty term for complexity in the 
model. 
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RMSEA is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, a complex but reliable 
measurement of model fit.  RMSEA below 0.08 is a definite indication of good fit, 
while 0.05 is excellent.   
 
The final column, B-S P-value, is the result of testing a Bollen-Stine bootstrap method 
on the model.  This is the probability AMOS (the SEM software used) has determined 
of the model being correct from using a bootstrapping approach.  Again, the null 
hypothesis is good fit. 
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Table 7.1: Table of SEM Results 
Model Chi-square DF P-value 
CMIN/ 
DF 
NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
Regression Models 
Reg 1 318.392 15 0.000 21.226 0.544 0.374 0.389 0.119 0.139 
Reg 2 67.262 15 0.000 4.484 0.741 0.694 0.529 0.049 0.070 
Reg 3 166.880 15 0.000 11.125 0.673 0.567 0.482 0.084 0.174 
Exploratory Models 
Base 2177.565 24 0.000 90.732 0.841 0.764 0.561 0.250 0.005 
Outlier 1180.702 65 0.000 18.165 0.899 0.865 0.642 0.112 0.005 
Log 872.200 28 0.000 31.150 0.882 0.816 0.549 0.145 0.035 
Normal 3122.814 46 0.000 67.887 0.791 0.703 0.551 0.216 0.050 
Agency Theory Models 
 Base 4.797 3 0.187 1.599 0.984 0.987 0.492 0.020 0.055 
Outlier 918.821 54 0.000 17.015 0.885 0.891 0.637 0.108 0.010 
Log 348.056 27 0.000 12.891 0.954 0.929 0.572 0.091 0.050 
Normal 315.935 13 0.000 24.303 0.968 0.934 0.450 0.127 0.005 
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Table 7.1 continued : Table of SEM Results 
Model Chi-square DF P-value 
CMIN/ 
DF 
NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-
value 
Legitimacy Theory Models 
Base 179.117 16 0.000 11.195 0.986 0.977 0.563 0.084 0.557 
Outlier 812.946 19 0.000 42.787 0.914 0.840 0.482 0.175 0.010 
Log 288.977 22 0.000 13.135 0.961 0.940 0.587 0.092 0.085 
Normal 436.835 20 0.000 21.842 0.957 0.926 0.532 0.121 0.005 
Signalling Theory Models 
Base 180.239 23 0.000 7.836 0.986 0.980 0.631 0.069 0.562 
Outlier 915.613 44 0.000 20.809 0.921 0.886 0.614 0.120 0.005 
Log 312.755 28 0.000 11.170 0.958 0.938 0.596 0.084 0.005 
Norm 1661.922 41 0.000 40.535 0.894 0.832 0.555 0.166 0.005 
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7.2: Exploratory Models 
Each model is given the same series of analyses and resulting modifications.  Before 
performing the SEM analysis, there are a number of preparatory steps.  First, each latent 
variable must be tested for reliability and validity.  Next, a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) is run to test the measurement aspect of the model, before finally performing the 
SEM to test the structure side.   
 
In each case, the pre-SEM analyses indicate a need to change plans.  Some combination 
of the steps (usually validity and reliability) often indicated that latent variables were 
not working well.  In many cases, the solution to this problem has been to replace latent 
variables with a single indicator.  This suggests that a single measure is sufficient for 
many of the variables used in this field of research, possibly indicating that they are not 
complex and multifaceted concepts in need of complementary measurement methods. 
 
Latent variables must be tested for reliability and validity, and a few tests are used.  
First, the average standardised loading for a given set of indicators must be 0.7 or 
above.  Ideally, all indicators would load to this level on their own, but in some cases 
this is not possible.  Following this, three reliability tests for latent variables are used.  
The first is Cronbach’s (standardised) Alpha, which needs to be between 0.7 and 0.9 for 
a given set of indicators.  Lower indicates that the variables are too divergent, while 
higher suggests that two or more are possibly identical measures.  Second is Composite 
Reliability, a similar but more complex measure, which needs only to be above 0.7.  
The final measure is Average Variance Extracted (AVE), which works differently and 
needs only to be above 0.5. 
 
Most important, the model is subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test 
the measurement aspect.  No CFA models are pictured here.  In most cases, they are 
simply not useful to show as they are almost identical to the pictured SEM for the 
relevant case.  The difference is that CFA is performed by removing all of the expected 
causal links between variables and instead allowing a covariance between every pair of 
variables.   
 
The CFA process has been responsible for most of the changes made between initial 
models and the final tests.  In each case, clear problems highlighted from the process are 
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taken into account to form a new SEM, which is then subject to the same procedure.  As 
expected, the new models rarely had any further problems highlighted by CFA.  
Another method of recommending changes to models also exists, known as the 
modification indices.  After performing the calculations required for a SEM, these 
indices suggest possible relationships that could be added to the model in order to 
improve fit.  They must be used with care, as the suggestions are based entirely on fit 
and not theory.  However, after making CFA-derived changes, these indices largely 
suggested no further improvements. 
 
Details on the process are given for a single model only, the one used to explore the 
intended latent variables.  Others tended towards similar changes, making further 
discussion into repetition.  This model is not based on a named theory.  Instead, it 
simply assumes all data gathered is a potentially useful explanation of disclosure since 
each variable selected was based on existing research that contained justifications for it.  
The model uses all variables to attempt to explain disclosure.  If a theory can be said to 
exist behind it, it is simply that this selection of variables may explain disclosure.  This 
enables testing of the various planned latent variables without the influence of theory. 
 
Volatility and sensitivity are each measured using single indicators in the regressions 
and are unchanged from this for SEM purposes. 
 
Listing was originally a two-indicator latent, consisting of all foreign listing and US 
listing specifically.  When both are used, problems consistently emerge involving the 
foreign listing measure.  The latent variable has a standardised loading greater than 1 on 
foreign listing, which also carries a negative estimate of variance.  The latter problem 
can sometimes be resolved in a simple manner; the estimate is negative, but the 95% 
confidence interval for it may range into acceptable positive numbers.  This would 
indicate that the estimate, while problematic, is not necessarily enough to prevent the 
model being used.  However, this is not the case here; the variance estimates are not 
quite large enough for the upper end of the CI to rise above 0, indicating a genuine 
problem, and this still leaves the impossibly large loading.  The only solution found is to 
delete one of the two variables, as this eliminates the issue regardless of which one is 
removed.  While total listing is causing the problems when both are used, it is a more 
informative measure and the preferred choice if only one is to be used. 
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Debt finance is initially measured in terms of Debt/Assets, Debt/Equity, and the total 
value of debt in the firm, not scaled by size.  As anticipated from its unscaled nature, the 
third measure is problematic, in this case by providing almost no loading for the latent.  
It can be removed safely, which then leads to the same problem with Debt/Equity.  
Debt/Assets is the sole remaining measure of debt finance in the firm in most models.   
 
Performance is initially measured using profit/size, earnings margin, and ROA.  
Generally, earnings margin demonstrates a tendency towards too-high loadings and 
negative variance and is removed for this reason.  ROA is removed in some cases due to 
a low loading, but in others it has a higher effect and is retained.   
 
Firm size retains five of its intended six indicators.  With all six there is arguably a 
problem with discriminant validity here in that the Alpha for the measures chosen tends 
towards very high values, potentially indicating that two or more of the measures are 
too similar. 
 
These findings are generally true across other models.  Differences are noted where they 
arise.   
 
Latent variable values and correlations with other variables were found and examined 
after each model was fitted.  The predicted value of each latent variable was found to 
vary greatly with data type; a size latent using the base data is very different to one 
using the logarithmic data, for example.  However, the values are almost identical 
between model types as long as the underlying data is the same; for example, the size 
latent variables in all four models below using the normal score data all have near-
identical predicted values.  The equations predicting latent variable values are therefore 
provided only for the exploratory models.  The sole exception is a latent performance 
variable that was not part of the normal score exploratory model but was present in the 
normal score Signalling model.  It is discussed at the model in which it appears. 
 
By contrast, correlations involving latent variables are listed with each model.  Two 
models using different data types often have different variables included due to different 
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expectations regarding the underlying theories.  Correlations are therefore more 
idiosyncratic to a single model. 
 
SEM software offers an option known as modification indices (MI).  Each MI is 
attached to a potential link between variables which was not included in the model and 
estimates the effects of including that link on the model’s overall fit.  The process 
calculates the expected decrease to the chi-square statistic if the model were to be re-fit 
with the new parameter included.  This helps the researcher determine whether a 
connection between variables (either causal or covariance) should be included in later 
iterations of a model. 
 
While useful, there are two matters to be aware of when using MIs.  The first is that 
their use can render a model impossible to generalise.  The use of MIs explains what 
will improve fit based entirely on the data used to form the model.  Repeated use of MIs 
to iterate on a given model will ultimately lead to a final model that captures all fit 
improvements possible with the data in use and may suggest including links that only 
exist due to chance in the sample used to test the model.  Taking the process too far may 
result in a model that almost perfectly describes the data used, but fits very poorly on 
another sample.  The other potential problem is that MIs are calculated without regard 
to theory.  MIs may suggest a linkage that improves the model fit but is not supported 
by theory.  Some degree of judgement is required in determining whether a given MI 
should be accounted for in later iterations of a model. 
 
In this thesis, MIs are used to search for model fit improvements.  The value of the MI 
itself must be above (approximately) 3.84, the value corresponding to a chi-square test 
on one degree of freedom being significant at the 5% level.  In addition, the expected 
parameter change must be substantial; some judgement is required to determine what is 
substantial for any given parameter, but many cases occurred where practically 
insignificant parameter changes (e.g. 0.01 or lower) were recorded.  In addition, the 
connection suggested by the index must be between two variables that are valid 
variables to connect.  For example, following the general rule that an indicator variable 
should be causally linked to only one latent variable, cases where this kind of 
connection are suggested are ignored.  In addition, the suggested connection must be 
consistent with the theory that the model represents.   
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The initial form of the exploratory model series, named Latent in tables, is represented 
below: 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Latent Model Diagram, Initial Conception 
 
  
207 
 
7.2.1: Base Data 
When modelled using the unaltered data, it quickly became apparent that the latent 
variables were generally not helping with measurement.  Between the various reliability 
and validity tests above and the CFA itself, it soon emerged that size alone was 
benefiting from having multiple measurements. 
 
The final SEM constructed is: 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Latent Model, Final Version 
 
Only the size latent remains in the end.  This proves acceptable in most regards, with 
CR 0.912 (well above the required 0.7) and Average Variance Extracted 0.657.  
Cronbach’s Alpha for this latent is 0.928, acceptable but high enough that there may be 
significant overlap in two or more of the indicators. 
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The additional connections in this model compared to figure 7.1 are the results of 
following modification indices.  Allowing two indicators of a latent variable to covary 
often makes a large difference to the model’s fit and is commonly seen in many models 
below.  The other additions are allowing size and sensitive industry membership to 
cause foreign listing.  Sensitivity is considered largely fixed for a given company; it is 
difficult to change whether a company is sensitive as this involves changing industry 
sector.  Where a MI suggests allowing sensitivity to connect to another variable, 
sensitivity is always used as the causal variable.  The link between size and foreign 
listing is not as clear, as discussed in chapter 5, but the MI suggestion was to allow size 
as the cause. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Latent Model SEM estimates 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Foreign <--- Sensitive 0.363 0.04 9.108 0.000 0.233 
Foreign <--- Size 0 0 3.905 0.000 0.100 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.974 
Income <--- Size 0.276 0.002 143.644 0.000 0.993 
Revenue <--- Size 0.747 0.015 48.229 0.000 0.801 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 2.407 0.016 148.53 0.000 0.995 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 1.649 0.112 14.707 0.000 0.364 
Following <--- Sensitive 1.091 0.328 3.330 0.000 0.082 
Following <--- Size 0 0 4.826 0.000 0.116 
Following <--- Foreign 3.179 0.211 15.067 0.000 0.371 
Following <--- Profit/Size 0.302 0.108 2.794 0.005 0.067 
Following <--- Profit/Size 0.302 0.108 2.794 0.005 0.067 
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The only insignificant relationship left in the final model is the effect of volatility on 
analyst following.  Looking at the standardised loadings, a few more pieces of 
information are clear.  First, the size latent is dominated by income and market cap.  
Second, the size latent is not particularly powerful as a determinant of disclosure.   
 
This model is intended to examine the potential latent variables rather than explore one 
of the theories of disclosure.  It should not be expected to fit the data well. 
 
Table 7.3: Latent Model Fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
2177.565 24 0 90.732 0.841 0.764 0.561 0.25 0.005 
 
As expected, the fit of this model is clearly lacking.  The chi-square is high and leads to 
a hugely significant discrepancy, backed up by the chi/DF ratio being over 90.  Neither 
set of indices demonstrates particularly good fit, falling a little short of the cut-off 
points.  Most tellingly, however, is that the RMSEA is over double the maximum 
acceptable value.  Further, the Bollen-Stine p-value is highly significant (down below 
the 1% level), indicating poor fit.   
 
Table 7.1 shows that this model fits better than the regressions in terms of the index 
measures, but is notably worse in the RMSEA and Bollen-Stine p-value.  Overall, the 
results suggest that there may be some usefulness to latent variables (at least for 
company size), but connections between variables may be necessary to obtain further 
improvements in model fit. 
 
The only latent variable in any of the models using the unaltered data is a size latent and 
it does not vary much between models.  Its predicted value is approximately: 
 
Size = 0*Book Value + 0.233*Market Cap + 0.009*Revenue + 1.299*Income + 
0.094*Equity          (7) 
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In later models that include a Profit term, the coefficient attached to this is 0.005. 
 
Outside of the size variables that define it, this variable correlates weakly with analyst 
following, foreign listing, and sensitive industry classification.  Size does not correlate 
significantly with the remaining performance measure.  This result is expected; any 
given latent variable should not correlated strongly with an observed variable that is not 
one of its indicators.   
 
Pearson correlation coefficient values are provided below.  The low correlation with 
profit suggests this is not a good indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although not reported in Table 7.1 above, another exploratory model was tested.  This 
was visually similar to Figure 7.1 but added paths between latent variables where a 
correlation had previously been identified in Section 5.3.  Taking the same approach of 
removing insignificant items from the model resulted in a final version that was nearly 
identical to Figure 7.2, differing only in that size was considered a cause of listing 
status.  The resulting model was examined for estimates and fit, and the results had only 
trivial differences compared to Tables 7.2 and 7.3.  For this reason, the results are not 
reported in Table 7.1. 
  
Table 7.4: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .102** 
Sensitive .130** 
Book Value .363** 
Market Cap .998** 
Revenue .801** 
Income .995** 
Equity .976** 
Profit/Size .012 
Following .155** 
211 
 
7.2.2: Outliers Removed 
When the same initial model is tested with the outliers removed, the final version is 
very different. 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Final Model with Outliers Removed 
 
Modification index examination of this model suggested many possible connections.  
As this model is based only on exploring the data and not any more direct disclosure 
theory, all are included.  Correlations among indicators are not discussed.  All are 
significant. 
 
Company size is suggested to link to both debt finance and foreign listing.  In both 
cases, size is assigned as the causal variable.  Size is assumed to lead to or include 
foreign operations, which in turn encourage foreign listing.  Debt finance is difficult to 
argue strongly in either direction; a company that has reached the size that equity alone 
will support may look to alternative sources of financing, but at the same time a 
company that has already secured debt finance has greater resources with which to 
grow.  The connection can be argued to work in either direction; the MI suggests that 
size be considered the causal variable, however. 
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Sensitivity is suggested to cause foreign listing and financial performance.  These two 
possible connections are accepted as suggested because the relative immutability of 
industrial sector compared to the other two variables means it is far more likely to be 
the cause than the effect in each case.  This implies that the industries considered 
sensitive are generally more profitable and internationally-focused than other sectors. 
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Table 7.5: Latent Model SEM estimates, outliers removed 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Performance <--- Sensitive -0.036 0.014 -2.670 0.008 -0.074 
Foreign <--- Sensitive 0.290 0.040 7.287 0.000 0.19 
Debt  
Finance 
<--- Performance 0.343 0.144 2.383 0.017 0.12 
Debt 
Finance 
<--- Size 0.000 0.000 2.983 0.003 0.148 
Foreign <--- Size 0.000 0.000 7.089 0.000 0.188 
Equity <--- Size 1.000    0.76 
Income <--- Size 0.436 0.010 42.304 0.000 0.997 
Revenue <--- Size 1.687 0.044 38.604 0.000 0.763 
Market Cap <--- Size 3.517 0.089 39.296 0.000 0.932 
Book Value <--- Size 3.404 0.164 20.700 0.000 0.471 
Profit <--- Size 0.357 0.010 36.080 0.000 0.872 
Return 
On Assets 
<--- Performance 1.000    0.927 
Earnings 
Margin 
<--- Performance 1451.855 236.670 6.135 0.000 0.171 
Profit/ 
Size 
<--- Performance 1.232 0.053 23.421 0.000 0.932 
Debt/ 
Equity 
<--- 
Debt 
Finance 
1.000    0.489 
Debt/ 
Assets 
<--- 
Debt 
Finance 
0.128 0.036 3.567 0.000 0.404 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.656 0.290 2.264 0.024 0.052 
Following <--- 
Debt 
Finance 
1.489 0.472 3.157 0.002 0.166 
Following <--- Performance 5.807 0.649 8.946 0.000 0.226 
Following <--- Size 0.000 0.000 11.585 0.000 0.296 
Following <--- Foreign 2.339 0.193 12.142 0.000 0.283 
Performance <-> Size 44363 9295 4.773 0.000 0.137 
 
In this table, size is the most powerful cause of analyst following, but foreign listing is 
almost as influential.   
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Table 7.6: Latent Model Fit, outliers removed 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
1180.702 65 0 18.165 0.899 0.865 0.642 0.112 0.005 
 
As table 7.6 demonstrates, this model is a better fit than the basic data version overall.  
The size latent for this model is described as: 
 
Size = 0*Book Value + 0.009*Market Cap + 0.001*Revenue + 2.158*Income + 
0.006*Equity          (8) 
 
Again, the coefficient of 0 with BV likely represents a miniscule value.  However, in 
this case, the variable’s value is dominated by the income measurement and all others 
have barely noticeable effects.   
 
Comparing this latent to the two others, the Pearson correlation with debt finance is 
0.122, a relatively high value, while the correlation with performance is a slightly lower 
0.094.  It otherwise has low correlations with all variables in the model except for its 
indicators and the disclosure measure, as shown in table 7.7 below.  In addition, the 
correlation between this variable and the disclosure measure is relatively high for a non-
indicator at 0.416.   
 
The debt finance latent is: 
 
Debt finance = 840390.4*Debt/Assets + 163076.9*Debt/Equity   (9) 
 
This variable shows a weak correlation of 0.077 with the performance latent discussed 
below and low correlations with all variables other than its indicators. 
 
The performance latent is: 
 
Performance = 0.469*Profit/Size + 0*Earnings Margin + 0.328*Return on Assets (10) 
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In addition to the latent correlations described in the preceding paragraphs, this has low 
correlations with all variables except for two of its three indicators.  The correlation 
with earnings margin is low. 
 
Table 7.7: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Debt 
Finance Perf. 
Foreign listing .211** .016 .022 
Sensitive .128** .028 -.053* 
Profit .874** .091** .126** 
Book Value .471** .080** .060* 
Market Cap .934** .095** .113** 
Revenue .758** .119** .125** 
Income .989** .094** .122** 
Equity .762** .070** .101** 
Debt/Equity .075** .841** .095** 
Debt/Assets .071** .696** .012 
Profit/Size .109** .066* .968** 
Earnings 
Margin 
.031 .074** .163** 
Return on 
Assets 
.128** .082** .963** 
Following .416** .148** .278** 
Size 1 .094** .122** 
Debt Finance .094** 1 .077** 
Perf. .122** .077** 1 
 
7.2.3: Logarithmic Data 
Retesting this model with logarithmic data results in the following: 
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Table 7.4: Final Model With Logarithmic Data 
 
 
MIs here suggest that size be linked to all other non-indicator variables.  As no further 
theory defines the likely relationships, it is assumed that company size has a causal 
effect on all others.  The sole exception is sensitivity.  This variable represents the 
company’s industry sector and is not easily changed.  While it is possible that 
companies grow large through mergers that will push them into sensitive industries, it is 
far more likely that some of the industries considered sensitive here offer large growth 
potential.  Sensitivity is therefore considered a cause of size. 
 
The model’s data and fit follows below. 
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Table 7.8: Latent Model SEM estimates, logarithmic data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std. 
Estimate 
Profit/ 
Size 
<--- Size 0.002 0 4.985 0.000 0.135 
Sensitive <--- Size 0.102 0.019 5.516 0.000 0.15 
Foreign <--- Size 0.439 0.028 15.517 0.000 0.411 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.777 
Income <--- Size 0.247 0.023 10.945 0.000 0.293 
Revenue <--- Size 2.635 0.067 39.607 0.000 0.918 
Market  
Cap 
<--- Size 3.218 0.103 31.285 0.000 0.763 
Book  
Value 
<--- Size 3.388 0.084 40.271 0.000 0.93 
Profit <--- Size 0.14 0.01 13.374 0.000 0.355 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.43 0.208 2.063 0.039 0.032 
Following <--- Size 7.4 0.226 32.715 0.000 0.809 
Following <--- Foreign 0.543 0.146 3.721 0.000 0.063 
Following <--- 
Profit/ 
Size 
-18.197 7.746 -2.349 0.019 -0.037 
 
 
Table 7.9: Latent Model Fit, logarithmic data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
872.2 28 0 31.15 0.882 0.816 0.549 0.145 0.035 
 
This has the overall second-best fit of the four versions of the exploratory model.   
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Only one latent variable remains in this model, that of size, and this is consistent across 
later logarithmic models.  It is therefore impossible to compare this to other latent 
variables.  It is described with the equation: 
 
Size = 0.057*Log(Profit) + 0.098*Log(Book Value) + 0.023* Log(Market Cap) + 
0.121* Log(Revenue) + 0.021* Log(Income) + 0.082* Log(Equity)  (11) 
 
This latent variable is correlates to some extent with all variables in the model, as 
shown below.  As with the previous exploratory models, correlations with non-
indicators are low.  Unlike the previous examples, two of the indicators have low 
correlations with the latent. 
 
Table 7.10: Latent Correlations  
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .399** 
Sensitive .144** 
Profit .817** 
Book Value .945** 
Market Cap .788** 
Revenue .944** 
Income .379** 
Equity .308** 
Profit/Size -.178** 
Following -.069** 
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7.2.4: Normal Score Data 
The final version of this model tested uses normal score data and results in the 
following: 
 
 
Table 7.5: Final Model with Normal Score Data 
 
MIs suggest what is now clearly a pattern, allowing covariance among size indicators 
and adding the previously absent sensitivity-size link.  No further MI-derived changes 
are present compared to the above models.  The model’s data and fit follows below. 
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Table 7.11: Latent Model SEM estimates, normal score data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Size <--- Sensitive 0.227 0.048 4.775 0.000 0.131 
Foreign <--- Size 0.375 0.024 15.916 0.000 0.416 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.865 
Income <--- Size 0.712 0.028 25.512 0.000 0.616 
Revenue <--- Size 0.899 0.024 36.849 0.000 0.797 
Market  
Cap 
<--- Size 1.027 0.023 43.945 0.000 0.896 
Book  
Value 
<--- Size 1.050 0.017 63.279 0.000 0.910 
Profit <--- Size 0.643 0.029 22.432 0.000 0.557 
Debt <--- Debt Finance 1    0.956 
Debt/ 
Equity 
<--- Debt Finance 0.792 0.027 29.602 0.000 0.720 
Debt/ 
Assets 
<--- Debt Finance 0.821 0.025 32.489 0.000 0.784 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.700 0.226 3.097 0.002 0.055 
Following <--- Size 5.246 0.171 30.64 0.000 0.717 
Following <--- Foreign 0.715 0.160 4.472 0.000 0.088 
Following <--- Debt Finance 0.897 0.132 6.789 0.000 0.125 
 
 
Table 7.12: Latent Model Fit, normal score data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
3122.814 46 0 67.887 0.791 0.703 0.551 0.216 0.050 
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This fit is not among the best for this model.  The significant B-S p-value is unique to 
this version, but the other measures are all among the lowest for the exploratory model. 
 
The size latent is here described with the equation: 
 
Size = 0.02*Nscore(Profit) + 0.257*Nscore(Book Value) + 0.308*Nscore(Market Cap) 
+ 0.049*Nscore(Revenue) + 0.034*Nscore(Income) + 0.137*Nscore(Equity) (12) 
 
While the debt finance latent is: 
 
Debt finance = 0.137*Nscore(Debt/Assets) + 0.095*NScore(Debt/Equity) + 
0.74*NScore(Debt)         (13) 
 
The size latent correlates to a low extent with most of the variables in the model as 
shown below.  However, the correlation between the value of debt and the size latent is 
a high 0.700, close to the level at which the size latent correlates to its own indicators.  
This provides further evidence that the value of debt is providing an indication of size.  
As a result, the correlation between the size and debt latent variables is also high at 
0.629.  The value of debt is not used as an indicator of debt finance in any further 
models. 
 
The debt finance latent demonstrates further problems.  It correlates strongly with some 
of the size indicators, particularly book value and revenue.  This is another result of the 
debt value variable acting as a size measure. 
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Table 7.13: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Debt 
Finance 
Foreign listing .393** .202** 
Sensitive .116** .063* 
Profit .576** .383** 
Book Value .961** .673** 
Market Cap .932** .490** 
Revenue .837** .684** 
Income .633** .483** 
Equity .902** .525** 
Debt .700** .987** 
Debt/Equity .411** .758** 
Debt/Assets .216** .825** 
Following .461** .532** 
Size 1 .629** 
Debt .629** 1 
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7.3: Signalling Theory Models 
The initial model of Signalling theory is as pictured below: 
 
Figure 7.6: Signalling Theory, Initial Model 
 
The basic idea behind this model is, as the theory itself suggests, a company with good 
news of any form will share it.  Within the limitations of the model, the main indication 
of good news comes from the performance latent as this directly demonstrates the 
financial results.   
 
Size is included because it may offer some good news in terms of diversification, 
offering the company stability and the potential to take losses in one area without the 
whole entity suffering.  Listing status is included for similar reasons, in this case 
looking only at geographic diversification.  Sensitivity has been included on the 
assumption that a more sensitive company may find it has more to gain from signalling.  
Volatility is included as investors like to see stable returns, so the ability to report low 
volatility is good news for the firm. 
 
As shown above, size is considered a cause of listing and performance.  Listing is easily 
explained in that a larger company has greater potential to have the resources needed to 
expand into a foreign market.  Alternatively, a large company is more likely to attract 
international attention and therefore list elsewhere even if operations are limited to one 
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location.  The arrow could be argued to point in the opposite direction or even be a two-
way link (see Appendix A), however; listing in a second market offers greater potential 
for funding that can be used to grow the company. 
 
The size-performance link has a different justification.  Size is assumed to potentially 
indicate lines of business and, from that, diversification.  Like the justification for size 
as diversity, a failure in one part of the business does not harm the overall performance 
much. 
 
7.3.1: Base Data 
After investigation, the final model is: 
 
Figure 7.7: Signalling Theory, Final Model 
 
The main MI-derived change here is allowing sensitivity to cause foreign listing.  
Almost everything has remained in the model, with the exceptions being a few 
indicators and the size-performance link.  Book Value of Assets has been removed from 
the model and replaced with Profit between the initial model and this version.  
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Experimentation showed that Book Value contributed very little to this model, while 
Profit has a significant effect on the size latent variable. 
 
Table 7.14: Signalling Theory Estimates 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Foreign <--- Size 0.000 0.000 3.88 0.000 0.099 
Foreign <--- Sensitive 0.363 0.04 9.109 0.000 0.233 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.973 
Income <--- Size 0.277 0.002 143.678 0.000 0.993 
Revenue <--- Size 0.747 0.016 48.201 0.000 0.801 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 2.407 0.016 146.847 0.000 0.995 
Profit <--- Size 0.297 0.014 21.215 0.000 0.493 
Following <--- Sensitive 1.091 0.328 3.331 0.000 0.082 
Following <--- Size 0 0 4.799 0.000 0.115 
Following <--- Foreign 3.18 0.211 15.073 0.000 0.371 
Following <--- 
Profit/ 
Size 
0.302 0.108 2.795 0.005 0.067 
 
Once again, a single item not significant at 5% has remained in the model and it is the 
volatility-disclosure link.  Given that volatility was never significant in the regressions, 
this is not surprising.  The effect of size on foreign listing is high enough that it cannot 
be dismissed, but is somewhat low nonetheless.  In addition, note that sensitivity has a 
small effect. 
 
In terms of the theory, there is an important finding.  Performance is the second most 
powerful explanation of disclosure once standardisation is taken into account.  This 
lends some weight to the theory, although the greater power of the Foreign Listing 
variable suggests another explanation of disclosure may be more valid. 
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Table 7.15: Signalling Theory Fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
180.239 23 0 7.836 0.986 0.98 0.631 0.069 0.562 
 
According to the index measures, this model fit is excellent.  RMSEA and the chi-
square derived measures are still too high, although they are better than the Latent 
model.  The B-S p-value, on the other hand, indicates a low but significant good fit. 
 
The size latent variable is slightly different to the size latent in equation (7) in section 
7.2.1, replacing the book value term with 0.005*Profit.  The size latent variable’s 
correlations are shown below.  As usual, it correlates weakly with most variables and 
strongly with its indicators.  The correlation with profit is weak for an indicator, 
however. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7.16: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .104** 
Sensitive 0.14 
Profit .493** 
Market Cap .804** 
Revenue .995** 
Income .974** 
Equity 0.012 
Profit/Size .158** 
Following .104** 
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7.3.2: Outliers Removed 
If modelled with the outliers removed, the model makes one important change: the 
performance variable is replaced with its latent: 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Final Model With Outliers Removed 
 
No new MI-derived changes are made.  However, this seemingly small change makes 
some important differences between this and the base data model. 
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Table 7.17: Signalling Model SEM estimates, outliers removed 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std. 
Estimate 
Size <--- Sensitive 339478.3 71315.26 4.760 0.000 0.128 
Performance <--- Size 0.000 0.000 4.450 0.000 0.125 
Foreign <--- Size 0.000 0.000 6.946 0.000 0.183 
Foreign <--- Sensitive 0.290 0.040 7.245 0.000 0.189 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.759 
Income <--- Size 0.440 0.010 42.326 0.000 1.004 
Revenue <--- Size 1.677 0.042 40.074 0.000 0.751 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 3.495 0.076 46.014 0.000 0.924 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 3.404 0.163 20.825 0.000 0.470 
Profit <--- Size 0.356 0.010 36.059 0.000 0.868 
Return on 
Assets 
<--- Performance 1    0.925 
Earnings 
Margin 
<--- Performance 1452.095 237.460 6.115 0.000 0.171 
Profit/ 
Size 
<--- Performance 1.237 0.055 22.651 0.000 0.934 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.682 0.294 2.318 0.020 0.054 
Following <--- Performance 6.389 0.627 10.189 0.000 0.246 
Following <--- Size 0.000 0.000 12.567 0.000 0.305 
Following <--- Foreign 2.364 0.195 12.147 0.000 0.285 
 
The performance latent in this model has a far more powerful effect on disclosure than 
the single variable in the base data model, suggesting the theory is more powerful if a 
229 
 
latent variable can be involved.  Other variables have stronger effects, but the difference 
is not large enough to suggest the performance latent is weak. 
 
Table 7.18: Signalling Model Fit, outliers removed 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
915.613 44 0 20.809 0.921 0.886 0.614 0.120 0.005 
 
Despite the explanatory power, this model does not fit as well as the base data model.   
 
The size latent for this model is as equation (7) with the addition of a 0.005*Profit term.  
All further size latent variables follow this pattern. 
 
Correlations for the two latent variables are provided below.  As usual, neither 
correlates strongly with any observed variable other than its own indicators.  Each latent 
also has a low correlation with one of its indicators. 
  
230 
 
Table 7.19: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size Perf. 
Foreign listing .208** .021 
Sensitive .128** -.053* 
Profit .864** .126** 
Book Value .466** .060* 
Market Cap .920** .113** 
Revenue .748** .125** 
Income .990** .121** 
Equity .755** .101** 
Profit/Size .107** .970** 
Earnings 
Margin 
.032 .164** 
Return on 
Assets 
.127** .961** 
Following .404** .277** 
Size 1 .120** 
Performance .120** 1 
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7.3.3: Logarithmic Data 
Logarithmic data produces a model similar to the base data model: 
 
Figure 7.9: Final Model with Logarithmic Data 
 
No MI-derived changes beyond size covariances are included.  The difference is size 
having a causal effect on the profit/size variable in this model. 
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Table 7.20: Signalling Model SEM estimates, logarithmic data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P Std. Estimate 
Foreign <--- Size 0.445 0.028 15.627 0.000 0.425 
Profit/ 
Size 
<--- Size 0.002 0.001 4.427 0.000 0.124 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.792 
Income <--- Size 0.243 0.022 10.961 0.000 0.294 
Revenue <--- Size 2.497 0.067 37.158 0.000 0.886 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 3.08 0.102 30.085 0.000 0.745 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 3.116 0.086 36.264 0.000 0.872 
Profit <--- Size 0.135 0.010 13.515 0.000 0.348 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.477 0.200 2.384 0.017 0.036 
Following <--- Size 7.716 0.226 34.176 0.000 0.864 
Following <--- Foreign 0.255 0.149 1.708 0.088 0.03 
Following <--- 
Profit/ 
Size 
-16.509 7.658 -2.156 0.031 -0.033 
 
As in the base data model, the single performance variable has a weak effect on 
disclosure.  In this case it is negative. 
 
Table 7.21: Signalling Model Fit, logarithmic data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
312.755 28 0.000 11.170 0.958 0.938 0.596 0.084 0.005 
 
In absolute terms, this model fits well.  The ratio measures are high and the RMSEA 
only marginally misses the 0.08 required minimum.  However, the base data fits better. 
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The size latent variable for this model shows the expected weak correlations with non-
indicators.  As in section 7.2.3, the correlation between the latent and two of the 
indicators is low. 
  Table 7.22: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .399** 
Sensitive .145** 
Profit .819** 
Book Value .937** 
Market Cap .791** 
Revenue .943** 
Income .371** 
Equity .307** 
Profit/Size -.175** 
Following -.068* 
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7.3.4: Normal Score Data 
Finally, using normal score data results in a model similar to the outlier-removed 
model: 
 
Figure 7.10: Final Model with Normal Score Data 
 
In a rare example, MIs on the initial version of this model suggest adding some unusual 
items.  As normal, a size-sensitivity link and size indicator covariances are suggested.  
In addition, a number of modification indices relate to the performance latent.  Indices 
suggest that all three of the other explanatory variables (size, sensitivity, foreign listing) 
may have some connection to the performance latent.   
 
The suggestion given is that each of these variables causes performance.  Sensitivity is 
relatively immutable as it is defined by industry sector, so this variable is allowed as a 
cause of performance.  The remaining two links are less clear, however.  A larger 
company may be able to benefit from economies of scale and have the efficiencies these 
create translate into higher income per unit of size.  On the other hand, higher 
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performance may lead to greater growth potential.  The former explanation is chosen for 
use in the model. 
 
Similarly, the listing-performance link can be argued to act in either direction.  The 
assumption throughout the thesis is that foreign listing is strongly correlated with 
foreign operations, which in turn indicate the company’s overall size.  Like the direct 
size link argued above, it is possible that high performance leads to the resources 
required to expand into a new market.  Alternatively, the company may expand into a 
foreign market because analysis suggests greater profit potential by doing so.  Like the 
size argument above, the decision was made to allow listing as a cause of performance. 
 
The addition of these MI-derived changes to the structural model has some implications 
for the theory in this case.  Financial performance, the main driver of disclosure under 
the theory, is itself heavily influenced by other company characteristics.  The Signalling 
part of disclosure is not the entire story, but the result of large quantities of company 
information 
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Table 7.23: Signalling Model SEM estimates, Normal Score Data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P Std. Estimate 
Size <--- Sensitive 0.193 0.048 4.051 0.000 0.109 
Foreign <--- Size 0.337 0.023 14.753 0.000 0.380 
Performance <--- Size 0.64 0.028 22.523 0.000 0.627 
Performance <--- Foreign -0.226 0.028 -8.119 0.000 -0.196 
Performance <--- Sensitive -0.208 0.04 -5.181 0.000 -0.116 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.878 
Income <--- Size 0.784 0.025 31.077 0.000 0.689 
Revenue <--- Size 0.966 0.021 46.15 0.000 0.866 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 0.963 0.022 44.655 0.000 0.852 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 1.070 0.019 55.148 0.000 0.940 
Profit <--- Size 0.714 0.026 27.197 0.000 0.627 
Return on 
Assets 
<--- Performance 1    0.899 
Earnings <--- Performance 0.865 0.022 39.668 0.000 0.777 
Profit/ 
Size 
<--- Performance 1.101 0.018 61.551 0.000 0.990 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.724 0.227 3.193 0.001 0.054 
Following <--- Performance -0.551 0.158 -3.495 0.000 -0.074 
Following <--- Size 5.945 0.196 30.393 0.000 0.784 
Following <--- Foreign 0.806 0.160 5.041 0.000 0.094 
 
237 
 
The inclusion of a performance latent variable has in this case not led to a strong effect, 
with it having a low standardised estimate of the effect of performance on analyst 
following.  
 
Table 7.24: Signalling Model Fit, Normal Score Data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
1661.922 41 0.000 40.535 0.894 0.832 0.555 0.166 0.005 
 
The fit of this model is low.  Few of the models tested have NFI or TLI below 0.9 and 
the RMSEA of this model is double the maximum acceptable value.   
 
Uniquely, this model contains a latent variable that was not present in the comparable 
exploration model, that of performance.  It is described by the equation: 
 
Performance = 0.398*NScore(Profit/Size) + 0.428*NScore(ROA) (14) 
 
The coefficient for Earnings Margin is 0.  While such variables were included in some 
earlier models, in this case the rescaling performed as part of the Normal Score 
transformation means the coefficient is not related to the large scale of the variable. 
 
Correlations involving the latent variables in this model demonstrate that each latent 
correlates strongly to its indicators.  However, in this model the correlations with other 
variables are stronger than usual and close to being problematically high.  
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Table 7.25: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size Perf. 
Foreign listing .290** 0.016 
Sensitive .055* -.095** 
Profit .765** .466** 
Book Value .883** .452** 
Market Cap .835** .308** 
Revenue .932** .444** 
Income .822** .436** 
Equity .814** .292** 
Profit/Size .400** .997** 
Earnings 
Margin 
.501** .791** 
Return on 
Assets 
.540** .921** 
Following .473** .346** 
Size 1 .421** 
Performance .421** 1 
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7.4: Agency Theory 
The initial Agency model is: 
 
 
Figure 7.11: Agency Theory, Initial Model 
 
This model is based on the idea that anything that may cause agency problems within 
the firm is a cause of disclosure.  Other potential causes are not necessarily untrue, but 
are not explained by Agency theory.  Debt finance and listing status are the most 
important items here.  Debt is directly used in the original explanation of the theory, so 
in disclosure terms is a clear indication of an Agency problem situation that requires 
disclosure of activity to counteract.  Listing status is included because the more owners 
there are, the less interest each has in making sure the company is working to their 
benefit at all times.  Performance is included because of the argument that good 
performance needs no explanation.  If this is true, good results would imply lower 
vigilance among owners, potentially enabling more self-interest among managers. 
 
Size is included, but only as a cause of the other three.  There is the possibility that size 
causes agency simply because a larger firm is more difficult to monitor completely, but 
this is not taken into account in the model as it exacerbates agency problems without 
causing them.  The links between size and performance and size and listing are similar 
to those explained under Signalling above. 
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7.4.1: Base Data 
The model is quickly shown to be very inaccurate and is greatly cut down: 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Agency Theory, Final Model 
 
No significant or large MI-derived alterations were suggested.  All of the remaining 
variables in this model are single-indicators in place of latent variables.   
 
Table 7.26: Agency Theory Estimates 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Following <--- Foreign 3.384 0.205 16.545 0.000 0.396 
Following <--- Return on Assets 1.486 0.252 5.900 0.000 0.141 
Following <--- Debt/Equity 0.003 0.029 0.102 0.919 0.002 
 
With the model as stripped back as it is, drawing conclusions becomes difficult.  
However, based on the information given, it appears Agency is not supported as an 
explanation of disclosure.  The measure of debt finance usage, Debt/Equity, is both very 
weak as a standardised estimate and very insignificant.  The lack of debt finance as an 
explanation of disclosure suggests the theory is not true in this context. 
 
The model does not contain any size measure as this became insignificant early in the 
modelling process.  This is very unusual and goes against the near-universal finding in 
literature that size is a positive and significant determinant of disclosure. 
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Table 7.27: Agency Theory Fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
4.797 3 0.187 1.599 0.984 0.987 0.492 0.020  0.069 
 
Perhaps because there is so little left in the model, the fit here is excellent, being by 
some margin the best model.  Almost all tests suggest this model to be acceptable and 
very well-fitting despite being largely meaningless as a model of Agency Theory.  The 
B-S p-value is significant but oddly low, possibly indicating that the non-normality of 
the data is inflating the fit in other measures. 
 
However the PNFI is below 0.5.  The reason for this is unclear as it is not consistent 
with any other fit measure.  A low PNFI for an otherwise well-fitting but highly 
complex model would be expected, but this is the simplest model examined in the 
thesis. 
 
No latent variable correlations are discussed as no latent variable was present in the 
final version of this model. 
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7.4.2: Outliers Removed 
Removing outliers results in a very different model. 
 
Figure 7.13: Final Model with Outliers Removed 
This is one of the more complete models in terms of how little has been removed 
compared to the original conception of the model.   
 
MIs here suggest the usual covariances among size indicators, plus the unusual case of 
allowing performance as a cause of debt finance.  The connection makes some logical 
sense; a higher-performing company will be assumed to be more capable of meeting 
loan interest payments and may therefore be able to acquire more credit and more 
favourable repayment terms.  Higher performance could be taken as a sign of lower 
default risk, reducing the cost of this form of capital.   
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Table 7.28: Agency Model SEM estimates, outliers removed 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Performance <--- Size 0.000 0.000 4.458 0.000 0.125 
Debt 
Finance 
<--- Size 0.000 0.000 2.94 0.003 0.144 
Foreign <--- Size 0.000 0.000 7.758 0.000 0.208 
Debt 
Finance 
<--- Performance 0.347 0.144 2.409 0.016 0.121 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.759 
Income <--- Size 0.440 0.010 42.305 0.000 1.004 
Revenue <--- Size 1.677 0.042 40.069 0.000 0.751 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 3.496 0.076 46.004 0.000 0.925 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 3.404 0.163 20.823 0.000 0.470 
Profit <--- Size 0.356 0.010 36.055 0.000 0.869 
Return on 
Assets 
<--- Performance 1    0.927 
Earnings 
Margin 
<--- Performance 1446.708 237.25 6.098 0.000 0.170 
Profit/ 
Size 
<--- Performance 1.233 0.055 22.527 0.000 0.933 
Debt 
Equity 
<--- 
Debt 
Finance 
1    0.490 
Debt 
Assets 
<--- 
Debt 
Finance 
0.127 0.036 3.572 0.000 0.403 
Following <--- 
Debt 
Finance 
1.527 0.478 3.196 0.001 0.170 
Following <--- Performance 5.752 0.653 8.807 0.000 0.222 
Following <--- Size 0.000 0.000 11.262 0.000 0.286 
Following <--- Foreign 2.452 0.19 12.898 0.000 0.296 
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Overall, this model implies that debt financing does have an effect on disclosure, but 
that debt is influenced by other factors.  Agency Theory has some explanatory power, 
but there are other forces that influence the extent to which agency costs affect the 
company.  The debt finance latent is the weakest of those that influence analyst 
following, however.  The higher power of the financial performance latent suggests that 
Signalling Theory may better explain disclosure, but that both theories have some 
power and disclosure decisions may be the result of both together. 
 
Table 7.29: Agency Model Fit, outliers removed 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
918.821 54 0 17.015 0.885 0.891 0.637 0.108 0.010 
 
The fit for this model is generally lower than that of the base data, but as this model 
contains more variables and includes debt finance, it provides more useful information 
on the theory. 
 
All three of the latent variables in this model correlate strongly with their indicators and 
weakly or not at all with all other variables.  As in other outlier-free data models, the 
correlation between size and analyst following is high for a non-indicator variable. 
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Table 7.30: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Debt 
Finance Perf. 
Foreign listing .211** .016 .022 
Sensitive .128** .028 -.053* 
Profit .874** .091** .126** 
Book Value .471** .080** .060* 
Market Cap .934** .095** .113** 
Revenue .758** .119** .125** 
Income .989** .094** .122** 
Equity .762** .070** .101** 
Debt/Equity .075** .841** .095** 
Debt/Assets .071** .696** .012 
Profit/Size .109** .066* .968** 
Earnings 
Margin 
.031 .074** .163** 
Return on 
Assets 
.128** .082** .963** 
Following .416** .148** .278** 
Size 1 .094** .122** 
Debt Finance .094** 1 .077** 
Perf. .122** .077** 1 
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7.4.3: Logarithmic Data 
Logarithmic data provides a different view of the theory: 
 
 
Figure 7.14: Final Model with Logarithmic Data 
 
This model is reduced compared to that using untransformed but outlier-free data, but 
contains far more than the base data model.  Importantly, a debt measure is present, so 
this model may provide information about the theory.  No MI-derived changes other 
than covariances within size were significant. 
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Table 7.31: Agency Model SEM estimates, logarithmic data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std. 
Estimate 
Foreign <--- Size 0.446 0.029 15.53 0.000 0.421 
Return on 
Assets 
<--- Size 0.007 0.001 9.823 0.000 0.271 
Debt/ 
Assets 
<--- Size -0.455 0.067 -6.834 0.000 -0.19 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.784 
Income <--- Size 0.241 0.022 10.777 0.000 0.288 
Revenue <--- Size 2.534 0.069 36.95 0.000 0.89 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 3.13 0.104 30.072 0.000 0.749 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 3.202 0.087 36.626 0.000 0.886 
Profit <--- Size 0.134 0.01 13.377 0.000 0.343 
Following <--- Size 8.035 0.24 33.434 0.000 0.887 
Following <--- Foreign 0.305 0.149 2.05 0.04 0.036 
Following <--- 
Return on 
Assets 
-28.789 5.696 -5.054 0.000 -0.081 
Following <--- 
Debt/ 
Assets 
0.222 0.059 3.766 0.000 0.059 
 
While size is ultimately far more important, as indicated by its large standardised 
estimate, the debt/assets ratio is a determinant of analyst following. 
 
Table 7.33: Agency Model Fit, logarithmic data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
348.056 27 0 12.891 0.954 0.929 0.572 0.091 0.050 
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This fit table is, on the whole, the second best of those for Agency Theory models.  The 
base data does have better fit, but provides little information about the theory.  This 
model is therefore superior.  
 
Correlations for the size latent are presented below.  As in other logarithmic data 
models, the correlations with two of the indicators are low. 
 
  Table 7.34: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .400** 
Profit .817** 
Book Value .946** 
Market Cap .789** 
Revenue .945** 
Income .365** 
Equity .299** 
Debt/Assets 0.004 
Return on Assets -0.007 
Following -.068** 
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7.4.4: Normal Score Data 
Normal score data for this theory results in the same problem as the initial model: 
 
Figure 7.15: Final Model with Normal Score Data 
 
While size has been retained as a cause of disclosure, there is no debt measure.  Size 
and foreign listing may each have agency costs as discussed in chapter 5, but overall 
this model provides limited information on the theory and is not discussed further.  
Estimates and fit tables are provided below.  Again, no MI-derived changes beyond size 
covariances were significant. 
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Table 7.35: Agency Model SEM estimates, normal score data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std. 
Estimate 
Foreign <--- Size 0.374 0.024 15.628 0.000 0.412 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.858 
Income <--- Size 0.729 0.028 25.589 0.000 0.625 
Revenue <--- Size 0.919 0.026 35.901 0.000 0.805 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 1.028 0.024 43.614 0.000 0.889 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 1.064 0.018 58.201 0.000 0.914 
Profit <--- Size 0.656 0.029 22.449 0.000 0.563 
Following <--- Size 5.929 0.183 32.35 0.000 0.762 
Following <--- Foreign 0.758 0.162 4.681 0.000 0.089 
 
 
Table 7.36: Agency Model Fit, Normal Score Data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
315.935 13 0 24.303 0.968 0.934 0.45 0.127 0.005 
 
The latent correlations for the size latent in this model as usual show strong correlations 
with the indicator variables.   
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Table 7.37: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .394** 
Profit .574** 
Book Value .958** 
Market Cap .934** 
Revenue .833** 
Income .630** 
Equity .908** 
Following .761** 
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7.5: Legitimacy 
The final set of models is based on Legitimacy Theory.  The initial model is: 
 
Figure 7.16: Legitimacy Theory, Initial Model 
 
The whole model is based on the idea of negative attention being prevented by 
disclosures pointing out why it is not warranted.  The included variables are all items 
that could lead to such.  The critical one here is the Sensitivity variable.  Size is 
included because of the PCH aspect of the model, as Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
argued that larger companies would be subject to greater political pressure.  Listing is 
considered related to size, but may also indicate a globalised company, which is 
sometimes considered a negative trait. 
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7.5.1: Base data 
When tested with the base data, the final iteration of the model is: 
 
 
Figure 7.17: Legitimacy Theory, Final Model 
 
The main MI-derived change here is that of allowing sensitivity to cause foreign listing.  
There is theory derived logic to this connection.  Assuming that foreign listing is 
reflective of foreign operations, the multiple listing decision may allow locals easier 
access to the company’s decision-makers processes and defuse possible tensions 
between the locals affected by company actions and its distant headquarters.   
 
There are two differences compared to the original model pictured in figure 7.16.  First, 
as usual the listing latent was reduced to a single measure.  The second is that it 
emerged that the Book Value of the firm was not making a meaningful contribution to 
this model, but adding profit as a measure of size was of some value. 
 
Once again, there is little to be said in terms of reliability and validity as the various 
tests are either identical to previous models or differ only to such small extents as to be 
practically identical.  
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Table 7.38: Legitimacy Theory Estimates 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Foreign <--- Size 0.000 0.000 3.823 0.000 0.102 
Equity <--- Size 3.363 0.159 21.214 0.000 0.973 
Income <--- Size 0.930 0.044 21.356 0.000 0.993 
Revenue <--- Size 2.514 0.128 19.708 0.000 0.801 
Market Cap <--- Size 8.094 0.379 21.366 0.000 0.995 
Profit <--- Size 1.000 
  
0.000 0.493 
Following <--- Size 0.000 0.000 4.701 0.000 0.117 
Following <--- Sensitive 1.072 0.319 3.355 0.000 0.081 
Following <--- Foreign 3.187 0.206 15.493 0.000 0.375 
 
The standardised regression weights highlight that the theory is not incorrect, but 
neither is it powerful.  Sensitivity, the core of this theory, is by some margin the 
weakest explanation of disclosure.  This suggests that Legitimacy Theory has some 
explanatory power, but is not the main explanation of disclosure. 
 
Table 7.39: Legitimacy Theory Fit 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
785.075 19 0.000 41.320 0.937 0.909 0.636 0.168  0.408 
 
While the basic indices suggest good fit, little else does.  The RMSEA is approximately 
double the maximum recommended value and the model itself is highly significant, 
indicating poor fit.  The Bollen-Stine p-value does, however, indicate a moderate level 
of fit. 
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Correlations involving the size latent variable in this model show the expected low 
correlations with non-indicators and high correlations with indicators.  As in the other 
base data models, one indicator has a low correlation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7.40: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .104** 
Sensitive 0.14 
Profit .493** 
Market Cap .998** 
Revenue .804** 
Income .995** 
Equity .974** 
Following .158** 
Foreign listing .104** 
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7.5.2: Outliers Removed 
Modelling Legitimacy Theory after removing the outliers from the sample results in the 
model: 
 
Figure 7.18: Final Model with Outliers Removed 
 
MI examination suggests this model behaves much the same as the full data version, but 
with one difference.  Like the full data Legitimacy model, foreign listing is suggested 
(and allowed) as a cause of size and covariances among size indicators are allowed.  
The MIs also suggest allowing sensitivity to cause foreign listing. 
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Table 7.41: Legitimacy Model SEM estimates, outliers removed 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std.  
Estimate 
Size <--- Sensitive 339305 71323.95 4.757 0.000 0.128 
Foreign <--- Size 0.000 0.000 6.948 0.000 0.183 
Foreign <--- Sensitive 0.290 0.040 7.245 0.000 0.189 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.759 
Income <--- Size 0.440 0.010 42.311 0.000 1.004 
Revenue <--- Size 1.677 0.042 40.07 0.000 0.751 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 3.495 0.076 46.006 0.000 0.924 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 3.404 0.163 20.824 0.000 0.470 
Profit <--- Size 0.356 0.01 36.056 0.000 0.868 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.462 0.306 1.513 0.130 0.036 
Following <--- Size 0.000 0.000 13.42 0.000 0.338 
Following <--- Foreign 2.381 0.202 11.777 0.000 0.288 
 
Sensitivity does influence disclosure, but the effect is very weak.  Other variables are 
much more powerful and this suggests a low power to Signalling Theory. 
 
Table 7.42: Legitimacy Model Fit, outliers removed 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
812.946 19 0.000 42.787 0.914 0.840 0.482 0.175 0.010 
 
Unusually, this fit is actually overall worse than that of the base data. 
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Correlations involving the size latent are presented below.  As is normal for the outlier-
free data, the correlation with book value is low for an indicator variable while the 
correlation with analyst following is high for a non-indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7.43: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .211** 
Sensitive .128** 
Profit .874** 
Book Value .471** 
Market Cap .934** 
Revenue .758** 
Income .989** 
Equity .762** 
Following .416** 
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7.5.3: Logarithmic Data 
Using logarithmic data provides a similar model, implying that this model is relatively 
invariant to data transformations. 
 
Figure 7.19: Final Model with Logarithmic Data 
 
The MI-derived changes are the usual size covariances and a link from sensitivity to 
size.  This was allowed for the possible fit improvement rather than any clear theoretical 
reason.  A company increasing its scale in response to sensitivity is not a clear 
legitimation strategy.  Instead, it is as argued in other models, that sensitivity is 
reflective of industry sector, and this defines the market conditions and growth potential 
for the company  
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Table 7.44: Legitimacy Model SEM estimates, logarithmic data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std. 
Estimate 
Size <--- Sensitive 0.220 0.040 5.526 0.000 0.150 
Foreign <--- Size 0.439 0.028 15.525 0.000 0.411 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.778 
Income <--- Size 0.247 0.023 10.968 0.000 0.293 
Revenue <--- Size 2.633 0.066 39.708 0.000 0.918 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 3.212 0.103 31.291 0.000 0.763 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 3.381 0.084 40.293 0.000 0.929 
Profit <--- Size 0.140 0.01 13.403 0.000 0.356 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.440 0.209 2.111 0.035 0.033 
Following <--- Size 7.344 0.224 32.785 0.000 0.804 
Following <--- Foreign 0.555 0.146 3.797 0.000 0.065 
  
As before, the sensitivity effect is weak and other variables explain more. 
 
Table 7.45: Legitimacy Model Fit, logarithmic data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
288.977 22 0 13.135 0.961 0.94 0.587 0.092 0.085 
 
Again, the fit is actually better in the base data model. 
 
Correlations for the size latent are presented below.  As with other logarithmic data 
models, two indicators have low correlations. 
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Table 7.46: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .400** 
Sensitive .146** 
Profit .818** 
Book Value .929** 
Market Cap .788** 
Revenue .938** 
Income .408** 
Equity .325** 
Following -.067* 
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7.5.4: Normal Score Data 
Finally, using normal score data once again provides a similar model: 
 
 
Figure 7.20: Final Model with Normal Score Data 
 
MI-derived additions to this model are mostly identical to those for the logarithmic 
Legitimacy model and discussion is not repeated. 
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Table 7.47: Legitimacy Model SEM estimates, Normal Score Data 
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Std. 
Estimate 
Size <--- Sensitive 0.205 0.048 4.267 0.000 0.115 
Foreign <--- Size 0.338 0.022 15.159 0.000 0.387 
Equity <--- Size 1    0.891 
Income <--- Size 0.736 0.025 29.379 0.000 0.656 
Revenue <--- Size 0.941 0.02 46.49 0.000 0.856 
Market 
Cap 
<--- Size 0.952 0.021 46.404 0.000 0.855 
Book 
Value 
<--- Size 1.069 0.018 59.858 0.000 0.953 
Profit <--- Size 0.664 0.026 25.421 0.000 0.592 
Following <--- Sensitive 0.803 0.227 3.533 0.000 0.060 
Following <--- Size 5.439 0.158 34.515 0.000 0.728 
Following <--- Foreign 0.922 0.158 5.85 0.000 0.108 
 
The effect of sensitivity is weak here, but higher than in other models for the theory. 
 
Table 7.48: Legitimacy Model Fit, Normal Score Data 
Chi-
square 
DF P-value CMIN/DF NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
436.835 20 0 21.842 0.957 0.926 0.532 0.121 0.005 
 
As with other models, the fit of this one is worse than that of the base data. 
 
Correlations involving the size latent are presented below.  As in other normal score 
models, the indicators correlate strongly. 
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Table 7.16: Latent Correlations 
Latent Size 
Foreign listing .393** 
Sensitive .116** 
Profit .623** 
Book Value .962** 
Market Cap .935** 
Revenue .836** 
Income .673** 
Equity .929** 
Following .470** 
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7.6 Conclusion 
Any conclusion will involve examination of fit.   Table 7.50 is a repeat of Table 7.1, a 
series of SEM fits including the regression models.  Fit measures are explained in 
section 7.1 and 6.7. 
Table 7.50: Table of SEM Results 
Model Chi-square DF P-value 
CMIN/ 
DF 
NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
Regression Models 
Reg 1 318.392 15 0.000 21.226 0.544 0.374 0.389 0.119 0.139 
Reg 2 67.262 15 0.000 4.484 0.741 0.694 0.529 0.049 0.070 
Reg 3 166.880 15 0.000 11.125 0.673 0.567 0.482 0.084 0.174 
Exploratory Models 
Base 2177.565 24 0.000 90.732 0.841 0.764 0.561 0.250 0.005 
Outlier 1180.702 65 0.000 18.165 0.899 0.865 0.642 0.112 0.005 
Log 872.200 28 0.000 31.150 0.882 0.816 0.549 0.145 0.035 
Normal 3122.814 46 0.000 67.887 0.791 0.703 0.551 0.216 0.050 
Agency Theory Models 
 Base 4.797 3 0.187 1.599 0.984 0.987 0.492 0.020 0.055 
Outlier 918.821 54 0.000 17.015 0.885 0.891 0.637 0.108 0.010 
Log 348.056 27 0.000 12.891 0.954 0.929 0.572 0.091 0.050 
Normal 315.935 13 0.000 24.303 0.968 0.934 0.450 0.127 0.005 
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Table 7.34 continued : Table of SEM Results 
Model Chi-square DF P-value 
CMIN/ 
DF 
NFI TLI PNFI RMSEA 
B-S 
P-value 
Legitimacy Theory Models 
Base 179.117 16 0.000 11.195 0.986 0.977 0.563 0.084 0.557 
Outlier 812.946 19 0.000 42.787 0.914 0.840 0.482 0.175 0.010 
Log 288.977 22 0.000 13.135 0.961 0.940 0.587 0.092 0.085 
Normal 436.835 20 0.000 21.842 0.957 0.926 0.532 0.121 0.005 
Signalling Theory Models 
Base 180.239 23 0.000 7.836 0.986 0.980 0.631 0.069 0.562 
Outlier 915.613 44 0.000 20.809 0.921 0.886 0.614 0.120 0.005 
Log 312.755 28 0.000 11.170 0.958 0.938 0.596 0.084 0.005 
Norm 1661.922 41 0.000 40.535 0.894 0.832 0.555 0.166 0.005 
 
There are conclusions to be drawn without considering theory.  Fit is generally better 
overall among those models taking advantage of SEM.  The models named Latent, 
Signalling, and Legitimacy all contain at least one latent variable and have some of the 
explanatory variables explaining others.  By contrast, the three regression models 
remade in SEM have lower fits by most measures and by their nature do not allow 
either latent variables or inter-explanatory dependencies.  This suggests that there is 
extra information on disclosure behaviour provided by the use of SEM, although in this 
case not enough to generate clear good fit where the regressions failed.  The exception 
to this rule is the Agency model, which is the best fit despite it not taking advantage of 
SEM at all.  The final base data Agency model, as seen in Figure 7.12, has neither latent 
variables nor relationships between explanatory variables.   
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The final aspect worth considering is what common elements there are among models.  
The three regression models are not considered here.  They are effectively covered 
under 6.7 above; despite the different methodology, the each model is effectively the 
same as the regression of the same name.  While there are some minor differences in the 
exact p-values and estimates, any discussion of variables would be identical to that 
performed above. 
 
Looking at the other models brings in some new points, although few of them can be 
connected back to the literature.  Most models have multiple listing as the single most 
powerful variable, having the largest standardised estimate.  Sensitive industry 
membership tends to be the second most powerful.   
 
Size is important in almost all of the models and is always a latent variable of five 
measures, which in turn suggests that there is not a single clearly correct answer to 
questions of how to measure this concept.  In addition, this variable is in two models 
allowed as a potential cause of foreign listing, in both cases with significant results 
although the effect is not strong.  Buzby (1975) discussed the possible effects of such a 
link early in the literature, arguing that Singhvi and Desai’s (1971) results could be 
explained if one exists.  However, the limitations of regression mean that it has 
generally been difficult or impossible to confirm such a connection exists outside of 
Grüning’s (2007) work providing some support for the idea. 
 
Many of the findings about the significance and power of individual variables are 
similar to those of the regressions, although differences do occur.  Some are from 
variables not included in the final SEMs, although as a rule this indicates that the 
variable in question was insignificant.  No SEM contains volatility in the final formula, 
in keeping with the literature’s mix of findings on this matter.  The other largely lacking 
variable is debt finance, which appears in only the Agency model but is insignificant 
there.  Again, however, this has had very mixed results in literature and the lack of 
significance here is not surprising. 
 
7.6.1: Conclusions from theory modelling 
This section discusses possible interpretations in terms of the theory models. 
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In terms of the numbers alone, the best fit is on the Agency Theory model with the basic 
data.  It fits well by almost all measures and, uniquely, the chi-square test has an 
acceptable fit for this model.  No other model tested here manages this feat.   
 
However, not all measures favour the model.  First, the Bollen-Stine p-value is 
acceptable, but low.  Second, the PNFI is surprisingly low.  In itself this is not a major 
sign of poor fit, but the model is very simple and the PNFI is designed to penalise 
complex models. 
 
The third and largest problem comes from looking beyond the fit measures.  The model 
tests the power of listing status, financial performance, and debt finance as explanations 
of disclosure.  While listing and performance can be justified in terms of Agency 
Theory, debt finance is the easiest of the three to justify and has the clearest 
implications for the theory.  The fact that it is insignificant in the final analysis indicates 
that Agency Theory is not explaining the disclosure behaviour of this sample.  Looking 
at table 7.18 for standardised coefficients, all that can be said is that listing status is 
reasonably powerful as an explanation of disclosure, but almost all models find listing 
to be important.  The Agency model is the best fit by most measures, but it says little 
about the theory it is intended to analyse. 
 
We turn now to the second-place model for potential explanation of disclosure.  
However, there are a few candidates for this model.  Regression 2 is an immediate 
possibility as it has the next lowest RMSEA, but its B-S p-value indicates a low chance 
that the model is correct and the fit index measures are low. 
 
By RMSEA, the next model to consider is that of Signalling Theory using the basic 
data.  At 0.084, the RMSEA is barely unacceptable (although the default 90% 
confidence interval calculated by AMOS does range below 0.08).  By other measures, 
this model does well.  The indices are both above 0.9, a good sign despite other models 
doing better by these measures.   
 
Analysis so far looks at single models only, taking a single data type into account.  In 
order to identify the best model across all data types, a simple process is used.  Table 
7.35 below lists the ranks of each model by data type. 
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Table 7.35: Theory ranks by data used 
  Agency Legitimacy Signalling 
Base 3 2 1 
Outlier 1 3 2 
Logarithm 3 2 1 
Normal 2 1 3 
Total 9 8 7 
 
The final row of the table above totals the rankings for each model.  The lowest total 
(i.e. most consistently well-fitting) is the Signalling Theory model.  This is expected 
following the analysis of each set of models as Signalling models tend to fit consistently 
well where others are often the best fit by some measures but the worst by others.  
Signalling Theory is hereafter considered the best explanation of disclosure activity of 
the three tested, with Legitimacy a close second.   
 
This conclusion does rely on equally weighting all models.  Any alternatives involving 
unequal weights could easily change this ranking and the resulting conclusions.  
Excluding the unaltered data is a clear option as the other three data sets are all intended 
to clarify the data, but this has a distinct problem.  If this set is removed, all three 
models would have an equal total rank of 6.  The base data set provides a useful 
tiebreaker in this regard. 
 
Depending on how data is manipulated, all three of the theories tested can be 
demonstrated to be the single best explanation of disclosure.   
 
If Signalling theory is the primary explanation of disclosure, this presents challenges 
from a regulatory standpoint.  One of the key aspects of the theory is the need for a cost 
of signals.  If signals are free then every entity competing for attention has no real 
reason to not signal.  Different quality levels should still show, but one of the clear signs 
of a good option in the original theory is the existence of a signal – the entity believed 
that the cost of signalling was low in relation to the potential later gain.  If signals are 
free, this is true in all cases.  Mandatory disclosure is not directly a free signal.  There 
will be costs involved in finding and publishing the information.  However, if 
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mandatory then the disclosure package becomes an inevitable cost of doing business 
instead of a choice the company managers are making.  All companies will disclose to 
some level, meaning that it becomes harder for the true good investments to stand out 
from the crowd.   
 
The situation becomes worse if the underlying explanation is not Signalling, but 
Lemons Theory.  The two are modelled as one theory here due to similarity of 
conditions with regard to disclosure in section 4.7.  While Signalling is assumed to be 
the better explanation, there is a possibility that Lemons is the real theory underlying 
this model.  The implications of a uniformity of disclosure under this theory are a loss 
of quality in the market.   
 
A regulator with the goal of increasing the amount of public information should 
encourage voluntary disclosure instead of increasing mandatory disclosure 
requirements..  This approach retains the decision-making usefulness of costly signals. 
 
Legitimacy Theory is the second most consistent model across all data types.  However, 
much like the Signalling models potentially representing Lemons Theory, these models 
may cover the Political Costs Hypothesis, and the implications change if this is the 
actual explanation. 
 
According to the results of tables 7.10 through 7.17, size and foreign listing are 
significant determinants of disclosure as in the Signalling models, and sensitive industry 
membership is a new significant determinant.  In addition, size has a very strong effect 
on foreign listing.   More importantly, the significance of sensitivity provides strong 
support for the underlying theories.     
 
However, while the modelling overall supports Signalling Theory above other possible 
explanations of disclosure, the main indicator of this theory (performance measures or 
latent variables) often has a low standardised estimate for the scale of its effects on 
disclosure.  Models of this theory fit better than others, but the variables included as the 
main evidence of the theory provide weaker evidence.  Sensitive industry membership, 
the main evidence for Legitimacy Theory, is also consistent and has standardised 
estimates on a similar scale.   
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If Legitimacy holds as an explanation, further regulation would be useful.  The general 
rule is that companies with any serious concerns about their public image will reveal 
information.  On the surface, making higher levels of disclosure mandatory would 
increase the overall level of information in the market and reduce overall information 
asymmetry.  There may even be further-ranging benefits; if potentially controversial 
companies are disclosing to reduce the questions being asked about their actions, 
disclosure may soothe tensions that could otherwise lead to protest, creating a public 
order benefit.  However, there is little regulatory gain from this argument; the 
companies already likely to cause such problems are already disclosing, so higher 
standards of mandatory disclosure would mostly affect less controversial firms. 
 
If the PCH is instead the explanation, the implications change.  This theory holds that, 
from the company’s point of view, mandatory disclosure is to be avoided; companies 
are voluntarily releasing information in the hopes of preventing regulation.  To the 
regulator, this means there is likely to be some information that may help investor 
decisions that companies are not releasing.  The PCH itself therefore suggests that the 
regulator should always assume more information could be released, but any attempts to 
enforce it will be unpopular with companies.  The actual information contained in 
mandatory disclosure may ultimately be of low quality as managers unhappy with the 
regulation still attempt to release little information. 
 
The implications of a Legitimacy model depend heavily on which of the two possible 
theories behind it is actually holding.  Legitimacy suggests regulation may be useful, 
but limited in the overall gain since the companies with most benefit from it are already 
the best at disclosure.  The PCH, by contrast, suggests regulation is likely to bring more 
information to light, but would not be at all popular with the companies affected. 
 
The Agency Theory model using the base data is the best-fitting of those examined in 
the thesis.  This should mean that disclosure is best explained from the starting point of 
companies trying to reduce potential agency costs.  The release of information means 
two things.  First, managers know that their actions are likely to be publicised in some 
manner.  It may simply be that the annual report has a note to the accounts detailing that 
a given area of the company is unusually costly, but at the very least the financial 
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consequences of their actions are published and can be investigated in more detail.  The 
second useful aspect here is that the information is published, allowing it to be viewed 
by many and increasing the chances of any irregularities being noticed.  In addition to 
highlighting possible agency costs, this would also make it easier to detect potential 
fraud within the company provided those collating and publishing the information are 
not pressured to cover it up. 
 
However, this relies on the model being meaningful.  This model came to fit the data 
very well only after being cut down heavily.  Only three explanatory variables remained 
within the model: Debt/Equity ratio, foreign listing, and return on assets.  Of these, 
Debt/Equity is non-significant, having a p-value of close to 1.  This variable is vital to 
Agency Theory; its insignificance implies that the main cause of disclosure is not 
related to agency costs.  This is not an issue in the outlier-removed and logarithmic 
Agency models, both of which contain some form of debt finance variable as a 
significant determinant 
 
There is an Agency explanation in the listing variable.  A company with operations 
outside of its home territory, which is a common reason to list in another location, has 
distant offices that HQ cannot easily oversee.  Agency problems are easy to miss from 
this alone, plus there may be language barriers that enable easier concealment of 
managerial inefficiency.  However, as addressed in section 5.2.2, there is good reason to 
expect multiple listing to lead to improved disclosure without considering any sort of 
monitoring of agency costs.  Any agency reduction effects from this variable are at best 
minor support for the idea of Agency Theory explaining disclosure. 
 
Ultimately, the base data model says only that performance and listing lead to 
disclosure.  This is useful information as dealt with in the previous section, but says 
little about the theory it was designed to model.  The insignificance of debt finance as 
an explanation of disclosure implies that agency cost reduction is largely not connected 
to the decision to disclose information. 
 
If one theory is to be selected as a single explanation of disclosure, it is Signalling.  The 
other theories fit better in some cases but Signalling models are consistently among the 
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best fitting regardless of the form of data used.  This means the primary conclusions to 
be drawn are explained above. 
 
However, all three models contain some validity, and the earlier analysis of theory in 
chapter 4 demonstrates that the three may all coexist and explain disclosure to some 
extent.  There is potentially some explanatory power in all three theories, meaning that 
the all three of the discussions presented earlier in this section may have implications 
for disclosure.    
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7.6.2: Alternative interpretations 
While the models are intended to investigate the specific theories discussed above in 
section 7.6.1, they contain information beyond this.  Where it appears in the model, size 
is almost always a significant and positive determinant of the disclosure measure.  
Similarly, listing status has near-universal positive effects.  These two are consistently 
important.  Membership of a sensitive industry and performance are both frequently 
significant, although the power of performance tends to be lower.  Debt finance and 
volatility can generally be ignored as insignificant in some manner.  Debt finance tends 
to show a statistically significant positive effect on disclosure, but standardised 
estimates demonstrate a near-zero level of influence over the dependent variable.  
Volatility, by contrast, is never statistically significant. 
 
In purely descriptive terms, this suggests that the companies making the best disclosures 
are large multinationals in sensitive industries.  The profitability measure is not so 
clearly important, though does play a part, while the other two are at best arguably 
important.  The two most important variables both have solid arguments behind them.  
Size may encourage disclosure because the company’s scale of operations means the 
central HQ requires collated information, and the company can then disclose that 
information if it sees any advantage in doing so.   
 
Multiple listing leads to the firm having to follow multiple sets of listing rules and may 
cause a form of unintentional disclosure.  The company is likely to make one report 
covering all required information and therefore publish a little bit of extra information 
in each jurisdiction.  The high power of this variable provides evidence against Biddle 
and Saudagaran’s (1989, 1995) ideas.  The paper suggests that companies will select 
their second and subsequent listing locations in order to minimise the added reporting 
requirements.  For the multiple listing measures to be so powerful indicates that this is 
not a concern among companies.  It is possible that attitudes have changed since the two 
papers, the latter of which is nearing two decades old.  Similarly, the sample may make 
a difference.  This research has used only a UK sample, meaning most companies can 
potentially gain access to the large US markets with minimal language barriers.  It may 
be the case that, for the sample used, the ease and gains of US listing outweigh the 
apparent costs of the stricter disclosure requirements.  There is the additional possibility 
that the relationship is reversed; a company which is willing to disclose more 
275 
 
information is more willing to list in multiple locations, not considering the extra 
disclosure requirements to be a problem. 
 
The positive effect from performance results from manager interests; low results lead to 
less detailed information in order to prevent any specific manager(s) being blamed, 
while high performance means the managers can show off their talent with extra 
information.   
 
Sensitivity is harder to explain without reference to Legitimacy Theory or the Political 
Costs Hypothesis.  Sensitivity leading to disclosure suggests that potentially volatile 
public opinion can be settled with the release of information, which is exactly what 
Legitimacy theory predicts.  However, reputation concerns beyond legitimate behaviour 
may provide an explanation.  All companies need to maintain a good reputation in order 
to keep a steady flow of customers and the income they bring.  If the firm deals with the 
general public, giving information out publicly may be a means to this end.  Taking the 
argument further, there may be a reputation risk to the company and this has cost of 
capital implications.  From an investor’s point of view, any damage to the firm’s 
reputation will harm its ability to generate returns, adding a risk to the investment.  This 
is factored in to the investor’s calculations by requiring a reputation risk premium on 
any investment made in the company, similar to Lang and Lundholm’s (1996) 
information risk premium.  Disclosure to the general public may indirectly reduce this 
by stabilising the company’s reputation in the overall market. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
There are four sections to this chapter.  Section 8.1 discusses and summarises the 
answers to the research questions set out in chapter 1.  Section 8.2 covers the meaning 
of the outcomes for disclosure.  Section 8.3 discusses the identified limitations of the 
research, and section 8.4 discusses possible future research based on the ideas contained 
in this project. 
 
8.1: Summary of Findings 
Three main aspects of contribution were explained in chapter 1.  There were the 
triangulation of results using another method, the ability to model theory more directly 
than regression, and a possible improvement in model fit from the inclusion of causal 
links among explanatory variables.  The theory modelling aspect is explained in section 
8.2 below, while triangulation is covered in this section. 
 
The results of the models presented here largely help to confirm previous findings.  
Most models find a large effect on disclosure from the company’s listing status and size, 
as is consistent in other papers.  This supports the idea that Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
and following papers have correctly identified the two major causes of disclosure.  
Further triangulation of results using additional samples of different methods would still 
be useful. 
 
The use of SEM gave the possibility of allowing explanatory variables to be linked 
together, often with causal links between some where there is reason to expect such 
effects.  As discussed in chapter 1, the intention behind this was both to better model 
theory and to improve model fit by including effects not previously considered.  If the 
fit of the models was an improvement over regression models then the low fits observed 
in literature may be explained by the models not capturing all effects of the variables 
included. 
 
In this regard, results were mixed.  SEM fits are not directly comparable to regression 
fits due to the lack of any single measure of fit in SEM, as discussed in chapter 5.  
However, regression models have been rebuilt as structural models in chapter 6, giving 
some measures of fit for structural models that assume explanatory variable 
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independence.  The models in chapter 7 do allow such connections between explanatory 
variables and offer improvements in fit over the models with independence among 
explanatory variables.  This therefore suggests that the relaxation of the variable 
independence assumption does improve model fit, but it is difficult to translate the 
range of SEM fit numbers into an R
2
 figure for direct comparison of the improvement.   
 
While this appears to suggest that variable independence is causing problems for 
regression models of disclosure, the fits of the structural models were rarely in the range 
where they would be considered clearly well-fitting.  This suggests that the models are 
still missing some important determinants of disclosure.  Allowing explanatory 
variables to be correlated has helped with the fit and therefore improved upon the usual 
models of disclosure, but it is not the only cause of poor fit in literature to date. 
 
In addition to the contributions to literature, three research questions were set out in the 
introduction and are directly answered here. 
 
RQ1: What combination of company characteristics drives corporate disclosure? 
The models tested in chapters 6 and 7 are in broad agreement on this question.  The 
results of testing each variable are described here. 
 
The most powerful determinant of disclosure in the models tested here is multiple 
listing.  This variable is measured as the total number of countries in which a company 
is listed in most models, although one model, Regression 2 (detailed in section 6.2.2) 
uses an alternative measurement that uses US listing alone as a dummy variable.  While 
the structural models could in principle use both measures, the use of both created 
problems likely due to the inherent overlap; total foreign listing includes US listing.   
 
In all cases, a measure of foreign listing is included in the model and found to have a 
significant and positive effect on disclosure.  Further, comparing the standardised 
estimates of the significant variables, the estimate for foreign listing is invariably the 
largest.  In the regressions its highest value is 0.350 (regression 3, table 6.3), while the 
highest value any other variable reaches is 0.257 (revenue, a measure of size, in 
regression 2, table 6.2).  In the structural models, the lowest estimate for total foreign 
listing is 0.368 (Signalling model, Table 7.10), while the highest estimate for any other 
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variable in the SEMs is 0.159 (for performance in the same model).  In the one model 
that uses US listing as a measurement instead (regression 2, table 6.2), the standardised 
estimate is much lower at 0.150.  The total foreign listings of a company are an 
important determinant of disclosure practices. 
 
Almost all models find the size of a company, by whichever measure or combination of 
measures is used, to have a significant and positive effect on disclosure.  Although not 
as powerful as foreign listing, this variable has a long history of positive effects in 
existing literature.  The reasons why size should influence disclosure in this way are 
well-established, which may create a cyclical effect.  The sound reasoning and history 
of results encourage researchers to use the variable, and common use means new 
possible explanations are theorised, tested, and accepted.    
 
The sole exception found is the model for Agency Theory with the base data, pictured 
in Figure 7.12, which lacks any size variable.  The initial version of this model (figure 
7.11) did not directly connect size to disclosure, arguing that size effects under the 
theory would be better represented as influences on other variables rather than direct 
effects.  However, even if the connection is made, little changes – if included, the size 
effect on disclosure has a p-value of 0.516, indicating a highly insignificant variable.  
Had it been included, the model refinement process would have deleted the connection 
immediately, resulting in the model that was analysed in chapter 7.  This makes the 
model very unusual; with size being significant in all other models, and a majority of 
the existing literature, the lack of effect found here is a strong contrast to others. 
 
Financial performance has quite consistent results here despite varied findings in 
literature.  Where included it consistently has a significant and positive effect on 
disclosure unless logarithmic data is used, in which cases the effect is negative.  The 
size of the effect is less consistent, being dependent on exactly how the variable is 
measured, as observable from the varied standardised estimates.  Table 6.1 uses return 
on assets and estimates 0.162, table 6.2 uses earnings margin for an insignificant and 
small estimate, while 6.3 uses profit/size and estimates 0.066.  In the structural models, 
similar estimates are obtained depending on what is included in the model.  The 
exploratory model’s final iteration uses only profit/size, obtaining an estimate of 0.067, 
similar to that of table 6.3.  The Signalling model detailed in table 7.10 uses a 
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combination of profit/size and return on assets and obtains a standardised estimate of 
0.159 for the effect of performance on disclosure, which is similar to the return on 
assets estimate in table 6.1 and suggests that this variable is dominating the performance 
latent. 
 
Debt finance, like financial performance, has a significant and positive effect in most 
cases where it is included.  This variable is an important part of Agency Theory 
explanations of disclosure in the thesis, but was insignificant in two of the four Agency 
models. 
 
Sensitive industry membership is found to have a consistently significant effect on 
disclosure.  Where included, the variable’s effect is small, with a standardised estimate 
below 0.1 in almost all cases.   
 
Volatility never has a significant effect.  It was not included in some of the theory 
models as no direct effect explained by the theory was identified.  Where it is included 
in a model, it is never significant at the 5% level.  Using the less rigorous 10% level 
would offer it significance in some cases, e.g. p=0.095 in regression 2.  However, 
examination of the standardised estimates in each table demonstrates that the volatility 
effect is miniscule. 
 
In answer to the research question, then, multiple listing status is the most important 
determinant of disclosure, followed closely by the size of the company.  Sensitive 
industry membership has a weaker but consistent effect.  Other variables are less 
powerful; financial performance generally indicates better disclosure, although this is 
highly variable based on how the idea is measured, while debt and volatility are 
generally insignificant.   
 
RQ2: Which theory or combination of theories best explains disclosure? 
 
Section 4.7 demonstrates that all of the theories examined here are able to coexist, 
meaning that each can hold explanatory power over the question of what drives 
disclosure.  A combination of theories is therefore a possible outcome.  Lemons and 
Signalling Theory, after analysis, were considered identical in terms of their effects on 
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disclosure, while Legitimacy and the Political Costs Hypothesis were identical in terms 
of the models.  Differences are identifiable in the two, but the models make it 
impossible to distinguish between the two.  The comparison then leaves three 
distinguishable theories: Signalling, Agency, and Legitimacy. 
 
The two methods used result in some disagreement over which theories offer the best 
explanation of disclosure.  The regressions support all three of Signalling, Agency, and 
Legitimacy to some extent.  The consistent significance of sensitive industry 
membership implies strong support for Legitimacy above the others.  By contrast, this 
theory is the second most consistently supported when directly modelled with a SEM 
approach.   
 
The overall best fitting models across all data types are those for Signalling theory, 
which include several of the best-fitting structural equation models tested.  It is the best 
supported of the three theories under SEM. 
 
RQ3: Does the use of SEM offer any benefit over regression analysis for the research 
questions above? 
 
When regression models are remade in SEM form, the results are almost identical and 
most discrepancies are very small, often at the third decimal place.  While direct 
comparison is not possible, the two model types obtain near-identical results in the same 
circumstances. 
 
As described above, regression and SEM have different results in terms of the preferred 
theories.  However, the regression models are used to reach a conclusion by examining 
the implications of which variables are significant and which are powerful.  By contrast, 
the use of SEM enabled the direct modelling of each theory.  This method is preferred 
as it better captures the nature of each theory.  SEM, then, has benefits over regression 
that justify its greater complexity. 
 
However, fit values remain low.  As discussed in section 3.6, R
2
 values for regressions 
in the wider literature are often low and suggest that further variables are required for a 
full explanation of disclosure behaviour.  The use of SEM does not provide a 
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comparable fit measure, making direct comparison difficult, but the common finding in 
the models used here is that the fit is lacking in some way.  Allowing correlations 
among explanatory variables has changed the interpretation of some common variables, 
but has not been demonstrated to improve the model fit to acceptable levels. 
 
When directly comparing the methods by rebuilding regression models in SEM form, an 
important difference was noted.  Although the two techniques demonstrate similar 
estimates, transformation of data reveals an important difference.  Fit values for 
regressions are sensitive to the data type used, with the logarithmic and normal score 
data having large improvements to R
2
 values that clearly demonstrate an improved fit 
when using these alternatives.  This was not the case for SEM, which tends to have 
relatively invariant fit values across data types.  At least for the data used here, 
regression techniques show that a transformation of the data may help to explain 
variance in disclosure, giving it an advantage over SEM in this regard. 
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8.2: The outcomes in context 
This section asks what the results above mean for disclosure and companies. 
 
Most models have consistently shown that the most disclosure is coming from large, 
multiple listed firms with strong recent performance.  From a regulatory view, any 
attempts to mandate further disclosures must therefore be targeted towards the opposite 
– smaller, localised companies, often with weaker performance.  Some of the reasons 
these variables are included indicate that any targeting of these companies would be 
problematic, however.  Larger companies are more likely to have the resources 
necessary to disclose at all, plus an economy of scale is likely to exist and favour larger 
firms in disclosure.  Multiple listing tends to mean foreign operations and therefore a 
need to gather and collate information for internal control reasons, which can be 
disclosed at a lower marginal cost.  High profitability ratios suggest the firm has some 
extra resources available in the immediate term.  In each case, firms that have lower 
measures of each have either less need to ready the information internally or be less able 
to afford any costs involved in gathering it.  Such targeting is unlikely to be popular 
among companies as it places relatively greater burden on smaller businesses. 
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8.3: Limitations 
There are a number of limitations in the research performed. 
 
Disclosure as a concept is difficult to measure.  There is the question of whether to 
measure quality or quantity of disclosure which complicates the matter further, but even 
using only quantity measurements raises challenges.  One of the common approaches, 
as discussed in chapter 5, is to create an index of disclosures and score companies based 
on how many of them are included.  However, a variation on this approach allows for 
finer measurement, such as allowing one point if an item is included and another if it is 
discussed thoroughly.  Further, there is some researcher judgement required as to 
whether an item is included sufficiently in order to qualify for a point on the index or 
not. 
 
The use of a proxy measure in any context will cause problems.  By nature, a proxy is 
related to the item of interest but is not a direct measurement of the item.  It is therefore 
possible for a proxy to vary for reasons unrelated to the underlying item.  The use of 
analyst following as a proxy for disclosure is not an exception.  It is correlated with 
disclosure quantity, an important quality in a proxy.  Further, it is often used in the 
index-based approaches described in section 5.2.7; the first step in forming an index is 
to decide what to include, which often involves surveys of what information is useful to 
people using the company’s information, a survey usually directed towards those using 
such information in a professional capacity to examine the company, i.e. analysts.  Even 
where external disclosure ratings for companies are used, such as the AIMR rankings, 
these are commonly formed with analyst consultation. 
 
However, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that analysts are driven by market forces.  
This is central to the argument for the proxy; analysts tend to follow those companies 
that release enough information to be easy to follow, minimising the analysts’ own 
information-gathering time.  However, the same market forces may cause analysts to 
follow companies for other reasons.  Once the analyst has finished analysis of a 
company, the resulting information can be sold to many customers without depleting 
any stock the analyst has, by the nature of the economics of information.  This means 
there is potentially great profit to the analyst in following a company popular with the 
analyst’s customers even if its disclosures are minimal and require much of the analyst’s 
284 
 
time to process.  Similarly, a company with little information demand is unlikely to be 
profitable to follow even if its disclosures are thorough.  In addition, there is no 
guarantee that detailed disclosures that would score highly on an index measure 
translate to ease of analysis; by making more information available, the company may 
become difficult to analyse through the sheer quantity of information or even obscure 
relevant information among unnecessary details. 
 
In terms of the results obtained, regression and SEM support different theories.  
Regression suggests a Legitimacy Theory explanation for disclosure above the others 
examined.  The Legitimacy model is the worst fitting of the structural models, which 
suggest Signalling Theory is the most accurate.  While there is some disagreement in 
this matter despite the two methods demonstrating compatibility in chapter 6, it is not 
problematic.  SEM has provided the ability to model theories directly rather than 
identifying which theories best represent the results of a less flexible regression model.  
However, there may be alternative modelling approaches available that would provide 
more useful modelling ability.  SEM was identified from a few appearances in 
accounting and finance journals and is not a method in widespread use in the discipline.  
Most of the information on SEM used in the project has come from marketing and 
psychology journals, disciplines that have been using the method for decades.  
Alternative approaches may be available under similar circumstances, common in 
another discipline not considered here but largely unknown in accounting and finance.   
 
The theories examined here represent a limited range of the possible explanations for 
voluntary disclosure.  Each was selected because it has appeared repeatedly in literature 
as a possible explanation, but also because each is a long-standing theory in accounting 
or finance.  Each one has broad implications beyond any phenomena or behaviour for 
which they were originally formed.  However, other explanations have been advanced 
to explain disclosure, often forming new theories for the specific purpose of explaining 
disclosure.  In some cases, the implications of these disclosure-specific theories may be 
contained within the broad ones studied.  As an example, one idea holds that disclosure 
increases the information available about the company and reduces the risks of 
something completely unknown to investors causing harm, which in turn reduces an 
information risk premium investors demand in their expected returns.  By disclosing, 
then, the company’s cost of capital is reduced.  This theoretical idea may be explained 
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through the broader Signalling Theory, however; the company obtains a benefit in the 
market by showing more information to investors.  While the theories studied will cover 
many of these more specific explanations, there may be some that do not neatly fit with 
a broad theory.  Further, narrowing the focus onto these more specific explanations may 
change the models and potentially reveal further insights into when disclosure occurs. 
 
In addition, chapter 4 introduced five theories, but chapter 7 modelled only three.  
Lemons and Signalling were considered identical in terms of disclosure and there is 
little that can be done to change this; they make the same predictions due to conceptual 
overlap.  By contrast, Legitimacy and the PCH were given a common model as much 
because of similar conditions as the practical matter of the models being identical.  The 
problem lies in the selection of variables in the project; alternatives, or the addition of 
other variables, may make a difference detectable. 
 
The form of data used may influence the results.  The single best fit across all models is 
the Agency Theory model using the unaltered data set, but as discussed in section 7.4.1, 
this model uses few variables and provides little information on any theory.  The next 
model considered is the Signalling Theory model using the unaltered data, and the third 
is Legitimacy Theory again using the same data.   
 
If the unaltered data is removed from consideration, however, the conclusion is less 
clear.  The three best-fitting models are all removed with the data, making the remaining 
models weaker on average.  Further, in Table 7.35, the removal of the first row of data 
would lead to all three theories having a total rank of 6, making it impossible to identify 
a most convincing explanation of disclosure through this method.   
 
Looking at the fit values in tables 7.1 or 7.34 and excluding rows labelled “base” offers 
a different means to identify a best-fitting model while excluding the unaltered data.  
The lowest RMSEA is 0.084 on the logarithmic Signalling model, putting this near to 
the required maximum of 0.08.  Further, this has the lowest 2/DF ratio, further 
suggesting it is the best fit (with the ratio value of 11.170, this is indicative of best fit 
relative to other tested models and not good fit in absolute terms).  The closest 
competitors is the logarithmic Agency model, which has slightly worse values for most 
measures but does fit well according to the B-S p-value.  Beyond this, the next best fit 
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comes from the logarithmic Legitimacy model, which has marginally better fit index 
values than the logarithmic Signalling model but is worse on other values.  This 
indicates that the logarithmic data provides the best fit outside of the unaltered data, and 
both of these data sets rank the theory models the same way.   
 
The conclusion that Signalling Theory best explains disclosure (at least in this sample) 
is based on Signalling models being consistently good, if not always the best, fits 
among the models tested.  With a convincing reason to use a specific form of data for 
this testing, this conclusion could easily be changed.   
 
The final limitation considered here is a broad methodological one.  To summarise, is 
this question best studied by large sample statistical methods? While a quantitative 
approach produces generalizable results, there is merit in a qualitative approach of 
asking financial managers or members of the board of directors about their disclosure 
practices.  The research performed supports the idea that disclosure is intended to signal 
the company’s best points and stand out against competition for finance, but cannot 
explain what series of decisions were involved.  Another question remains unanswered: 
What effect are managers intending to achieve with their disclosure practices? 
 
Despite the number of quantitative papers in voluntary disclosure research, qualitative 
methods have value in the area.  As an example, Armitage and Marston’s (2008) series 
of interviews “makes it clearer what [financial directors] are saying about the purpose of 
disclosure” (p332), providing a useful alternative means of examining why voluntary 
disclosure occurs.  Although not employed in this thesis, the value of qualitative 
research for determining the reasons for voluntary disclosure is recognised. 
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8.4: Further research opportunities 
Two research opportunities come from considering alternatives.  A UK-based sample 
was used due to researcher familiarity with the sample.  However, this limits the 
conclusions drawn to the UK.  Even assuming this does generalise to countries with 
similar accounting systems, the Anglo-American accounting system is based on 
shareholders as a source of finance instead of institutional investors in the system used 
throughout Continental Europe.  The first research opportunity is to use the same 
method with a sample drawn from another country to determine which theories of 
disclosure best explain observed disclosure practices elsewhere in the world.  Some 
literature (e.g. Zarzeski 1996, Adams et al 1998) uses samples drawn from multiple 
countries to compare different national practices in one paper.  A similar approach 
would be possible, but a limit of SEM becomes relevant.  SEM cannot easily deal with 
large numbers of dummy variables in the same way as regression.  A comparative study 
with many countries, such as Archambault and Archambault’s (2003) comparison 
across 33 nations, would be more challenging to perform using SEM compared to 
regression. 
 
The second opportunity is to limit the sample rather than expand on it.  For this project, 
a large sample was selected to ensure statistical power when using an unusual 
methodology, but SEM does not require a sample as large as that used here.  During the 
course of the project, a pilot study was performed on a sample drawn from the FTSE 
350.  This pilot study had further data requirements compared to the final study and 
availability limited the sample to 289 companies without problem.  The results of the 
pilot study are not detailed here, and they are not comparable to the full results due to 
the pilot being used to refine the approach and different data being used.  It is 
mentioned only to highlight a directly comparable example in which the sample was 
limited in some way being used with the same methods.  Patten’s (1992) paper is a good 
example of this idea as not only is it restricted to the oil industry, it mostly focuses on a 
few companies in the industry.  While the pilot study example would show what occurs 
among only larger UK quoted companies, other possible limits are readily available. 
 
Additional opportunities for further study emerge from some of the limitations above.  
One of the limits is that only five theories of disclosure were selected for study.  As 
discussed above, many other explanations have been advanced over time.  While this 
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project involved only broad theories that explain various observations in accounting and 
finance that include disclosure, the disclosure-specific explanations also need analysis.  
While this has been performed in other literature, the SEM approach used here enables 
modelling the implications of each explanation directly.   
 
From the third limitation, there are other explanations of disclosure available.  It may be 
worth examining these in the same manner, testing them in comparison to theories.  The 
theory comparison phase would be a potential challenge as these are not generally 
formalised theories in the same way as those tested here and therefore are less clearly 
defined (and definable) in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
 
Further, the use of one model for both Legitimacy Theory and the PCH was, as 
mentioned above and in Chapter 4, due to the differences between the models being 
indistinguishable using the set of variables involved in the project.  This gives impetus 
to the idea of using a different set of measurements or adding additional variables.  Even 
without this issue, the use of additional variables may offer further information on what 
drives disclosure.  The main challenge involved is identifying suitable variables, as 
results in literature tend to be mixed for many possibilities. 
 
The final limitation listed in section 8.3, the question of what a qualitative approach 
may bring to the research question of what drives disclosure, suggests a completely 
different form of research into the same area.  Obtaining information on disclosure 
intentions is likely to involve qualitative methods, such as Armitage and Marston’s 
(2008) interviews with financial managers, although a large-scale survey of those 
making the decisions of what is disclosed may be possible.  However viewpoints are 
gathered, it may be useful to compare the results of this hypothetical research to those of 
the common quantitative literature to determine whether stated intentions match what 
modelling methods are showing and investigate any discrepancies.  An understanding of 
how disclosure decisions are made may provide further variables to include in models 
informed by the process of gathering views. 
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